ship of Laketon. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Judgment reversed and rendered.

for his supervision, we are of the opinion that he is not entitled to compensation for time spent in supervision, and the court

Argued before HOOKER, MOORE, MCAL- should have so instructed the jury. The quesVAY, BROOKE, and BLAIR, JJ.

Alex Sutherland, for appellant. Cross, Vanderwerp, Foote & Ross, for appellee.

tion seems to us to be within the spirit, if not the letter, of the rule.

As the record shows that the defendant can contest only the excess of the judgment over $75, that amount-i. e., $75-having been allowed and tendered, and no question being raised in the appeal as to that sum, we may enter a judgment for plaintiff in this court for $75, with interest from the time the action was begun, and with costs made before the offer of judgment.

HOOKER, J. The defendant has appealed from a judgment of $85 in favor of the plaintiff; the same having been rendered in circuit court upon a verdict for that amount. Only $10 is involved; defendant having offered in writing, under Comp. Laws, § 10,084, to allow judgment for $75. The plaintiff is a highway commissioner, and filed a claim for services with the township board. They al-written offer of judgment. lowed him compensation at $2 a day, the minimum amount provided by statute, and for a less number of days than he claimed to have worked. The amount allowed was $75.

He refused to accept this amount, and brought this action. The defendant has appealed.

The contested item appears to be time spent in overseeing the work of his own team and driver only in work upon the highway. It is the contention of defendant's counsel that he is not entitled to pay, for such service. The learned circuit judge instructed the jury that he might recover for such services, and left it to the jury to say how much of the time charged it was reasonably necessary to spend. The only question requiring consideration is whether he could lawfully charge for overseeing the work of his own man and team, when no one else was at work. The highway commissioner determined to do certain grading by the day, and teams were employed by him-among others, his own: On some of the days only his own team worked.

The defendant claims that the court erred in submitting these items to the jury, and in declining to decide them himself. It is a well-settled rule that an agent cannot bind his principal in a contract which the agent makes with himself, and we have decided that the doctrine extends to public officers. This was decided in the case of People ex rel. Plugger v. Township Board, 11 Mich. 222. The following cases are in point on the general proposition: Beaubien v. Poupard, Har. 206; Walten v. Torrey, Har. 259; Clute v. Barren, 2 Mich. 192; Dwight v. Blackman, 2 Mich. 330, 57 Am. Dec. 130; Moore v. Mandelbaum, 8 Mich. 433; F. & P. M. v. Dewey, 14 Mich. 486, 487; Hannah v. Fife, 27 Mich. 171; Powell v. Conant, 33 Mich. 395; Prince v. Clark, 81 Mich. 170, 45 N. W. 663; Wilbur v. Stoepel, 82 Mich. 344, 46 N. W. 724, 21 Am. St. Rep. 568; McNutt v. Dex, 83 Mich. 328, 47 N. W. 212, 10 L. R. A. 660; Miner v. Ice Co., 93 Mich. 109, 53 N. W. 218, 17 L. R. A. 412; Humphrey v. Trans. Co., 107 Mich. 167, 65 N. W. 13. We are constrained to hold that the plaintiff set his own man and team at work unlawfully; and, this being the only occasion

The defendant is entitled to a judgment here for all costs made since the filing of its

RALPH v. GIES-GEAR CO.

(Supreme Court of Michigan. Dec. 22, 1910.)

1. DAMAGES (§ 131*)-TEMPORARY INJURIESINADEQUATE DAMAGES.

In an action for personal injuries, where the plaintiff, a boy of 16, had his hand injured and where there was evidence of severe sufferby contact with an unguarded emery wheel, ing for two weeks, and more or less suffering for four years, but also testimony that much of the pain suffered by the plaintiff was due to his own neglect in caring for the injury, which defendant insisted was not serious, a verdict of $100 was not so inadequate as to be a ground for a reversal.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Damages, Cent. Dig. § 370; Dec. Dig. § 131.*] 2. DAMAGES (§ 158*) PLEADING AND PROOF-PERSONAL INJURIES-CONSEQUENCES.

ISSUES

A declaration, in an action for personal injuries to plaintiff's hand from contact with an unguarded emery wheel, which alleges that in consequence of the injury he became sick and was treated and operated upon, and that he had not recovered, and would suffer a like pain for an indefinite time to come, is sufficient to warrant the admission of evidence as to the effect of the injury on the plaintiff's general health. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Damages, Cent. Dig. §§ 441-446; Dec. Dig. § 158.*]

Error to Circuit Court, Wayne County; James O. Murfin, Judge.

Action by William Ralph, by next friend, against the Gies-Gear Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and he brings writ of error. Reversed, and new trial ordered.

