distinction between them. In the first there exists a permanent provision that the two States shall be commonly represented by a single sovereign. In the latter, community of ruler is accidental, and is occasioned by one sovereign becoming invested by descent or other casual circumstance with two or more rulerships.

The two main types of the composite State are the Confederacy (Staatenbund) and the Federal State (Bundesstaat).

240. Degrees of relationship among states. A classification of the relation that may exist among states that is of especial value in international affairs follows:

The best line of demarcation of classes among nations is that of the responsibility of a common agent in the exercise of rights over the entire territory of the nation. Where a nation exercises rights, if at all, through its own exclusive agents, or through an agent who, though common to another nation, is yet responsible to itself for the exercise of its rights, or where the rights exercised by its common agents extend to only a portion of its territory, the nation is commonly called independent; where, on the contrary, a common agent exercises one or more of the rights of a nation as to its whole territory, without responsibility to it, the nation is said to be dependent. Among independent nations, it is seen, there may be distinguished three groups: (1) those that exercise all the rights of independence that they possess through their own agents; (2) those that have rights exercised by agents responsible to themselves in common with other nations; and (3) those that have rights exercised as to a portion of their territory by agents who, within the limits of their office, are not directly responsible to themselves.

The bare relinquishment or deprivation of certain of the rights of independence is not regarded as a material impairment of that attribute. Two categories of independent nations in this situation are recognized. One of these consists of neutralized states, which do not possess the right of offensive warfare; and the other comprises tributary states, which are under an obligation to pay a tax to another nation. With this group may also be placed nations which enjoy rights not generally possessed by independent nations and hence not necessary to the conception of independence. These are guaranteed states.

The employment of a common agent, responsible to each of the several nations, constitutes an alliance or union. Such is the personal union in which two or more nations have a common ruler through accident or coincidence. The real union or confederation is a form in which the employment of a common agent is the result of treaty. In both the personal union and the real union or confederation the rights

exercised by the common agent include always a part at least of the rights of treating with other nations. Many unions of states through which are established commissions of one kind or another are not classified in international law, owing to their temporary character or to the relative unimportance of the rights exercised by the agent.

The third class of independent nations consists of those, one or more of whose rights are exercised as to a portion of their territory by an agent not responsible to themselves. Such are the nations subject to the exercise within definite areas of their territories of foreign consular jurisdiction over aliens of the consuls' nationality. Such also are the nations, portions of whose territories are administered by a common agent not responsible to themselves. Territory thus held is known partly as leased territory and partly as vassal territory. The nation that possesses the right of territory is the suzerain state; the nation to which the common agent is responsible is the lessee or administering state. A dependent nation is one that has an agent not directly responsible to itself in common with some other nation for the exercise of one or more of its rights of independence as to its entire territory. Of this class is the protected state, which differs from the guaranteed state in that in return for protection it relinquishes some portion of its independence to the exercise of a common agent. An administered state is unlike the protected state in that the rights exercised by the common agent in the former include those concerned purely with internal administration.

241. Forms of union. Burgess considers the main forms of union for the purpose of showing that no such thing as a compound state can exist; but that, at most, only a dual system of government may be created.

Two states in personal union form no compound state. They do not even form a compound government. A personal union of two or more states results when the executive head of the government of one becomes the executive head of the government or governments of the other or others. This person then acts in two or more entirely distinct capacities. . . . The fact that two or more states make use of the same person, or even of the same institution, in their governmental organization, does not make these states a compound state. Its influence toward the consolidation of the states is favorable; but that is another thing.

Again, the confederacy is no compound state. The states forming the same remain separate, simple states. The confederate organization has no power to bind any one of the states entering into the same without its own separate and expressed consent; i.e. it has no sovereignty;

it is no state at all; it is only government. The confederate constitution is a treaty, an interstate agreement. It differs from the usual treaty in two points, viz.; it creates a sort of governmental organization, or rather a council of advisers, and contains the general agreement on the part of the different states to execute the recommendations of this body; and it has, generally, no limitation as to duration. These are circumstances favorable to the consolidation of the separate states into one state. The very fact of the confederacy is the best of proof that there are natural forces at work conspiring to secure such consolidation. After this consolidation shall have been accomplished, however, there is no compound state as the result; i.e. no state in which the sovereignty is partly in the new state and partly in the old states, but there is a simple state of wider organization.

