The facts and circumstances set out in the declaration show that the master failed to perform this duty by leaving the floor near the joiner "in a dangerous and defective condition." Of course, the declaration should have specified the character of the defect which made the floor dangerous to a person operating the joiner. The rule is that certainty in the statement of the plaintiff's case must be such that it is intelligible, and that in reasonable measure it apprises the defendant of the substantial case to be made against him. But the want of specific averment in this regard cannot be taken advantage of on general demurrer. It constitutes a formal defect and the remedy was a motion to strike out the pleading. Central Railroad Co. v. Van Horn, 9 Vroom 133; Race v. Easton and Amboy Railroad Co., 33 Id. 536; Minnuci v. Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Co., 39 Id. 432. The plaintiff is entitled to judgment on the demurrer. CHRISTIAN JOHNSON ET AL., PROSECUTORS. v. NEWKIRK N. WENTZ. RESPONDENT. Argued April 8, 1911-Decided April 15, 1911. An application for license to keep an inn and tavern under the act of April 17th, 1846 (Gen. Stat., p. 1788), must be determined by the court on the first day of its session or upon a day then publicly fixed by the court, or upon a day to which the matter has been regularly continued by the court; otherwise the grant of such license is a nullity, and will, upon proper application, be set aside. On certiorari. Before Justice TRENCHARD. For the prosecutors, Charles E. Sheppard and John Boyd Avis. For the respondent, James S. Ware and Roscoe C. Ward. The opinion of the court was delivered by TRENCHARD, J. An application for a license to keep an inn and tavern was made by Newkirk N. Wentz on April 26th, 1910, being the first day of the April term of the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland county. A remonstrance was filed by the prosecutors of this writ, and others, and the hearing of the application was continued from time to time until May 25th, 1910, when the court "gave counsel leave to file briefs within thirty days," without fixing any day upon which the application would receive further consideration. On July 8th, 1910, the court granted the license, and this writ brings up for review such action. The main reason relied upon by the prosecutors is that the court had lost jurisdiction to grant the license. Section 11 of "An act concerning inns and taverns" (Gen. Stat., p. 1789) provides that "all and every person applying to any court authorized by law to grant license to keep an inn and tavern shall make his or her application to the court for said purpose on the first day of the session of said court, and the said court shall, on the first day of said session, or on some other day thereof, publicly fixed on by the said court on the said first day, determine in open court on said application. by granting or refusing the same." Construing that section this court has held that an application must be determined by the Common Pleas Court on the first day of its session or upon a day then publicly fixed by the court, or upon a day to which the matter has been regularly continued by the court; otherwise the grant of such license is a nullity, and will, upon proper application, be set aside. Hinchman v. Stoepel, 25 Vroom 486; Cramer v. Sooy, 38 Id. 107; Breese v. Winters, 48 Id. 255. The reason for the rule thus announced is to effectuate the purpose of the statute which is to afford an opportunity to the public to be present at both the hearing and determination of the application. McCauley v. Ridgewood Trust Co. 81 N. J. L. The application of this rule to the facts of this case as exhibited by the return and herein recited, shows that the court was without jurisdiction to grant the license on July 8th, 1910, and it is set aside, with costs. JAMES MCCAULEY v. RIDGEWOOD TRUST COMPANY. Submitted July 8, 1910-Decided March 13, 1911. 1. An action will lie for the breach of a warranty on a sale by the defendant personally to the plaintiff of a bond payable by a third party to the defendant as trustee or to bearer. 2. When a warranty is made at the time of the sale. it is part of the entire contract, and the price paid for the subject of the sale constitutes the consideration for it. 3. When a person acts and contracts avowedly as the agent of another, who is known as the principal. his acts and contracts, within the scope of his authority, are the acts and contracts of the principal, and involve no personal liability on the part of the agent. 4. A trustee of a corporate mortgage, by signing a certificate on each of the bonds of the corporation that "this bond is one of a series of bonds mentioned in the deed of trust within referred to. executed by the Bayamon Plantation Company to the trustee," does not thereby render himself liable to a purchaser of the bonds from the corporation in case the mortgage proves not to have been a first lien upon the property covered by it as recited in the bond. 5. A trust company created under the act concerning trust companies (Pamph. L. 1899. p. 450), has power to become a guarantor or indemnator of a bond made by a corporation to it as trustee. 