never thought," says that distinguished jurist and Christian, "I never thought that my profession should either necessitate a man to use his eloquence, by extenuations or aggravations, to make any thing look worse or better than it deserves, or could justify a man in it; to prostitute my eloquence or rhetoric in such a way, I ever held to be most basely mercenary, and that it was below the worth of a man, much more a Christian, to do so.'

If Lord Brougham's remarks are to be regarded as the calm utterances of his cool judgment, and not as the result of excitement produced by a trial of unusual interest and importance; and if his sentiments were generally entertained and carried into practice by the bar, we should greatly fear the corruption of justice in the country, and should be the last to commend the pursuit of the law as a high and honorable and Christian calling. But they are not so to be regarded. His own cooler and more dispassionate consideration of the disastrous consequences of the universal acceptance of his doctrines has doubtless satisfied him of his error; and the day, we hope, is far in the future, when such sentiments as these shall meet with favor from an enlightened bar. While duty demands the exercise of the best gifts with which the advocate is endowed by his Maker, and their exercise to the utmost extent, it has never required-it never will require, that he should plead the cause of injustice, or espouse the defence of iniquity. Strictly consonant is this remark with the further one, that even the guilty man should be defended. Guilty as he is, the law annexes to his guilt but a certain penalty; and the infliction of a penalty variant from that either in character or degree, would be a clear violation of justice, and of the plainest dictates of right. He needs then an adviser and defender to protect him from the unjust infliction of a severer penalty than he deserves; and the Christian lawyer may rightly assume his defence for that purpose. It is equally true that even guilt had better go unpunished, than that the solemn sanctions and safeguards the law has thrown around the lives and liberties of the people should be violated. And so, when in order to exe

cute speedily upon the culprit the extreme penalties of the law, lynch-law is resorted to, every just-minded and reasonable and law-loving citizen exclaims against the outrage -even though the object of it be notoriously guilty of crimes of deepest malignity. If in popular outbreaks thus characterized, the guilty are punished without the law and against the law, and the punishment is thus decried as unjust and iniquitous, it is true also that where any of the barriers erected for the protection of life and liberty are broken down by a yielding or timid judiciary, or removed by a truculent and trimming bar, and even the guilty are thus punished, a wrong is done an injury is inflicted which the culprit may not alone complain of, but the body of the people as well. The honor of the State, the vindication of justice, and the lives and liberties of the citizen are as much concerned in the proper defence of the accused culprit at the bar, as in his due prosecution and conviction by legal means, by the prosecuting attorney; and a high philosophy and a profound knowledge of the question in its diversified relations, would teach us that we are as much interested in the one as in the other. Take, for example, the case of a man indicted for murder. He has been guilty of an atrocious crime. He deserves to suffer the extreme penalty of the law; but he must suffer it in a legal way. He is a freeman, and entitled under the laws to be tried by a jury of his peers-his equals. Did not his peers sit upon his trial, a verdict of guilty might be returned against him, or without a verdict the judge might pronounce the sentence of execution, but in neither case ought the law or justice to sanction it. He is entitled to be confronted with his accusers. A conviction obtained by testimony secured privately, apart from his presence, and with no opportunity on his part to test the accuracy of the memory, or the veracity of the witness, would be unjust, and such a conviction ought not to stand. He is entitled to have his triers sworn or solemnly affirmed, before passing upon the question of his life or death. If they are not, and they convict, the conviction is, it ought to be, naught. He is entitled to a speedy trial, while the recollection of witnesses is fresh, and

the circumstances attending the fact, preceding or following it, may be accurately detailed-while his own witnesses are in being, and may be had. If his trial be unreasonably delayed, and the facts have faded from the memory, and witnesses have died or removed to distant places, and beyond the reach of the court, and he is convicted because of their absence or death, the conviction is unjust, and should be annulled. Last of all, he is entitled to an acquittal until he is proved to be guilty, and if the proof fails, and the judge, pressed by outside popular sentiment, or thirsting for blood, or influenced by the moral conviction of guilt upon his own mind, either by actions or by words, either in admitting improper testimony or rejecting that which is proper, influences the mind of the jury wrong, and they convict, and the man is hung-the culprit is judicially murdered!; he has suffered a penalty the law did not demand, and his execution should be viewed with no higher favor than if, immediately upon the commission of the crime, a fierce and angry populace had hurried him to the gallows without the mockery of an unjust trial. In all these steps, the man needs assistance. To protect him in his rights he should have the counsel and aid of those who know his rights, and who will maintain them. Who shall say, that the Christian lawyer, even in such a case, owes it not to himself and to the ordinary law of humanity, to the cardinal rule of love to his neighbor, laid down specifically by the Savior, to undertake the cause of the culprit, and to guard for him his rights?-for rights he has; the law has guaranteed them to him; and he is wronged, he is unjustly dealt with, if they be taken away.

