qualifications of the soldier in the matter of an application under section 2306. Separate and distinct classes are contemplated in sections 2305 and 2306, namely, those honorably discharged on account of wounds received or disability incurred in the line of duty, and who are to be credited with the term of their enlistment in the matter of residence, regardless of the length of service, and those honorably discharged after an actual service of ninety days. While a soldier who made entry under the homestead law for less than 160 acres would be entitled to the provisions of section 2305, he would not be entitled to the provisions of section 2306, unless he had served ninety days. The latter privilege is only conferred upon the soldier who, in the express language of the law, served for ninety days, and is in no way dependent upon the completion of the original entry. It is likewise contended that the sections of the Revised Statutes in question should be construed as in pari materia with the general system of homestead laws. That there is a well defined distinction between the right of homestead entry conferred by section 2289 of the Revised Statutes, and the additional right conferred upon certain soldiers by section 2306, is clearly set forth in the case of Webster . Luther (163 U. S., 331). The language employed in section 2306, as well as that in section 2304, is plain and unambiguous. It is therefore not open to interpretation. Whatever construction might possibly be placed upon the original act of June 8, 1872, supra, said act is, by the express language of the repealing clause, section 5596 of the Revised Statutes, no longer in force. Resort may therefore be had to said act to interpret the sections in question only in case of some doubt as to the language employed therein. As was said in the case of United States v. Bowen (100 U. S., 508, 513), which possesses some similarity to this one: Where there is a substantial doubt as to the meaning of the language used in the revision, the old law is a valuable source of information. The Revised Statutes must be treated as the legislative declaration of the statute law on the subjects which they embrace on the first day of December, 1873. When the meaning is plain, the courts cannot look to the statutes which have been revised to see if Congress erred in that revision, but may do so when necessary to construe doubtful language used in expressing the meaning of Congress. The motion for review is hereby denied. SECOND HOMESTEAD-SOLDIERS' ADDITIONAL. EDGAR A. COFFIN. One entitled under section 2 of the act of March 2, 1889, to make a second homestead entry for 160 acres, does not, by an entry under said act for a less area, affect his right to make a soldiers' additional homestead entry under section 2306, Revised Statutes, where the aggregate of both entries does not exceed such quantity. Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, (W. V. D.) October 25, 1902. (J. R. W.) Edgar A. Coffin appealed from your office decision of April 22, 1902, rejecting his application under section 2306 of the Revised Statutes, as assignee of David L. Cowan, to enter lots 4 and 9, sec. 18, and NE. NE. 4, sec. 8, T. 151 N., R. 25 W., 5th P. M., 79.66 acres, Duluth, Minnesota. Cowan is shown by the War Department records to have rendered the requisite military service and made homestead entry, at Springfield, Missouri, for the S.NE. 4, Sec. 14, T. 22 N., R. 31 W., 80 acres, canceled on relinquishment February 15, 1873, and November 3, 1892, he made a second entry under section 2 of the act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 854), for the S. NE. 4, Sec. 24, T. 22 N., R. 31 W., Springfield, Missouri. Your office decision held that "his additional right under Sec. 2306, R. S., was exhausted by his making the last-mentioned entry. His application is therefore rejected." The right given by section 2306 of the Revised Statutes is defined by the court, in Webster v. Luther (163 U. S., 331, 340), to be "a compensation for the person's failure to get the full quota of one hundred and sixty acres by his first homestead entry," and (ib., 341) “in the nature of compensation for past services," and it was held by the court that "It vested a property right in the donee." On the other hand, the right given by the act of March 2, 1889, supra, is the offer of land to the landless, as "public policy requires the peopling of the vacant public lands." (Ib., 340.) There is, therefore, nothing inconsistent between the two rights, as they have different purposes and proceed from different motives impelling legislative action. But for an apparent general intent of the homestead laws, as a whole, to limit the amount that may be acquired thereby to a total of 160 acres, or one quarter section, the two rights, under both acts, might consistently be exercised to the full extent. Cowan having two distinct rights, limited, however, to an aggregate of 160 acres, might elect to make entry under the act of March 2, 1889, for 80 acres only, and retain his military right for the residue. This is what he did. He might have taken full 160 acres under the act of March 2, 1889, and have waived his military additional right. But, if the military right was the more valuable, it was an unfettered property right, which he might retain or sell, and take 80 acres, as he did, under the later act. The object of that act is thereby secured; neither act is violated in spirit; and he is within the letter of both. Your office decision is reversed. RAILROAD GRANT-WITHDRAWAL-LANDS EXCEPTED. NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY. Lands included in the withdrawal upon the map of general route of the Lake Superior and Mississippi Railroad at the date of the passage of the act making the grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company were not "public lands," and for that reason were excepted from the Northern Pacific grant. Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, (W. V. D.) October 27, 1902. (F. W. C.) The Department has considered the appeal by the Northern Pacific Railway Company from your decision of August 6, 1901, wherein your office decision of September 20, 1900, holding that the conflicting claims to the SW. of Sec. 3, T. 51 N., R. 14 W., Duluth land district, Minnesota, were subject to adjustment under the provisions of the act of July 1, 1898 (30 Stat., 597, 620), was recalled and set aside and the claim of said company to said tract under its grant made by the act of July 2, 1864 (13 Stat., 365) was rejected. The tract in question has the same status as that involved in the case of the Northern Pacific Railway Company considered in departmental decision of July 16, 1901 (31 L. D., 32), wherein it was held that the reservation of land on account of the grant made by the act of May 5. 