in 1790, it was clear law in the United States that it could not be punished. Many cases, also, and solemn judgments are cited by that learned judge to show that the strictest possible reading, excluding all arbitrary and constructive interpretations, has on several remarkable occasions been put by the judges of the supreme court on the definition copied from the English statute book. The leaders of your revolution, on the contrary, although the difficulty was distinctly pointed out to them in the Chamber of Deputies, and again more urgently in the report read by M. de Bastard to the Chamber of Peers, persist in the prosecution of the ministers of Charles the Tenth for treason; and, without laws which define the crime or enact the punishment for it, extort against their political opponents a sentence of perpetual imprisonment and of civil death.

It were idle to tell me that by the constitution of the United States, the ministers might be impeached for other crimes and misdemeanours besides treason, whereas the ministers of Charles the Tenth could only be impeached for treason. First prove that there was any necessity for impeaching them at all; next, if that argument were admissible, it would not help the leaders of the revolution of July, unless they could show that they had refused to enforce a more severe punishment than removal and disqualification from office; but the argument of expedience and convenience is no more deserving of attention than an excuse of political enmity and party resentment; they are, in fact, one and the same thing, and when reduced to their simplest expression, mean nothing more or less than Mr. St. John meant when he said, "We allow law to hares and deer, but it never was accounted foul play to knock foxes and wolves on the head.” Besides, I am not aware, though of course I speak with diffidence on the subject, that there would have been any difficulty in trying the Prince de Polignac and his colleagues before the Chamber of Peers *, for all the crimes defined, with appropriate punish

* I do not mean by impeachment.

ments enacted for each, by the articles of the Penal Code, from 75 to 108 inclusively-articles which reach all, and something more, than all the high treasons punishable by the laws of the United States, or within the statute of Edward and that of George the Third except this, that they had not been guilty of them. That, however, would have been a question for MM. de Bastard, Pasquier, de Pontécoulant, and Séguier, to report upon to the Chamber of Peers; and I cannot understand how any greater obstacles could have occurred to their lordships, than those which they have already had the candour to acknowledge, and the courage to surmount.

4thly. I have undertaken to show that, before the ordinances were thought of by the accused Ministers, and since their signature, there had existed grave and authoritative opinions, that in point of law the King of France had, by the Charter, reserved to himself, for cases of emergency, the power which, by the ordinances, he assumed to exercise.

Louis XVIII., although willing to extend to his subjects the blessings of a constitutional government, and to acknowledge that their wish to live under free institutions had its origin in a rational desire for political improvement, was yet determined to treat all that passed in his absence as usurpation, and not to bate, except of his own free will and pleasure, one jot of the indefeasible prerogative of that absolute power, which Louis XIV., in the zenith of his pride, had been accustomed to assert. Perhaps he was in some degree stung into this unbending spirit by the slur thrown upon his title by the Allies when they entertained, as Mr. Canning afterwards reminded the Vicomte de Châteaubriand, the possible expediency of placing a Prince, not a Bourbon, on the throne of France *. However that may have been, he prefaced the Charter, which gave a liberal Constitution to his Kingdom, with as stern and stubborn an assertion of his

* State Paper (1822) addressed by Mr. Canning, as Foreign Secretary, to the Ambassador of France or the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Divine Right and Despotic Power as the Tudor or the Stuart had ever ventured to propound.

"Divine Providence (said he) in recalling me after a long absence to my States, has imposed upon me great obligations. A constitutional Charter being rendered requisite by the actual condition of the Kingdom, I have promised, and hereby publish it. I have considered that, although the Supreme Power of France belongs wholly and entirely to the person of the King, yet that my predecessors have not hesitated to accommodate the exercise of it to the varying circumstances of the times. Thus the Communes owed their enfranchisement to Louis le Gros; the confirmation and extension of their rights to Saint Louis and Philippe le Bel. Our juridical system was established by the laws of Louis XI., of Henry II., and of Charles IX.; and, finally, Louis XIV. reformed almost every branch of the Public Administration by various Ordinances, the wisdom of which has never been surpassed *. I have not failed, after the example of the kings, my predecessors, to appreciate the effects of the increasing progress of knowledge, the relations which that progress has introduced into society, the new direction which the minds of men have taken during the last half century, and the grave alterations which have been the result. I am satisfied that the desire evinced by my subjects for a Constitutional Charter is the expression of a real want. I have taken all necessary precautions to make that Charter worthy of me and of the People over whom I am proud to reign. Sage men selected from the highest bodies of the state have been associated with members of my council to prepare this important work. While I acknowledge that a free Constitution was necessary to fulfil the expectations of enlightened Europe, I could not forget that my first duty to my People was to preserve, for their sake, the Rights and Prerogatives of my Crown. I trust that experience will convince them that supreme authority can alone communicate to the institutions which it establishes, the strength, the stability, and the majesty which belongs to itself; and that when

