gard this as one of the great essential provisions of this bill; and if the House desires to promote the remedial legislation which will protect the 50,000,000 of our American people against the rapacity of these corporations, you will never do it successfully by saying that the corporations may charge greatly more for carrying a car-load of freight 100 miles than for carrying it 1,000 miles. Such a proposition will command the approval and sense of justice and propriety of mankind. The next point of difference between the two bills is that the committee's bill in its third section only prohibits the allowance of rebates or drawbacks and other discriminations to any one person which are not allowed to any other person, while the substitute bill prohibits the allowance of rebates, drawbacks, or advantages of any kind in all cases.

I desire to call attention to the particular wording of this bill on this subject, because I wish the House to understand what is in the bill itself. The third section of the committee's bill provides:

SEC. 3. That it shall be unlawful for any person or persons engaged in the transportation of property as aforesaid directly or indirectly to allow any rebate, drawback, or other advantage in any form, upon shipments made or services rendered as aforesaid by him or them, which, under similar circumstances, are not allowed to all other persons.

Instead of prohibiting the allowance of rebates, drawbacks, cut-rates, and other discriminating advantages, this bill goes on first to prohibit this and say then that if you allow them to one person you must also allow them to another. I submit that it simply opens the door to the whole wrong against which we are proposing to guard. And why, sir, should rebates be allowed to anybody? If they are allowed to all persons alike it simply amounts to a uniform reduction of the rates of freight to that extent. It amounts to that, and nothing else. It can not be anything else; and if, therefore, they make a uniform reduction of rates to all men, why not change the schedule and reduce the freight instead of saying that by this discriminating and swindling method of rebates and drawbacks we propose to swindle everybody alike? Have I not put the case fairly? Why permit this process at all? It amounts to saying that you shall not knock your neighbor down unless you knock some other neighbor down. You shall not steal your neighbor's hog unless you steal another neighbor's sheep. Why put it that way Why not say that this discrimination in giving advantages to one shipper over another shall be absolutely prohibited?

In this connection I would invite the attention of the members of this House to the legislative investigation made a few years ago by the great State of New York, and contained in five large volumes, in which investigation it was shown, in the face of a written denial on the part of Mr. Vanderbilt and of Mr. Gould, that they allowed special rates. In answer to an inquiry from the chamber of commerce whether they did not make such discriminations Mr. Vanderbilt positively denied it, and the committee, members of the Legislature of New York, proceeded to take evidence, and proved the fact that within the last year preceding that time some thousands of contracts for rebates and drawbacks had been made by that company-not instances of rebates, but contracts for their daily allowance. There stands in these reports the written denial of the president of that corporation, and in oppositoin to it the proofs submitted to the Legislature of the State of New York. I submit this, Mr. Speaker, not to call attention to that particular man or to his road, but simply to illustrate what has been going on all over the country. If you give the power to a corporation or to the officers of a

corporation to discriminate between the shippers they will enrich their friends while they may impoverish those they do not like; and that investigation cited from New York furnishes the strongest, the purest, and the amplest evidence of the truth of this statement. So I hold out the substitute bill as preferable to the committee's bill.

The committee's bill contains no provision requiring a railroad company to post up schedules of its rates of charges, while section 5 of the substitute bill does require such schedules to be posted up. And this is essential to secure fairness and equality in rates between shippers and as a means of evidence in determining whether discriminations have been made, and whether more than regular or schedule prices have been charged. If you leave that provision out and come to a trial in each case you will have to prove what reasonable rates are. If you put the provision in requiring them to post up their schedules of rates the law will presume they constitute reasonable rates, and the production of the schedules at a trifling expense would directly show the jury the amount of charges which the road had fixed, and it would then be for the court and jury to determine whether the schedule had been disregarded or not in the case under consideration. Perhaps I had better read this section of t .e substitute bill:

SEC. 5. That all persons engaged in carrying property as provided in the first section of this act shall adopt and keep posted up schedules which shall plainly state:

First. The different kinds and classes of property to be carried.

Second. The different places between which such property shall be carried. Third. The rates of freight and prices of carriage between such places, and for all services connected with the receiving, delivery, loading, unloading, storing, or handling the same. And the accounts for such service shall show what part of the charges are for transportation, and what part are for loading, unloading, and other terminal facilities.

That last provision is as to the discrimination of rates and charges under the pretext of regulating the terminal charges. So I require by the substitute bill that the accounts shall state what portion of the amount is for freight and what portion is for terminal charges.