This is an extreme case, and one usually put to the lawyer as a test of conscience. We have seen that to espouse even such a cause is not altogether beyond excuse; that it may be right. We confess that we cannot see that a judicial trial and conviction by any unfair or unlawful means, and subsequent punishment, differ from an execution by lynch-law; or, if there be differences, that they are not in favor of the latter, for while the process of lynching must, from the necessity of the case, be notorious, and of infre

quent and extraordinary occurrence, judicial murderings without law or evidence, might be perpetrated in secret and without responsibility! If prisoners are protected by appropriate counsel, these will but infrequently occur if they were wholly undefended, their numbers would be greatly enlarged.*

*Mr. Brown mentions a remarkable case in which an innocent man narrowly escaped final conviction, though without the leanings of the court against him, and though defended by counsel. The case was this: Van Vliet, the "defendant, was prosecuted for having stolen three thousand dollars in foreign gold, (sovereigns.) The prosecutrix swore that she had that amount of money which she had been collecting for a long time; that the prisoner upon one occasion introduced himself into her house, under pretence of desiring to buy old watches or jewelry; that at the time he entered, she was engaged in counting her gold, but put it in her bureau for the purpose of bringing down an old watch; that when she came down, after a few minutes conversation the prisoner left the house, and upon her then going to the drawer, the gold was gone. She swore, also, to the identity of the prisoner, who was a Frenchman, and speaking very broken English, and somewhat deformed in person.

"The next witness was a confederate, who testified that he knew the defendant, and had lived with him for about two weeks; that on the day of the alleged loss of money, the defendant came home and had with him a large quantity of gold, of the description sworn to; that they counted it together, and that the number of sovereigns exactly corresponded with the amount lost; that the day after, these sovereigns were melted down by the mint, and that the product, in new American coinage, was handed over to the defendant. The officer of the mint proved the melting, and the payment to the defendant. The new coin was all found on the person of the defendant.

"Now, upon this testimony, what could be plainer than the guilt of the defendant?

The defendant was a stranger-he denied his guilt; nobody knew him. He averred he had brought the money from Liverpool-produced some little evidence that he had such money on his arrival. But this would not do; he was convicted, and the money was about passing into the hands of the prosecutrix.

'Newly discovered testimony was the ground of motion for a new trial. The new trial was granted, and by consent of the Attorney-General, a commission issued to England.

"Upon the second trial, it appeared that the prosecutrix had no such money.

That the defendant had received English sovereigns for French gold, in Liverpool. That he had employed the confederate to interpret for him for two weeks, and had counted the money with him, and then carried it to the mint, and obtained in lieu American gold. That having dismissed his interpreter, that person concocted the above scheme, with the prosecutrix, for the purpose of gratifying his revenge, obtaining the money, and dividing the spoils.

"He was, of course, acquitted."

Had not this man been assisted by counsel, he would doubtless have been condemned and punished as a felon. Even with the assistance of

Having disproved the charge of immorality, when alleged as an universal fact in relation to the defence of a known criminal, we are now ready to examine into that branch of the objection urged against the bar, which charges them with the neglect of Christianity. It is too true that as a class legal men are not peculiarly distinguished for Christian character and devotion. While not falling behind others in contributing its quota of excellent Christian men, the legal profession has not, in proportion to its superior advantages, multiplied the numbers of sincere and devoted Christians. The fact is, there are hindrances not a few to Christian devotion at the bar. The prevailing tone of sentiment of leading men in the profession seems to discourage a high degree of spirituality, and, indeed, all spirituality whatever. In some circles, and those too claiming respectability and influence, the name of Christian is flouted, or spoken of in light and irreverential terms. Unfortunately, it is too true that there are very many at the bar who willingly unite in unjust and harsh criticisms of barristers who profess Christianity. This is practical scepticism. Besides, scepticism and infidelity in theory, are openly avowed and defended. There are not a few who are led into these delusions by a desire for the reputation of superior sagacity; and others have learned to repeat by rote the ordinary objections to the Christian religion, and to dwell with apparent satisfaction upon the errors and inconsistencies of professors of Christianity. All this is beyond question true; and the Christian barrister is oft times tempted to believe that he encounters more discouragements in his Christian life than he would do, were he engaged in any other pursuit.

Many of the bar do, as we have said, pay an outward and decent respect to the observances of the house of worship. Many, however, on the other hand, regard the public worship as but a veil to conceal hypocrisy, and cover over the

counsel, the record of convictions of innocent men, to all appearances guilty, is not small. Their number would be almost indefinitely multiplied, if lawyers were to usurp the powers of the judge, and first determine as to the guilt of the accused before they undertake his defence.