the records and qualifications of such officials, and soon eliminates all but a few names, the choice usually lying between no more than three or four candidates by the time the question comes before the council.

425. The mayor in England. In England the position of the mayor is largely honorary, his governing power being comparatively small.

The selection of a mayor is seldom a difficult problem in English municipalities; for the post is not, as it is in the cities of the United States, one of any serious administrative importance. Executive ability and experience are in no wise essential to the proper performance of mayoral duties; for these, being very largely of a social nature, make heavier demands upon the mayor's purse and personality than upon his skill as a governing authority. He must entertain distinguished visitors to the borough, must assume a prominent part in all civic ceremonies and festivities, and must, above all things, be a leader in local philanthropic enterprises, incidentally contributing with generosity to their exchequers. His only special administrative function is that of presiding at meetings of the council, and even this he need not perform if it be not to his liking. In short, to the end that he may fill his position capably and satisfactorily, the mayor of an English borough must ordinarily be a man of some wealth, preferably with leisure and social attainments.

Ordinarily the English mayor receives no stipend. The council is empowered by law to grant him from the borough funds "such remuneration as it may think reasonable"; but many boroughs pay nothing at all, and, save in the largest boroughs, those which grant remuneration rarely afford anything approaching his personal outlay in the performance of his civic functions. Tenure of the office even for a single year thus involves some financial sacrifice; but as a rule the post is satisfactorily filled without much trouble, for wealth and social aspirations are likely to be more plentiful than administrative energy and experience. It has sometimes been said that a wealthy peer makes an ideal English mayor; at any rate, if any such happens to reside within the fifteen-mile limit he is pretty certain to be invited to the post, and, if necessary, cajoled or persuaded into accepting it. In default of a peer, some opulent bourgeois who is willing to prove his liberality may have an opportunity to do so as the chief magistrate of the borough.

426. Need of experts in city administration. One of the crying needs in the administration of American cities is well stated in the following:

The adoption of a proper city plan, well-constructed sewers, convenient means of transportation, an ample supply of potable water, good housing conditions, a wise administration of an effective health and building law, and well-managed schools which teach what urban populations really need, all these things are necessary if we would have a healthy and happy city life. All these things require the organization of a permanent and intelligent administrative personnel, who shall exercise the wide powers necessarily granted to them in the interest of the city people, and who shall rigorously refrain from using these powers in the interest of particular classes or of favored individuals.

How to organize such a force is one of the great problems in city government. For if we accord an administrative force a position which is too permanent in character, i.e., too much relieved from popular control, it is apt to become arbitrary in its action and given up to red tape, and may easily degenerate into an engine of oppression, which is used to further individual interest. If we may judge from the experience of the western world we shall probably reach the conclusion that cities, unaided by the state, find it exceedingly difficult to establish and permanently retain such an expert administrative force. The cities of Great Britain, it is true, have succeeded in doing so without such aid, but in the cities of Prussia, where the administrative force is probably more efficient than elsewhere, the qualifications of city officers and their methods of appointment are fixed in great detail by state law. In the United States, on the other hand, it may be said that few if any cities have, even with the aid of the civil service laws passed by the state, succeeded in rescuing from the operation of the spoils system by which American administrative institutions have so long been cursed, any but their most unimportant employees. Even those are appointed for almost purely political reasons in most cases where such action is not forbidden by state law.

VI. MUNICIPAL REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES

427. Essential defects of city government in the United States. Some of the defects in city government arise from the nature of city populations or from the conditions of city existence, and are practically impossible to remedy. Others may be removed by intelligent public spirit.

Among the inherent defects is the rapid change in the make-up of the cities. Where population is increasing with leaps and bounds, no city government makes sufficient provision for the future. For instance,

had the people of the great cities fifty years ago foreseen the present use of pipes, they would have prevented the intolerable digging up of the streets by providing subways into which new pipes could be introduced as needed. Hardly a city in the country makes provision in advance for the growth of the school population, and hence the pitiful spectacle of thousands of children in some cities turned away on the day of the opening of school, because there is not room for them.

The shifting of population to and fro, the rise and sometimes the decay of suburbs, necessarily cause wastefulness in the expenditure of public money. The movement of people from country to town, from town to city, from city to large city, from large city to another large city, prevents the formation of a civic pride, which must be the basis of good government. The large amount of city business, the great problem of transporting literally hundreds of thousands of people to and from their avocations, the question of proper terminal facilities for steamrailroads, these are difficulties which cannot be obviated. Furthermore, the division of powers between the nation, state, and cities, while salutary, tends to sacrifice the interests of the city to those of the state.