Such schedules may be changed from time to time as hereinafter provided. Copies of such schedules shall be printed in plain, large type, at least the size of ordinary pica, and shall be kept plainly posted for public inspection in at least two places in every depot where freights are received or delivered; and no such schedule shall be changed in any particular except by the substitution of another schedule containing the specifications above required, which substitute schedule shall plainly state the time when it shall go into effect, and copies of which, printed as aforesaid, shall be posted as above provided at least five days before the same shall go into effect; and the same shall remain in force until another schedule shall as aforesaid be substituted. And it shall be unlawful for any person or persons engaged in carrying property on railroads as aforesaid, after thirty days after the passage of this act, to charge or receive more or less compensation for the carriage, receiving, delivery, loading, unloading, handling, or storing of any of the property contemplated by the first section of this act than shall be specified in such schedule as may at the time be in force.

You see this provision not only requires these schedules to be posted up so that the citizen when he goes to make his shipment knows what part of the product of his labor or capital belongs to him and what part must go to the common carrier, but it provides that a charging of more or less than the schedule rates shall be punished as a crime. It simply means to make them be honest and to treat all men alike. Who but the corporations can object to this? Who that seeks common fairness can object to this? The committee's bill limits its provisions to carloads of freight, while the substitute bill extends its provisions to all amounts of freight. A bill formerly reported from the Committee on

Commerce on this subject was the same in its provisions as the present committee's bill, limiting the amount of freight which should come under the influence of the bill to car-loads, but the jobbing merchants of all the great cities protested that it was unjust in not giving to them the same protection for smaller amounts of freight that was given to others for larger amounts. It seemed to me that their statement was so just and fair that I chose to give up my former convictions and position on this subject in deference to what was demanded by justice. Therefore, I submit that as one of the differences between the bills; and I think when we come to examine it we shall see that there is no just reason why we should not place all amounts of freight under the same wholesome influence of this legislation and protect the citizen against the rapacity and unfairness of the corporation.

The committee's bill requires a railroad commission to be appointed under it; and by its sixteenth section it directs said commission to inquire into the method known as pooling and to report what legislation is expedient in relation thereto, while the preceding part of the bill prohibits absolutely by its third section all pooling of freights by competing roads.

After

I ought to observe that the committee's bill prohibits pooling. the provision prohibiting pooling was inserted in the bill, however, another provision was inserted in the latter part of the bill, the sixteenth section, directing the commission provided for by the bill to enter upon an investigation as to the propriety of permitting pooling.

I have but a single remark at this time to offer on that subject, and it is this: In early times the anxiety of the people to secure the advantages of railroad transportation and travel induced them to make very liberal charters, almost as liberal as could be at any time asked for. It was felt then, as we all know to be the case now, that each road was a monopoly for the transportation of the freights and carrying of the travel on its particular line. They felt that then, and they then supposed that transportation by water and by other modes of conveyance would furnish such competition as in some measure to relieve the people against the monopoly exaction of these corporations. They felt, too, that as new roads were built they would offer lines of competition with each other and by their competition reduce the rates of freight to a fair price for carriage. And they felt then as the law authorizes us to feel and to say now that in case water transportation and other modes of transportation and competing railroad transportation should fail to give the desired relief against the monopoly powers of these corporations-they felt and knew that they derived their life and being from the legislative authority of the country; and that the power which created them could regulate in a reasonable way their rates of charges as common carriers, as their charges and their actions have been regulated from time immemorial just as turnpikes are regulated and as hack-drivers in cities are regulated. They derive their powers in the main from legislative authority; and if their powers are not derived from legislative authority then they are engaged in public employments, that is, employments in which the public has an interest, and on both grounds the courts of England and America have always held that the right to regulate followed the creation of such corporations; otherwise we would have to assume, if that power does not exist, that the legislative authority can create something superior to itself. No wise statesman or wise statesmanship could make any such admission. The Government can not create something superior to itself. It would not dare to create

something superior to itself. But I do not choose now to elaborate this point. I simply desire to state it.

The substitute bill would omit the provision of the committee bill, which requires inquiry into the subject of the right of pooling. The substitute bill assumes that pooling is wrong. I assume that it is unlawful. I believe that at common law it can be shown to be unlawful. But I do not choose to discuss that question now. The question is simply one of power. The people of this country confer upon these corporations franchises without price-large and valuable privileges—and they have the right to say to such corporations, "You may charge a just and reasonable percentage upon your capital, but you shall not levy unreasonable and unjust exactions upon the people."

