State v. DeMarco. 81 N. J. L. For the prosecutor, Alexander Simpson. For the state, Pierre P. Garven, prosecutor of the pleas. The opinion of the court was delivered by GARRISON, J. An indictment having been removed to this court by a writ of certiorari, a motion is now argued to quash cach of the three counts of which it consists. The indictment is based upon the act of March 14th, 1910 (Pamph. L., p. 24), and the first and second counts are evidently intended to charge the offence set forth in the first and second sections, respectively, of the statute. This the first count fails to do. It charges that the accused did take and place a certain woman by force. This does not charge or even suggest the offence named in the statute. the gist of which is the character, or, at least, the existence of the place to which the woman was taken or in which she was placed, viz., "a house of illfame or of assignation or elsewhere." Even assuming that "elsewhere" need not have the described character, it must at least have a locality or be in existence, and this the pleader has totally failed to suggest, much less to state. Without such a predicate the verb "to take" means "to apprehend" or "to lay hold of;" and "to place" means "to locate" or "to put or set," none of which meanings remotely suggest the taking, placing, harboring, enticing or inveigling to a place devoted to sexual immorality which is the offence against which this clause of the statute is aimed. This count is bad for this reason and perhaps for others. The second count is good. It follows the language of the second section of the act which sufficiently describes a concrete offence. The third count is also good; it charges assault and battery, which is not incongruous with the offence charged in the second count. The record will be sent back to the Hudson Sessions, that the defendants may be placed upon trial under the second and third counts of the indictment. THE MAYOR AND COMMON COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEWARK v. HENRY W. TUNIS. Argued November 2, 1910-Decided February 27, 1911. 1. In taxing the shares of a national bank, the true value which is the basis of the assessment is under ordinary and normal conditions, their exchangeable value in the market and not their book or liquidation value. 2. In assessing shares of a national bank, the total valuation of all the shares at their true value is to be ascertained; and from this is to be deducted the amount of the assessment on real estate and such other items as the statute permits to be deducted; each share is assessable upon its pro rata of the balance. 3. Section 18 of the Tax act (Pamph. L. 1903, p. 394) provides that every trust company shall be assessed in the taxing district where its office is situated, upon the full amount of its capital stock paid in and accumulated surplus. Held, that it is assessable upon the true value of its stock. 4. Section 17 of the Tax act (Pamph. L. 1903, p. 394), with the modifications of the act of 1905 (Pamph. L., p. 457), does not tax shares of national banks at a greater rate than other moneyed capital in the hands of individuals. On certiorari to board of equalization of taxes. Before Justices GARRISON, SWAYZE and VOORHEES. For the prosecutor, Herbert Boggs. For the defendants, Robert II. McCarter (Arthur F. Egner, on his brief) and John R. Hardin. The opinion of the court was delivered by SWAYZE, J. The Tax act of 1903 evinces an intent to tax at its true value all property not exempt. Section 2 enacts that "all property, real and personal, within the jurisdiction of this state, not expressly exempted by this act, or excluded from its operation, shall be subject to annual taxation at its true value under this act." Section 6 requires the assessor. after examination and inquiry, to determine the full and fair value of each parcel of real property at such price as in his judgment such parcel would sell for at a fair and bona fide sale by private contract. Section 12 requires the assessors to ascertain by diligent inquiry and by the oath of persons to be assessed and others the true value of all the personal property. The question presented by this case is in what manner the true value of the shares of stock of a national bank is to be determined. The city insists that the basis for the ascertainment of the amount is the exchange value in the market from which such deductions are to be made as are authorized by section 17 of the act and by the act of 1905 as construed in Lippincott v. Lippincott, 46 Vroom 795. The defendant insists that the basis is the hook or liquidation value--the amount which would be payable to each share if the assets of the bank were at once distributed. In this view the defendant was sustained by the board of equalization, whose action is now before us for review. If we look merely at the language of the act itself, the city's contention seems the proper one. Personal property and real estate are both to be assessed at true value, and a statutory definition is attempted of the expression as used with reference to real estate. It is the price at which the property would sell at a fair and bona fide sale by private contract. Unless we are to assume that a different meaning is to be attributed to the words when used in the twelfth section from that