* The code civil, enacted by the Ordonnance of April, 1677; the code criminal, enacted by the Ordonnance of August, 1670; the code marchand, enacted by the Ordonnance of March, 1673; the code of maritime jurisprudence, enacted by the Ordonnance of August, 1681, would, if there were no others, well justify this panegyric. On the last-mentioned Ordonnance see the opinion of the late Lord Chief Justice of England, Lord Tenterden, in the preface to his work on the law of merchant shipping.

the wisdom of Kings comes into a free accordance with the desires of their People a long duration may be secured to a Constitutional Charter, but that when concessions are extorted by violence from the weakness of Government, Public Liberty and the Throne are equally endangered *, &c."

“For these causes I have voluntarily, and by the free exercise of my royal authority granted, and do hereby grant, make concession, and Octroi, for myself and my successors for ever, of the following Constitutional Charter.”

It cannot be denied that this constitutional charter granted with such solemn reservations of the inherent right of his absolute authority, was not founded on the recognition of any principle approximating to those of the Revolution, which placed the House of Hanover on the throne of these realms. Indeed, I know not whether the Revolution of July be not more clearly justifiable on the assumption, that the Constitutional Charter of 1814 did expressly reserve to the King of France, the absolute power of making ordinances and dispensing with laws-than on the postulate that his power so to do had been restrained. If Locke, or Lord Somers, or Algernon Sidney, or Sir John Holland, or Mr. Fox, men not at all likely to abet "humoursome factious arms," could have been asked by the Abbé de Montesquieu their opinion on the point, they would have told him that the single word, "Octroi," because of its impugning the principle, that all power is from the people, was pregnant with, and of itself justified, resistance. The leaders of your liberal party, then, or soon after, represented by Lafayette, Benjamin Constant, Casimir Périer, Manuel, Foy, Lafitte, all received and swore to defend the charte so octroyée with more or less alacrity, and it continued their rallying cry, even to the Vos plaudite of what has since been indiscreetly called the "comédie de quinze ans†." I do not pretend to

. I do not insert the remainder here, which consists principally of the promise of Louis XVIII. to observe the Constitutional Charter; but I desire to point attention to the omission, because M. Béranger founds an argument upon it.

+I do not know, or forget, who first used this expression. It is claimed, I imagine, by none of the leaders of the revolution.

justify, on the contrary, if I could venture to give an opinion, I should blame the tone of despotic liberality, which pervades every line of the Charter; and which, according to my English notions of the matter, would have excused, if not justified, resistance. It was well remarked by Monsieur Béranger *, the ablest of the managers of the impeachment, that the affections, the manners, the interests, the population, of France, had in the interval between the first flight and the return of the Bourbons totally changed. A new generation had grown up, and all that part of the nation, whom the restoration found in the prime and vigour of active life, knew nothing, but from historical sources of the family of their ancient kings. The recollection of them that lingered in the memories of older men, had gradually become faint, and so many great events, and so much glory had been crowded into the more modern annals of the country, that little sympathy remained for its ancient splendour. I cannot agree with Monsieur Béranger, that Louis XVIII. rested his title to the allegiance of the French people on the Constitutional Charter. I think the view of M. Sauzett, the defender of Monsieur de

* Procès des Ministres, vol. iii. p. 209.

+Procès des Ministres, vol. iii. p. 161. Les haines ne sont pas éternelles en France, pas de nation plus oublieuse et plus magnanime. Bientôt les hommes placés dans les situations élevées firent concevoir, par des rapprochemens matériels, qu'il pouvait exister une mutuelle estime. Les uns étaient venus au Roi par la Charte et les autres à la Charte par le Roi. Tous désiraient réaliser le problème de la réunion de la Dynastie et des libertés publiques. Mais il faut le dire aussi avec une conviction profonde, ces efforts étaient impuissans. Les necessités de situations, les oppositions d'intérêts, les froissemens d'amour propre, plus mortels encore en France que les oppositions d'intérêts triompherent bientôt de cet accord passager, et laissèrent bientôt après éclater la plaie avec plus de violence. Aussi pendant ce long intervalle d'années, sans accuser l'opposition parlémentaire, quel spectacle a presenté la France! La plupart des chefs de l'opposition parlementaire, de ceux qui même dont le cœur n'était pas à la Dynastie, lui vouèrent leur fidelité, et s'ils ne purent imposer l'affection à leurs sentimens ils imposèrent du moins l'obeissance à leur conscience. Mais malgré la fidélité du serment et l'amour des souvenirs qui se rétracent toujours, disons le avec courage pour louer une restauration qui n'est plus dans ce qu'elle eut d'honorable pour le pays, elle a beaucoup fait pour se concilier la France.