This last reflection leads to the consideration of the final species of compound state . . . viz.; the federal. I take the ground here, again, that this is no compound state; that there is no such thing as a federal state; and that what is really meant by the phrase is a dual system of government under a common sovereign. If we put this case to a rigid scientific test, we shall find that the so-called federal state is a state which extends over a territory and comprehends a population previously divided into several independent states; that physical, ethnical, economic, and social harmony, conspiring to produce political unity, existed throughout the several states; that consolidation was resisted by the governments of some of the states, possibly by some of the states themselves; that, consequently, the consolidation was produced by violence, and the first organization of the new state was therefore revolutionary, i.e. was not created according to the prescripts of existing law; that the new state under its revolutionary organization has framed a constitution in which it has constructed a government for the general affairs of the whole state, and has left to the old bodies, whose former sovereignty it has destroyed, the residuary powers of government, to be exercised by them, under certain general limitations, as they will, so long as the new state may not see fit to make other disposition in reference to them. . . . It is no longer proper to call them states at all.

242. Nature of the union between Austria and Hungary. Lowell discusses the character of this peculiar union, showing its nature and the reasons for its existence.1

If France has been a laboratory for political experiments, AustriaHungary is a museum of political curiosities, but it contains nothing so extraordinary as the relation between Austria and Hungary themselves. 1 By permission of Houghton Mifflin Company.

The explanation of the strange connection is to be found in the fact that the two countries are not held together from within by any affection or loyalty to a common Fatherland, but are forced together by a pressure from outside which makes the union an international and military necessity. Austria, on the one hand, would not be large enough alone to be a really valuable ally to Germany and Italy; and if not an ally, she would be likely to become a prey, for she contains districts which they would be glad to absorb. Moreover, there would be imminent danger of some of her different races breaking into open revolt if the Emperor had not the Hungarian troops at his command. On the other hand, the Magyars without Austria would not be sufficiently strong to block the ambitions of Russia, or resist the tide of panslavism. They would not only have little influence outside their own dominions, but they would run a grave risk of foreign interference in favor of the Slavs in Hungary. The union is, therefore, unavoidable, and it is very little closer than is absolutely necessary to carry out the purposes for which it exists. There is a common army, a common direction of foreign affairs, and a terminable customs union, which is, after all, the most convenient method of defraying part of the cost of the military establishment.

In regard to the system adopted for accomplishing this object, two points are especially noticeable. One is the privileged position of Hungary, which pays thirty-two per cent. of the expenses, and furnishes forty-one per cent. of the troops, but is given one half of the power by law, and practically enjoys even a larger share. The other point is the clumsiness of the machinery, which requires for its working an infinite amount of tact and skill. There is no single authority that has power to settle anything, but every measure involves a negotiation between the two delegations or the two parliaments, and government becomes in consequence an endless series of compromises between legislative bodies belonging to different races which are jealous of each other. Moreover, the true source of power lies in the two parliaments, and to these the joint ministers have no access. It is in fact specially provided that they shall not be members of either cabinet. The ministers of Austria are at least nominally responsible to the lower house of the Reichsrath, and those of Hungary are actually responsible to the Table of Deputies, but the joint ministers are not in fact directly responsible to any legis lative body. One would naturally suppose that a mechanism so intricate and so unwieldy would be continually getting out of order, and in constant danger of breaking down. But political necessity is stronger than perfection of organization, and apart from some radical change in the western half of the monarchy, the forces that have made the dual system work smoothly in the past are likely to produce the same result in the future.

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II. NATURE OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

243. Distinctions between federation and confederation. Dealey points out some of the essential differences between two often-confused forms of organization :

In a confederation the several states composing the unity are individually sovereign, and are merely bound together by a sort of treaty relationship, under the terms of which a joint organization is effected for the performance of specified functions delegated to it. As each state in the union remains sovereign it may legally secede at pleasure, influenced only by the fear of consequences in case it violates obligations existing between itself and the other states of the confederation. In a federation, however, this right of withdrawal is not claimed by the commonwealths in the union, which can only be dissolved by mutual consent. In such a union the sovereignty of the several states merges into the sovereignty of the totality and the commonwealths cease to be international states. They differ, however, in status from provinces or departments in that their autonomy is fully safeguarded by constitution. Furthermore, they are given by constitution a determining voice in the federal government and in the amendment and revision of the national constitution. In a federation, therefore, the unity is permanent and definite, not dissolvable at the whim of one or several of its parts, but only by the united will of all. Its federal government exercises powers that cannot be hindered by individual commonwealths, and that must be altered if at all by united action. under the constitution. On the other hand, the commonwealths of the federation exercise sovereign powers in purely local matters without interference from the federal government, and each has a voice in the settlement of all matters that concern the welfare of the union as a whole.

244. Distinguishing marks of a federal state. Wilson considers the following to be the essential features of federal union:

The federal state has, as contrasted with a confederation, these distinguishing features: (a) A permanent surrender on the part of the constituent communities of their right to act independently of each other in matters which touch the common interest, and the consequent fusion of these communities, in respect of these matters, into what is practically a single state. As regards other states they have merged their individuality into one national whole: the lines which separate them are none of them on the outside but all on the inside. (b) The federal state possesses a special body of federal law and a special federal