1864 (13 Stat., 64), upon the map of general route of the Lake Superior and Mississippi railroad, existing at the date of the passage of the act making the grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, was sufficient to except the same from the Northern Pacific grant without regard to whether said land, upon the definite location of the Lake Shore and Mississippi railroad, fell within the limits prescribed in the act making the grant for the last-mentioned railroad. It is now urged that there was no claim of a vested right in the Lake Superior and Mississippi Railroad Company at the time of the withdrawal on its map of general route; that the United States was under no obligation to make a withdrawal under its grant until the definite location of the road (indeed, the authority to make such withdrawal is questioned); and that it is inequitable to hold, in the case of conflicting grants, that there is any exception on account of the prior grant beyond the lands to which a right actually attaches under such prior grant. It is not questioned that Congress could have granted to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company lands which at the date of that grant were in a state of withdrawal or reservation based solely upon the filing of the map designating the general route of the Lake Superior and Mississippi railroad, and indicating that the lands withdrawn would probably be required to satisfy the grant in aid of the construction of that road; but the real question in this case is not what Con gress could have done, but, Does the grant, as made by the act of July 2, 1864, include lands withdrawn for any purpose at the date of its passage? The Northern Pacific grant was only of "public lands," and, as said in Barker v. Harvey (181 U. S., 481, 490)— these words have acquired a settled meaning in the legislation of this country. "The words 'public lands' are habitually used in our legislation to describe such as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws." Newhall . Sanger, 92 U. S., 761, 763. "The grant is of alternate sections of public land, and by public land, as it has been long settled, is meant such land as is open to sale or other disposition under general laws." Bardon v. Northern Pacific Railroad Co., 145 U. S., 535, 538. See also Mann v. Tacoma Land Co., 153 U. S., 273, 284. A withdrawal of lands beyond the terminus and wholly outside of the grant in support of which the withdrawal was made was held valid in Wolcott v. Des Moines Company (5 Wall., 681), and declared sufficient to withhold the lands covered by the withdrawal from the operation of a subsequent railroad land grant with the ordinary reservation clause in it. A withdrawal in support of the provision for indemnity in a railroad land grant was also sustained against a subsequent railroad land grant, even where the lands withdrawn were not required to satisfy the losses in place. Northern Pacific Railroad Company v. Musser-Sauntry Company (168 U. S., 604). See also Spencer v. McDougal (159 U. S., 62). The authority of the Secretary of the Interior to make the withdrawal on the filing of the map designating the general route of the Lake Superior and Mississippi railroad can not be seriously questioned, and it follows that during the continuance of this withdrawal the lands so withdrawn were not "public lands" within the meaning of that term as used in land-grant legislation. Minnesota . Hitchcock (185 U. S., 373, 391) is also in point. The object of the appeal herein was to secure a reconsideration of the departmental decision of July 16, 1901, above referred to, and upon a careful consideration of the brief filed in support of the appeal, the Department adheres to its previous decision, and your office decision is therefore accordingly affirmed. RAILROAD LAND-SECTION 5, ACT OF MARCH 3, 1887. A person entitled to make purchase under the provisions of section 5 of the act of March 3, 1887, upon being advised of an adverse claim asserted to the land under the homestead law, should make prompt assertion of his right of purchase by filing his application in the district land office, and his failure to make timely assertion of claim under such circumstances will bar his right of purchase as against the adverse claimant in possession. 6855-Vol. 31-01-28 Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, (W. V. D.) October 27, 1902. (F. W. C.) The Department has considered the appeal by Alfred J. Howell from your office decision of April 15, last, rejecting his final proof offered under his homestead entry No. 8857, covering the NE. of Sec. 33, T. 1 N., R. 8 W., Los Angeles land district, California, and awarding to J. V. Hannon and Cassie L. Foss the right to make purchase of said land under the provisions of section 5 of the act of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat., 556). This tract is within the indemnity limits of the grant made by the act of July 27, 1866 (14 Stat., 292), in aid of the construction of the Atlantic and Pacific railroad, which road was never constructed in the State of California and the grant appertaining thereto was forfeited and restored to the public domain by act of Congress approved July 6, 1886 (24 Stat., 123). It is also within the primary limits of the grant made by the act of March 3, 1871 (16 Stat., 573), in aid of the construction of the Southern Pacific branch line. Lands having a like status were held to be excepted from the operation of the Southern Pacific branch line grant in United States v. Colton Marble and Lime Company, and United States v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company (146 U. S., 615), the date of the decision in these cases being December 12, 1892, but the particular tract here in question was not involved in those suits but was included in a later suit brought by the United States, which was carried to the supreme court and which is reported in 168 U. S., 1, the decision being rendered in the lastmentioned case October 18, 1897. Following this decision your office formulated instructions governing the formal restoration of these lands to entry, which were contained in your office letter of April 15, 1898, addressed to the local officers, and required a publication of the notice of restoration for at least thirty days prior to the date fixed for the receipt of entries. This notice was duly given in the Los Angeles Daily Times, the date fixed for the opening being September 6, 1898. On November 4, following, Howell made homestead entry of this land and, after due notice by publication, submitted final proof May 16, 1901. After Howell had given notice of his intention to offer proof, to wit, on May 13, 1901, J. Vincent Hannon and Cassie L. Foss filed their joint application to purchase this land under the provisions of section 5 of the act of March 3, 1887, supra, and on the date Howell offered his final proof filed protest against the acceptance of the same. Proof was submitted under the application to purchase June 27, 1901, against the acceptance of which Hannon protested and the entire matter was set for hearing on July 2, 1901, on which date both parties appeared and submitted testimony in support of their claimed rights |