Argued before OSTRANDER, HOOKER, MOORE, MCALVAY, and BROOKE, JJ.

Lehman, Riggs & Lehman, for appellant. Brennan, Donnelly & Van De Mark, for appellee.

MOORE, J. Plaintiff was born on the 25th of June, A. D. 1891. He received the injuries out of which this lawsuit grows on the 18th day of November, 1906. He recovered a judgment of $100. A motion was made for a new trial, which motion was overruled. He brings the case here by writ of error.

The contention of counsel is as follows (we quote from brief of counsel): "(1) The jury regarded plaintiff with disfavor because in substance he was characterized by the court, almost at the inception of the trial, as untruthful. (2) Because the jury obtained the impression that the court thought the case was a trifling one, because he would not permit plaintiff's counsel to occupy a half hour, were he not compelled to do so by rule, in which to make both the opening and closing arguments; and we insist the rule should only be applied in cases of a trifling character, and not involving permanent injury to the hand of a boy at the very threshold of his young manhood, a boy destined to earn his living by the toil of his hands."

An examination of the record does not sustain either of these contentions. We again quote from the brief: "We also insist that

VOLLI v. WIRTH.

(Supreme Court of Michigan. Dec. 22, 1910.) LIMITATION OF ACTIONS (§ 66*)-DEBT PAY

ABLE ON DEMAND-LIMITATIONS.

Where plaintiff deposited money with defendant at different times, each transaction amounting to a loan of money, on interest, pay able within a reasonable time after demand, and no demand was made until nearly seven years had expired after the last deposit, the debt was barred.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Limitation of Actions, Cent. Dig. §§ 353-375; Dec. Dig. § 66.*]

Error to Circuit Court, Wayne County; Joseph W. Donovan, Judge.

Action by Frederick Volli against Frederick Wirth. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

This action was begun in justice's court, where the plaintiff declared, orally, upon the of particulars, the last item of which was common counts in assumpsit and filed a bill

1898. The plea was the general issue, with money delivered to defendant December 11, notice that the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations. In the circuit court the cause came on to be tried October 22, 1909, and counsel for plaintiff made an opening statement to the jury. This statement, in substance and effect, was that plaintiff came to this country from Germany in 1889 and became acquainted with the defendant, "I think during the first or second

the court should have granted a new trial on the ground that the damages were wholly inadequate, and not at all reasonable compensation for the injury sustained by plaintiff. The undisputed testimony shows that plaintiff was a terrible sufferer for at least two weeks, and that he has suffered more or less pain for a period of four years, and is not yet free from pain." This contention cannot be sustained, because of testimony to the effect that much of the pain suffered by the plaintiff was due to neglect in caring for the injury, which injury defendant insists was not serious. If the jury believed this testi-year he was in this country. At any rate, mony, it might account for the small verdict. within the first years he was in this country, We must consider a more serious assign- he was out of employment, and not feeling ment of error. In the declaration appears very well, and he went to Mr. Wirth's and the following: "His hand came in contact with stayed there, and made it his home, and said unguarded and unprotected emery wheel, while there he let Mr. Wirth have $40, withand was burned and ground by the same to out any statement about the interest. He such an extent that the use of the same was just let him have it to take care of, and for a long time practically wholly destroyed, upon the express agreement that when he and he has not yet recovered from the same; wanted the money, he should tell Mr. Wirth that in consequence of the same he became that he wanted it, and then Mr. Wirth, after sick, sore, lame, and disordered; that the being told that he wanted it, was to have a same has been operated upon and treated on reasonable time to raise the money, and not four different occasions, but plaintiff has not be crowded. And the thing ran along a year yet recovered from the same; that as a reor such a matter, and he let him have $12 sult of said injuries plaintiff has suffered more on the same arrangement-nothing said pain from thence hitherto, and must suffer about interest-just let him have it to take like pain in the future indefinitely." Testi- care of it; and it was stated when he wantmony was offered as to the effect of the in-gether. And about a year after that, $18; ed it he would pay him the two sums tojury upon the general health of the plaintiff. and about a year after that, and, I think, the This testimony was excluded, upon the the latter part of the year 1898, Mr. Volli had ory that it should have been specially plead- some money in the City Savings Bank, and ed. We think this was error, under the fol- Mr. Wirth wanted to use some money, and lowing authorities: Leslie v. Traction Com- he spoke to him about it, and he either drew pany, 134 Mich. 518, 96 N. W. 580, and the the whole sum, or the principal portion of many authorities cited therein; Renders V. it, from the bank and gave it to him, again Railroad Co., 144 Mich. 387, 108 N. W. 368; upon the identical same understanding he Groat v. Railway, 153 Mich. 165, 116 N. W. had given him the other money. He was to 1081. take care of it for him and use it, and take care of it, and nothing said about the interest, and pay him back when he wanted it,

