NO ENGAGEMENTS TO USE FORCE

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Sir William Byles asked the prime minister whether he will say if this country is under any, and, if so, what, obligation to France to send an armed force in certain contingencies to operate in Europe; and, if so, what are the limits of our agreements, whether by assurance or treaty with the French nation?

Joseph King asked the prime minister (1) whether the foreign policy of this country is at the present time unhampered by any treaties, agreements or obligations under which British military forces would, in certain eventualities, be called upon to be landed on the Continent and join in military operations; and (2) whether, in 1905, 1908 or 1911, this country spontaneously offered to France the assistance of a British army to be landed on the Continent to support France in the event of European hostilities?

The Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith): As has been repeatedly stated, this country is not under any obligation not public and known to Parliament which compels it to take part in any war. In other words, if war arises between European powers there are no unpublished agreements which will restrict or hamper the freedom of the Government or of Parliament to decide whether or not Great Britain should participate in a war. The use that would be made of the naval or military forces if the Government and Parliament decided to take part in a war is, for obvious reasons, not a matter about which public statements can be made beforehand.'

If the Triple Entente had been aggressive in its nature naval and military conventions between Russia and Great Britain would have been negotiated. No suggestion of a military convention was made, and no naval agreement was concluded. This was very definitely stated by Sir Edward Grey in Parliament on June 11, 1914:

Joseph King asked whether any naval agreement has been recently entered into between Russia and Great Britain; and whether any negotiations, with a view to a naval agreement, have recently taken place or are now pending between Russia and Great Britain?

Sir William Byles asked the secretary of state for foreign affairs whether he can make any statement with regard to an alleged new naval agreement between Great Britain and Russia; how far such agreement would affect our relations with Germany; and will he lay papers?

Sir Edward Grey: The hon. member for North Somerset asked a similar question last year with regard to military forces, and the hon. member for North Salford asked a similar question also on the same day, as he has

Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, House of Commons, L, 1316–1317.

again done to-day. The prime minister then replied that, if war arose between European powers, there were no unpublished agreements which would restrict or hamper the freedom of the Government or of Parliament to decide whether or not Great Britain should participate in a war. That answer covers both the questions on the paper. It remains as true to-day as it was a year ago. No negotiations have since been concluded with any power that would make the statement less true. No such negotiations are in progress, and none are likely to be entered upon so far as I can judge. But if any agreement were to be concluded that made it necessary to withdraw or modify the prime minister's statement of last year, which I have quoted, it ought, in my opinion, to be, and I suppose that it would be, laid before Parliament.'

"TURNS OF THE ITALIAN WALTZ"

It would be unfair to Italy not to relate in this summary what have been called the "turns of the Italian waltz." By this term is meant the engagements or understandings on matters possibly within the scope of the Triple Alliance which Italy developed with countries outside the alliance. In reality, these were the only dependable efforts made on the part of its members to keep the political situation healthy in Europe. They were stabilizing in their effect, and it was noticeable that Italy's relations were usually better with her friends than with her allies. This condition was almost a permanent one in European politics, and was one of its important imponderables.

In October, 1891, M. Giers, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, had an interview with Marquis di Rudini, the Italian foreign minister, at Monza, where they found their policies were in no wise antagonistic. At Milan in November an agreement was concluded "by which Russia probably consented to intervene with France under certain hypotheses in the Near East."3 Italy's previous agreement with Great Britain respecting the Mediterranean was thus supplemented, and five years later, on September 28, 1896, the question of Tunis, whose acquisition by France in 1881 had been a blow to Italian ambitions, was laid to rest between the two powers.

'Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, House of Commons, LXIII, 457-458.

'London Times, October 20, 1891, page 3; Le Mémorial diplomatique, 1891, 660, 676, 678. Albin, La Guerre allemand. D'Agadir à Serajevo, 231.

ITALY'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

213

On that date three conventions relating to commerce, navigation, consular rights and privileges, establishment and extradition and applicable solely to Tunisia were signed by France and Italy, all being ratified on January 23, 1897. It is noteworthy that these, as well as the Franco-Italian agreement of 1902, all with states outside the Triple Alliance, proved permanent.

It was different with the separate arrangements with AustriaHungary, as the sequel showed. In 1897 Austria-Hungary and Italy sought to settle their respective claims in Albania. Albin2 cites the treaty of November 6, 1897, respecting Albania, signed by Count Agenor von Goluchowski for Austria-Hungary and by Count Emilio Visconti-Venosta and Marquis di Rudini for Italy. By it the contracting powers declared their respective territorial disinterestedness in Albania; declared in favor of the status quo (Ottoman sovereignty); guaranteed, if the status quo were altered, Albanian autonomy and independence, and that the territory should not fall under the sovereignty of a third power.