expressly given to them in the sixth, true value of personal property must mean market value under ordinary and normal conditions. It can hardly be that an expression which in the second section is applied to both real and personal property without distinction, takes different meanings in section 6 and section 12. This view is sustained by a careful examination of the language of section 17, which provides for the taxation of shares in national banks. We pass for the present the earlier history of the legislation and compare the language of the act with that of its immediate predecessor-the act of 1900. Pamph. L., p. 296. The latter provided that the amount of the assessment for the bank's real estate should be deducted from the assets of the bank in estimating the assessable value of the shares of stock. The revisers, when they came to draw the act of 1903, had the act of 1900 before them; instead of providing that the assessment of the real estate should be deducted from the assets of the bank, the legislature enacted that the deduction should be "from the total valuation of the shares of stock assessed against the stockholders." We shall show in the course of this opinion that the decided cases prior to 1903 had drawn a sharp distinction between the valuation of shares in the hands of stockholders and the valuation of the assets of the bank, the property of the corporation itself. We point out now the marked change in the language between "the assets of said bank," in the act of 1900, and "the total valuation of the shares of stock assessed against the stockholders" in the act of 1903. The act of 1903 was a revision and a clear intention to change the existing law must be manifested before we can infer such a change from the mere fact that different language is used. Trenton v. Standard Fire Insurance Co., 48 Vroom 757, 760. In that respect the rule of construction differs from that applicable to a supplement to an act such as was before the court in Lippincott v. Lippincott, 46 Id. 795. The act of 1900 seems never to have been construed by the courts. Prior to its passage the matter had been controlled by section 23 of the act of 1866. Gen. Stat., p. 3299, pl. 83. This provided for the deduction of the assessment of real estate of the bank other than the banking house and lot "from the amount of the capital stock and surplus and funded debt, or of the valuable assets of the corporation." By the act of 1891, as construed in Orange National Bank v. Orange, 29 Id. 45, the assessment of the banking house and lot was also to be deducted. The language of section 23 of the act of 1866, "Capital stock and surplus and funded debt, or of the valuable assets of the corporation," does not differ materially from the words, "the assets of said bank," in the act of 1900. Both expressions. aside from the words "capital stock," point to the property of the bank as a corporation, not to the property of the stockholders in their shares. There was room for a forcible argu ment under either act that this language required an ascertainment of the value of the property of the bank as a corporation as the basis for assessment. Strong as the argument may have seemed, the rule was to the contrary. Stratton v. Collins, 14 Id. 562; Myers v. Campbell, 35 Id. 186, 188. These decisions on this point are the logical result of the federal statute under which national banks are taxed. This statute provides only for taxation on the shares of stock in the hands of the stockholders and does not permit taxation of the banks as such, nor their property, assets and franchises, except real estate. Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 664. Since it is the shares of stock that are taxable, not the assets of the bank, the courts naturally held that it was the value of the shares that was to be ascertained, not the value of the bank's assets; and the value of the shares might include elements of value due to good will, public confidence, prudent management or the possession of property, like government bonds, which were in themselves exempt from taxation. It is enough here to refer to Mercantile National Bank of New York v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 121 Id. 138, in which the earlier cases were exhaustively reviewed, and to San Francisco National Bank v. Dodge, 197 Id. 70, an opinion by the present Chief Justice. Such was the state of the law prior to 1903, and notwithstanding the clear reference in section 23 of the act of 1866, and in the act of 1900, to the assets of the bank itself as the thing from which the value of real estate was to be deducted in estimating the assessable value of the shares, it was the value of the shares themselves that was ascertained, including therein elements of value which were in no sense taxable assets of the bank. The revisers, in 1903, found the law in that state, and what they did was to express in clear and precise language what was ambiguous in the former legislation except as elucidated by the decided cases. The language they adopted was clear and precise; the value of the real property is to be deducted from the total valuation not of the bank's assets but of the shares of stock; and to remove any possible doubt they added the words "assessed against the stockholders." The valuation of shares assessed |