Judgment is reversed, and new trial ordered.

the contrary, the vendee proposed in November, or December, 1904, to pay the balance unpaid on the contract and take a deed. The vendor assented, gave orders to have an abstract and deed of the land prepared, when he was told by the vendee that his title was infirm and that he would not accept a deed from him. Thereupon the vendor canceled his order for the preparation of a deed, and desired the vendee to pay him the sum which, by the terms of the contract, was then due and unpaid. This the vendee refused to do, saying he would put no more money into the place. Since then, neither he nor any one for him, or in his right, has paid or tendered any portion of the purchase money. The vendor, as he told the vendee he would do, re-entered peaceably and has been and is now in possession. Of the re-entry and removal of some of his property, the vendee had early notice.

an executory contract for the purchase and | sum, for a conveyance, and the vendor never sale of land, files his bill against the vendor required, or proposed, that the vendee should and his wife for specific performance. It ap-accept a quitclaim deed of the premises. On pears from the contract, which is set out with the bill, and is dated November 30, 1901, that the purchase price was $250, and of this the vendee paid $150. The contract permitted the vendee to occupy the land. The vendor agreed, upon payment of the purchase money and payment of taxes, etc., to execute and deliver a good and sufficient deed, conveying a good and unincumbered title in fee simple. The forfeiture clause contained the following: "And if he shall, at any time hereafter, violate or neglect to fulfill any of said agreements he shall forfeit all rights or claims under this contract, and be liable to the said party of the first part for damages, and shall also be liable to be removed from the said land in the same manner as is provided by law for the removal of a tenant that holds over after the expiration of the time specified in his lease. And it shall be lawful for the said party of the first part, at any time after the violation or nonfulfillment of any of the said agreements on the part of the said party of the second part, to sell and convey the said land, or any part thereof, to any other person whomsoever; and the said party of the first part shall not be liable in any way, nor to any person, to refund any part of the money which he may have received on this contract, nor for any damages on account of such sale."

The fourth (third annual) payment of $50 was due November 30, 1904. It is charged in the bill that the vendee on December 1, 1904, offered to pay the vendor $106, if he would then, under the agreement, execute and deliver a deed of the premises, and tendered the vendor $106, which sum the vendor refused, unless the vendee would accept a quitclaim deed of the premises, which he would not do; that thereafter the vendee was ready and always willing to pay the vendor $106 and to perform the agreement on his part whenever the vendor would execute and deliver a good and sufficient deed of the premises. It is charged that on March 4, 1907, the vendee conveyed his interest in the contract and land to complainant, who thereafter gave the vendor notice, in writing, of the acquirement of such interest and forbade the cutting of timber on the land. The notice also contains the statement that an agent of complainant, named in the notice, is authorized to take possession of the land, to tender the balance due on the contract, and to receive a deed of the premises, and that if a conveyance is refused a bill will be filed for specific performance of the contract. It is charged that the contract is in force. The bill is verified. It was answered, a replication was filed, and a hearing was had in open court. The bill was dismissed.

Considerable is said in the briefs about the state of the vendor's title to the land. The recitals in an abstract of title were read into the record, and it appears to be agreed that they correctly indicate the condition of the record title. It is asserted in the brief for the defendant (vendor) that the land had been occupied for 22 years by vendor and his grantors under tax titles. We are referred to no testimony supporting the assertion. The title of the vendor was acquired by quitclaim deed, dated January 29, 1900. His grantor's title originated in a deed given by the Auditor General in 1882, for taxes for the years 18751879 inclusive. There are other tax titles, as well as the original or government title, outstanding. Whatever support there may have been for the vendee's assertion that the vendor had not good title, and however the real or apparent condition of the title may have excused the refusal of the vendee to make further payments, and denied to the vendor the right to declare or work a forfeiture, these questions are not raised by the pleadings. The bill does not attack the title of the vendor and no right of the vendee is predicated on a want of title. A single reason is given in the bill for the refusal to make payments. That reason has no support in fact. The case stands, then, as if the vendee had, without excuse, refused to perform the contract, declaring, also, that he should pay no more. The consequences of such a default are declared in the contract to be forfeiture of all rights thereunder. If it is doubtful whether by the terms of the contract alone such default ipso facto forfeited the vendee's rights, there can be no doubt that the vendor, with notice to the vendee, accomplished both an entry and forfeiture before any assignment was made by the vendee to complainant. We are of opinion, therefore, that the circuit court rightly refused complainant relief.

The decree is affirmed, with costs to appel

The proofs do not sustain the case made by the bill. We find that the vendee never