(1) Of the non-inherent difficulties, first in importance is the confusion of the fundamental laws for the cities. Many city charters are not well balanced or adjusted, because drafted by men who have had small experience in city government. . . .

(2) The next difficulty is the constant interference of the states in city government, not only by the altering of the charters, but by new legislation throwing additional duties upon all the cities, and by special acts expressly intended to aid or depress the political leaders of the city government for the time being. Well-intentioned legislation produces confusion, and ill-intentioned legislation sometimes paralyzes a good administration. . . .

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(3) Another difficulty is adherence to bad methods of government. In most cities, both the mayor and the council have too little power; they are both too much tied up by legislative acts, and hence both work at a disadvantage; there are too many officers, elective and appointive, and their terms are too brief.

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(4) Another trouble very hard to prevent is occasional corruption in the city government. This may also occur in state or national affairs, but is perhaps more common in cities because it is harder to fix responsibility, and because there is so much detail in city business that it is hard to watch it.

428. Needs of city government in the United States. The fundamental changes needed in the political position and

governmental organization of cities in the United States are indicated in the following:

The attempt has also been made to show that the remedy for the evils of American city life is to be found, not so much in a change in the governmental organization of the city as in a change in its position in both the legal and the extra-legal political system. What is needed is a recognition, both in law and in political practice, that whatever else the city may be, it is also an organization for the satisfaction of local needs, and in such capacity should act largely free from state control — both the control exercised by the state government, and the control exercised by the state party. . .

What our cities need then are large powers of local government, the exercise of which, where necessary, shall be subjected to an administrative rather than a legislative control; separate elections for municipal offices; fewer elective officers; a more compact and concentrated organization, and greater freedom than at present is usually accorded to municipal citizens to nominate candidates for municipal offices. If changes in these directions were made, it would certainly be easier for the urban population to see more clearly than they now see what city government means to them and to free themselves in their municipal politics from the domination of the state and national parties.

429. Merits and defects of the commission plan. Professor Munro makes the following generalizations based upon the brief experience of American cities with the commission plan of gov

ernment:

The cardinal advantage of the system is that it affords definite hope of putting an end to the intolerable decentralization of responsibility which now characterizes American civic administration. By concentrating powers and focusing public attention upon a narrow area it will render more effective the scrutiny which the voters may apply to the conduct of men in public office. . . . It will undoubtedly facilitate the election of a higher type of men, for American municipal experience has plainly demonstrated that small bodies with large powers attract a better class of citizens than large bodies with restricted jurisdiction. . . .

Again, it is well known that municipal corruption nowadays arises as frequently from the power of municipal authorities to thwart the meritorious plans of public-service corporations as from their power to forward reprehensible projects. . . . A small commission would, indeed, simplify the task of dealing with civic franchises on a business basis. . . .

Still again, as we are frequently reminded, the work of administering the affairs of a city is in every essential respect akin to that of conducting the affairs of a private business corporation. Now, the salient characteristic of sound corporate management is the centralization of powers in the hands of a small board of directors. . . .

The system of government by commission will serve to render municipal administration more prompt and more effective in action.... In local administration promptness and efficiency are imperative; and it may be properly urged that, in order to secure these essential qualities, a municipality is justified in weakening its organs of deliberation and in assuming a reasonable amount of risk that concentrated power will be abused.

The most common objection urged in the public press and by the rank and file of municipal politicians is that the plan is un-American and undemocratic; that it involves a radical departure from American traditions of local self-government and proposes a step in the direction of municipal dictatorships. . . .

Political education, it has been observed, consists in the exercise not only of the right to choose but of the right to be chosen in candidacy and in service — and under the present municipal régime such education is annually afforded to a large number of citizens. The plan of government by commission proposes greatly to reduce this number. It would cut down the list of elective officers to four or five, all other posts being filled by appointment presumably for long terms. This policy, it is objected, would tend to vest the work of civic administration permanently in the hands of a very few men, and might very well assist in the development, as in the German cities, of a professional city bureaucracy. . . .

Again, objection is made that the system will serve to strengthen rather than to weaken the influence of the regular partisan organizations in civic affairs. The concentration of power and patronage in the hands of a few commissioners would, it is claimed, make it seem imperative to the party leaders that the commission should be controlled; and the party energies, now spread over a wider area, would thus be concentrated at a single point.

Without a change of personnel, the substitution of government by commission for the existing system would assuredly avail but little. Indeed, a corrupt or an inefficient commission with wide powers would be much more capable of injuring the best interests of a city than an equally corrupt or inefficient set of administrative organs with powers and patronage decentralized; for the very complexity and cumbrousness of the present system serves in some degree to place an obstacle in the way of any widespread or consistent wrongdoing.

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