The course of the English as well as the American decisions goes to this point: that the power of regulation resides with the legislative authority, but must not be abused by such legislation as will destroy the corporation or take from the stockholders a reasonable dividend upon the capital invested by them. That is the extent and character of the power to regulate transportation charges as recognized in Great Britain and this country.

The right to free competition ought to be left to the people. Pooling simply means we shall make one great mammoth corporation out of a number of smaller ones that shall take from the people all hope of protection against extortionate charges, denying to them the rights which grow out of free competition.

One other point as to the difference between these bills. The greatest defect in the committee's bill is that for many injuries to individuals it does not give an adequate legal or equitable remedy, but refers such matters to a railroad commission which is to determine questions between the wrong-doing railroad companies and the Government, while in many cases no remedy is provided for wrongs done to individual citizens.

Mr. LONG. Will not the individual citizen get the benefit of the investigation?

Mr. REAGAN. He may in a remote degree-indirectly. The substitute bill, on the other hand, gives complete legal and equitable remedy without delay through the ordinary courts of the country to citizens for every injury within the purview of this bill done them by such corporations.

I wish to say a word in relation to the proposed appointment of a commission. If it is the judgment of the House that we should have a commission on this subject I shall of course bow to the decision of the House. But I doubt the expediency of providing for such a commission, and will state why. If we provide for the appointment of a railroad commission either by the President or any other authority (and if provided for it would seem most natural that the members should be appointed by the President), however honest and patriotic his intentions may be in making such appointments, we must remember that the railroad corporations, few in number as to the heads that control them, can easily combine their influence and bring to bear by indirection, if they dare not do it directly, influences which will be likely to control in the appointment of commissioners.

If we get commissioners appointed in the interest of these corporations we can hardly expect either recommendations or direct action that will materially benefit the people.

It has been said that it was difficult even to get the representatives

of the people to act on this great question. We know the power of these corporations (with their experts and other officers filling the committeerooms and corridors, and often placing themselves upon the floor of this House with their attorneys, the ablest in the United States, all of them paid out of the people's money by levying a little more tribute upon the people) to secure or prevent legislation. If Congress has found now for nine years the impossibility of legislating upon this great question, what is to be the fate of the people if their interests are left in the hands of three men upon whom all these influences can be concentrated. I do not deny that it may be possible to secure men who will be faithful to the great trust committed to them; but to undertake to perform the duties of such a commission would expose any men to the severest trials that can be imposed upon them.

Mr. WILSON, of Iowa. Will the gentleman from Texas be kind enough to point out the difference between the difficulty of getting good commissioners and the difficulty of getting good judges of the Supreme Court?

Mr. REAGAN. My friend from Iowa asks me if I can point out the difference in point of difficulty between getting honest commissioners and the difficulty of getting honest judges. I do not know that I can point out the difference in such a way as will be satisfactory to him. But judges are appointed with reference to the general legal powers which they are to exercise, while these commissioners would be appointed with reference to the specific duties provided for in this act relating to railroads. Judges have many motives in connection with subjects of jurisdiction other than railroads to preserve their integrity. I have said I do not doubt that it is possible to get men who will act fairly in this capacity. But, in my judgment, when we look at what has occurred in the majority of the States that have appointed commissioners, when we remember that State Legislatures have been suborned, that courts of justice have been corrupted, that even governors of States have been improperly influenced in their action by the power of these corporations, we should rather trust the rights of the people in the hands of the courts of the country than commit them to three particular individuals whose jurisdiction at most can only be partial.

But I propose now, Mr. Speaker, to antagonize this idea of a commission by providing that certain things shall not be done, and that the doing of them shall be a violation of the law, and that certain things shall be done, and the non-doing of these things shall be a violation of law. I propose to give a civil remedy to the party injured, in the State or Federal court where these parties or their officers can be found, in civil damages for the wrong done. I propose to give a criminal remedy in the courts of the United States for the same wrongs where the penalty on conviction shall be not less than $1,000. If you put the highest penalty on these corporations they will laugh at you, in most cases; but you must make them respect the law and teach them that you are passing laws that must be obeyed, and not pass a law which may tempt them to wrongdoing first by want of vigor in its provisions

The SPEAKER. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. REAGAN. I ask, Mr. Speaker, permission of the House to conclude what I have to say on this question, which I will be able to do in a few minutes.

Mr. DAVIS, of Illinois. I move, by unanimous consent, Mr. Speaker, that the chairman of the Committee on Commerce be allowed an ex