52 Vroom. Coles & Son Co. v. Lothridge. profitable one to him. For this must be a potent factor in determining whether or not it will be reasonably safe to extend credit to the contractor for labor or material, particularly in those cases where his financial responsibility is questionable. Unless it was intended that such information should be afforded, the object of the statute would have been accomplished by a mere requirement that notice of the existence of a contract between the owner and the builder should be spread upon the record. The same reason which led the Supreme Court to its decision in Murphey-Hardy Lumber Co. v. Nicholas, and this court to the conclusion which it reached in Buckley v. Hann, is conclusive that a building contract which is altered in a material particular after it is filed, will not protect the building against the claim of a laborer or materialman for work done or materials furnished after such alteration, unless the contract, as altered, is filed in the office of the county clerk. In the present case the suggested alteration in the original contract, if it was in fact made, was, in our opinion, a material one. It consisted in a reduction in the contract price, and a change in the times of payment. The amount of the reduction it is true was small, but this, we think, is not an element to be considered, for once it is conceded that the original price may be reduced by a secret arrangement between the parties, the amount of reduction is a matter entirely within their discretion. The change in the time of payment was also material; for it affected seriously the right given by section 3 of the statute to laborers and materialmen to impound moneys due and owing by the owner to the contractor on the contract, or that might thereafter become due thereon, as a means of obtaining payment for work done upon or materials furnished to the building. The right of the one party or the other, therefore, to a verdict, depended upon whether or not the alteration in the contract, set up by the plaintiff, had in fact been made; and that of course was a matter which should have been left to the jury for determination. Hubatka v. Maierhoffer. 81 N. J. L. There was error in the direction of a verdict for the defendaut, Lothridge, and for this reason the judgment under review must be reversed, and a venire de novo awarded. For affirmance-None. For reversal-THE CHANCELLOR, CHIEF JUSTICE, GARRISON, SWAYZE, TRENCHARD, PARKER, BERGEN, VOORHEES, MINTURN, BOGERT, VREDENBURGII, CONGDON, JJ. 12. MARIA HUBATKA AND CARL HUBATKA, HER HUSBAND. v. FRANK MAIERHOFFER. Argued November 29, 1910-Decided June 28, 1911. 1. A judgment under review will not be reversed upon a ground not taken in the court below. 2. Declarations of deceased persons upon matters of pedigree are admissible in evidence only when the persons making them were related by blood or marriage to the person concerning whom the declarations were made. 3. Where the question for determination is whether a marriage existed or not, the declaration of one of the parties to the alleged marriage, who is since deceased, cannot be received in evidence against the other party if not made in his or her presence. On error to the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 50 Vroom 264. For the plaintiff in error, Alan H. Strong and William R. Wilson. For the defendants in error, William D. Wolfskeil. The opinion of the court was delivered by GUMMERE, CHIEF JUSTICE. This writ of error brings up for review a judgment of the Supreme Court, affirming a judg 52 Vroom. Hubatka v. Maierhoffer. ment of the Union Circuit Court, rendered in favor of the plaintiffs in an action of ejectment brought by them against the defendant. The suit was brought to recover an undivided half interest in a tract of land conveyed by Jacob Martin and wife to the defendant, and to Josephine Shelka under the name of Josephine Maierhoffer. Josephine Shelka was the mother of the plaintiff Maria Hubatka, and died before this action was brought. The rights of the parties depend upon whether or not at the time of the conveyance Josephine was the wife of the defendant. If she was, then the husband and wife took under it an estate by the entirety, and upon the death of Josephine the whole estate vested in the husband as survivor. If she was not, then she and the defendant were tenants in common of the estate conveyed, and upon her death her undivided interest in it passed to her daughter. We concur in the view expressed by the Supreme Court that the motion to nonsuit the plaintiff was properly refused, for the reason that there was sufficient evidence offered and received to support the conclusion that the defendant and Josephine Shelka were not husband and wife at the time of the conveyance to them. It is contended before us that the plaintiff was estopped to deny that the defendant and Josephine were married at the time of the conveyance to them, for the reason that the recital, or statement, therein that Josephine was the wife of the defendant is binding upon all parties to the deed and their privies. We find nothing in the record, however, to show that any such contention was made before the trial court, or was made the subject of an assignment of error on the review by the Supreme Court. That being so it cannot be considered by us as a ground for reversal. The conclusion of the Supreme Court that proof of statements testified to have been made by Josephine during her lifetime, not in the presence of the defendant, tending to show that she was not the wife of the defendant at the time of the conveyance to them, and admitted over objection interposed on behalf of the defendant, was competent, we think, is unsound. That the testimony was hearsay goes without saying. The Su Hubatka v. Maierhoffer. 81 N. J. L. preme Court considered that it concerned matters of pedigree, and was for that reason admissible. The declarations themselves, it seems to us, demonstrate that they were not admissible upon the ground indicated, for it is entirely settled that the admission of such testimony is restricted to declarations of deceased persons who were related by blood or marriage to the person concerning whom the declarations were made. 1 Greenl. Evid., § 103; 1 Phil. Ev. *271; Tayl. Ev., § 635. The declarations in question showing, as they did, that the decedent was not within the restricted class referred to, carried with them the evidence of their inadmissibility as to matters of pedigree. In the following cases it has been held that where the question for determination is whether a marriage exists or not, the declaration of one of the parties to the alleged marriage, who is since deceased, cannot be received in evidence against the other party, if not made in his or her presence: Hill v. Hill, 32 Pa. St. 511; Hulett v. Carey, 66 Minn. 327, 334; Thompson v. Nims, Executor, &c., 83 Wis. 261; Estate of James, 124 Cal. 653. We think this view the correct one; and because of the illegal admission of the statements of Josephine Shelka tending to show that she was not married to the defendant the judgment must be reversed. For affirmance-None. For reversal-THE CHANCELLOR, CHIEF JUSTICE, GARRISON, REED, BERGEN, VOORHEES, MINTURN, BOGERT, VREDENBURGH, VROOM, CONGDON, JJ. 11. 52 Vroom. Manufacturers Land & Imp. Co. v. Camden. MANUFACTURERS LAND AND IMPROVEMENT COMPANY v. CITY OF CAMDEN. Argued November 18, 1910-Decided March 6, 1911. 1. The constitutional provision that "every law shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title," does not require that the title of a statute shall set forth the means by which the object expressed therein shall be carried into effect. 2. Upon a review of a judgment of the Supreme Court, affirming a municipal ordinance, the only question to be determined is whether that court erred in refusing to set aside the ordinance for any of the reasons upon which it was there attacked. On error to the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 49 Vroom 247. For the plaintiff in error, Herbert A. Drake. For the defendant in error, Edwin G. C. Bleakly. The opinion of the court was delivered by GUMMERE, CHIEF JUSTICE. The plaintiff in error prosecuted a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court for the purpose of testing the validity of an ordinance of the city of Camden providing for the repaving of a portion of one of the streets of that municipality, and of an amendment to that ordinance; and for the further purpose of reviewing an assessment laid against its property abutting on that street for the benefits which accrued to it by the repaving. The Supreme Court, upon a consideration of the merits, reached the conclusion that the ordinance and its amendment were each of them valid, the authority to pass them having been conferred upon the city by an act of the legislature approved June 13th, 1898, and entitled "An act to authorize the improvement of streets and highways in cities of this state, and to provide for the payment of the expense of the same." Pamph. L., p. 466. They further considered that the assessment laid upon the property of the prose |