Yet in 1910 the situation remained so unsatisfactory that after an exchange of views only this indefinite communiqué was issued:

Count Aerenthal and Marquis di San Giuliano acquired the absolute conviction of concordance of ideas of Austria-Hungary and Italy on questions of the Orient and especially on the Turkish question, and that neither of the two powers pursues in the Orient particular purposes or seeks special advantages.3

Only a year later Italy was at war with Turkey and was being hard pressed by demands from the Ballhausplatz for compensation.

Before this occurred Italy had opportunity to learn the quality of Entente-cordiale diplomacy. On December 13, 1906, two agreements were signed at London between Great Britain, France and Italy respecting Abyssinia, whose proximity to Eritrea made it really within the Italian sphere of influence. One of these related to the

De Clerq, Les Traités de la France, XX, 597-625; Trattati, convenzioni, etc., XIV, 309–350. The French position in Tunisia was subsequently recognized by declarations as follows: Russia and Switzerland, October 14, 1896; Germany, November 18, 1896; Belgium, January 2, 1897; Spain, January 12, 1897; Denmark, January 26, 1897; Netherlands, April 3, 1897; Sweden and Norway, May 5, 1897; Great Britain, September 18, 1897 (De Clerq, loc. cit., 626-632).

La Guerre allemand. D'Agadir à Serajevo, 229-230.

Archives diplomatiques, CXV, 381-382.

importation of arms and ammunition,' and the other confirmed Italy's special interests in the country by this provision:

Art. 1. France, Great Britain and Italy are in agreement to maintain the political and territorial status quo in Ethiopia as determined by the existing state of affairs. . . .2

THE WORLD'S OLDEST ALLIANCE

Great Britain and Portugal have been allies for 545 years. No political alignment can compare with it for permanence. Through the storms and stress of half a millennium these two nations have remained friends and at peace with each other "against all men that may live or die," despite causes of difference as numerous and many times as serious as those arising between any other nations. It would almost seem that the negotiators of the first alliance spoke only the literal truth in the treaty jargon of the time when they declared a perpetual friendship and league of pure affection.

A word as to the origin of this alliance, which, originating 119 years before Columbus discovered America, brought Portugal into the fight against Germany in 1916. When the alliance began it was in a different world from ours, a medieval world in which communities were the units. Twenty years before the present alliance was concluded there was signed at London, on October 20, 1353, a treaty of commerce between Edward III, king of England, and the merchants, mariners and marine companies of the maritime states and cities of Portugal, which was in reality an alliance and which is here rendered into English, it is believed, for the first time:

1. There shall be good understanding and firm alliance both by sea and land between the said contracting parties for 50 years reckoned from the date of this treaty.

2. In consequence whereof, the vassals of the king of England will not be injured nor maltreated, either in their persons or their ships, merchandise or other objects belonging to them, by the merchants and mariners or maritime companies of the cities of Lisbon and Oporto.

197 British and Foreign State Papers, 252-253; Nouveau recueil général de traités, ze série, XXXV, 561. '97 British and Foreign State Papers, 486-490; Nouveau recueil général de traités, 3e série, V, 733.

A BIT OF MEDIEVAL HISTORY

215

3. Likewise, merchants and companies of the said cities will not receive injury, vexation or prejudice in their persons, ships, merchandise or other objects from the mariners of England, Gascony, Ireland and Wales, nor from any subject of the king of England.

4. None of the populace or subjects of either party shall contract an alliance with the enemies, opponents or adversaries of the other, cause prejudice nor lend them aid or succor.'

The circumstances which originated the alliance 20 years later were dynastic. Ferdinand I of Portugal after the death of Peter the Cruel of Castile in 1367 or 1368 pretended to the throne of that kingdom and from 1369 to 1371 was on that account at war with Henry II of Trastamara, who made good his claim to the kingdom. Ferdinand celebrated a treaty of league with the Moorish king of Granada against Henry, while the king of Aragon had recognized him by treaty as sovereign of Castile. Intending to make a new war against Henry, he wrote to the Duke of Lancaster, who had pretensions to the Castilian throne through his mother, inviting him to join the venture. A treaty of peace and alliance was celebrated at Braga in July, 1372, directed against Henry of Trastamara and Peter IV of Aragon. Ferdinand thereupon sought to use this treaty as a basis for a similar union with England, the Duke of Lancaster being the third son of Edward III. Accordingly, he issued full powers to negotiators on November 27, 1372, and the alliance was signed on June 16, 1373.2

1 Visconde Manuel Francisco de Barros de Santarem, Quadro elementar, XIV, 40-41; Rymer's Foedera, V, 763. ⚫ Santarem, Quadro Elementar, XIV, xlii-xlv.