6. A trustee of a corporate mortgage which provides that the trustee shall not be liable for any failure to record the mortgage, may nevertheless, make a special contract, independent of or in substitution for the provision in the mortgage, whereby he agrees with the purchaser of a bond, secured by such mortgage, to record the mortgage, and for failure to perform such contract he is liable. On defendant's demurrer to certain counts of plaintiff's declaration, and plaintiff's demurrer tc certain pleas of the defendant. 52 Vroom. McCauley v. Ridgewood Trust Co. Before GUMMERE, CHIEF JUSTICE, and Justices TRENCHARD and MINTURN. For the plaintiff, Griggs & Harding. For the defendant, Doremus & Lecour and Harlan Besson. The opinion of the court was delivered by TRENCHARD, J. The defendant, the Ridgewood Trust. Company, filed a general demurrer to the first, second and third counts, respectively, of the plaintiff's declaration, and the plaintiff filed a general demurrer to the fourth, fifth and sixth pleas, respectively, filed by the defendant. We are of opinion that the first count is good. It alleges that "in consideration that the said plaintiff, at the special instance and request of the said defendant, would buy of the said defendant a certain bond," payable by the Bayamon Plantation Company to the defendant as trustee under a trust mortgage, or to the bearer, "the said defendant undertook and then and there faithfully promised the said plaintiff" that the bond was secured by the mortgage referred to, and that the mortgage at the time of the sale was recorded in Porto Rico and appeared of record as the first and only lien upon or against the lands and property covered by the mortgage. The count further alleges that the plaintiff, confiding in such promise and undertaking, bought the bond of the defendant, paying $500 therefor; that if the defendant's warranty had been true there was ample property to protect the bonds, of which the plaintiff's was one, but that in fact the warranty was false and the plantation company having become insolvent, and the mortgage not having been recorded as warranted, the bonds were without security, and became valueless, to the plaintiff's damage, &c. It is contended that the count does not disclose a contract between the defendant and the plaintiff. We think it does. It alleges a warranty on a sale by "the defendant” to the plaintiff of a bond payable by the plantation company to the defendant as trustee, or to bearer. That imports a warranty McCauley v. Ridgewood Trust Co. 81 N. J. L. made by the defendant personally and not as trustee. For the breach thereof an action will lie. Phillips v. Crosby, 40 Vroom 612; S. C., 11 Id. 785. The fact that the bond was payable to the defendant as trustee, or to bearer, and was secured by a mortgage given by the plantation company to the defendant as trustee for the bondholders, as appears by reference to the bond annexed to and forming a part of the declaration, is immaterial. Nash v. Minnesota Title, &c., Co., 159 Mass. 437; Brewer v. Slater, 18 App. Cas. (D. C.) 48. It is further contended that no consideration is shown. We think there is. The warranty is alleged to have been made at the time of the sale. It was therefore a part of the entire contract, and the price paid for the bond constitutes the consideration for it. 30 Am. & Eng. Encycl. L. (2d ed.) 132. * We think the second count is bad. It sets up that "the defendant, acting for the Bayamon Plantation Company, in consideration that the said plaintiff, at the special instance and request of the said defendant, would buy of said Bayamon Plantation Company a certain bond. * the said defendant undertook and then and there faithfully promised." &c., and then continues with the same allegations as the first count. This count therefore comes within the rule that when a person acts and contracts avowedly as the agent of another, who is known as the principal, his acts and contracts, within the scope of his authority, are the acts and contracts of the principal, and involve no personal liability on the part of the agent. Colloty v. Schuman, 44 Vroom 92; Hauenstein v. Ruh, Id. 98. The third count is also bad. It varies from the second count in alleging that the defendant, acting as trustee under the mortgage, requested the plaintiff to purchase the bond, and in consideration that the plaintiff, at the special instance and request of the defendant, would purchase such bond from the defendant, which the defendant sold as trustee for the Bayamon Plantation Company at and for a certain price or sum of money to be therefor paid to the defendant, trustee for the Bayamon Plantation Company, the defendant under |