most likely to give weight to the offer. It is a bridge which I am willing to build, for the pride of France to retreat over; but what I wish to warn the house against, is the resting satisfied with building the bridge, to the neglect of those measures by which France may be induced to march over it, after it shall be built. I wish to negotiate, and I even rely much on success; but the success of the negotiation must be secured on this floor. It must be secured by adopting firm language and energetic measures; measures which will convince France, that those opinions respecting this country on which her system is founded, are wholly erroneous; that we are neither a weak, a pusillanimous or a divided people; that we are not disposed to barter honour for quiet, nor to save our money at the expense of our rights: which will convince her that we understood her projects, and are determined to oppose them, with all our resources, and at the hazard of all our possessions. This, I believe, is the way to insure success to the negotiation; and without this I shall consider it as a measure equally vain, weak, and delusive.

When France shall at length be convinced, that we are firmly resolved to call forth all our resources, and exert all our strength to resist her encroachments and aggressions, she will soon desist from them. She need not be told what these resources are; she well knows their greatness and extent; she well knows that this country, if driven into a war, could soon become invulnerable to her attacks, and could throw a most formidable and preponderating weight into the scale of her adversary. She will not therefore drive us to this extremity, but will desist as soon as she finds us determined. I have already touched on our means of injuring France, and of repelling her attacks; and if those means were less than they

are, still they might be rendered all sufficient, by reso lution and courage. It is in these that the strength of nations consists, and not in fleets, nor armies, nor population, nor money: in the "unconquerable will-the courage never to submit or yield." These are the true sources of national greatness; and to use the words of a celebrated writer," where these means are not wanting, all others will be found or created." It is by these means that Holland, in the days of her glory, triumphed over the mighty power of Spain. It is by these that in later times, and in the course of the present war, the Swiss, a people not half so numerous as us, and possessing few of our advantages, have honourably maintained their neutrality amid the shock of surrounding states, and against the haughty aggressions of France herself. The Swiss have not been without their trials. They had given refuge to many French emigrants, whom their vengeful and implacable country had driven and pursued from state to state, and whom it wished to deprive of their last asylum in the mountains of Swisserland. The Swiss were required to drive them away, under the pretence that to afford them a retreat was contrary to the laws of neutrality. They at first temporized and evaded the demand: France insisted; and finding at length that evasion was useless they assumed a firm attitude, and declared that having afforded an asylum to those unfortunate exiles, which no law of neutrality forbad, they would protect them in it at every hazard. France finding them thus resolved, gave up the attempt. This was effected by that determined courage, which alone can make a nation great or respectable: and this effect has invariably been produced by the same cause, in every age and every clime. It was this that made Rome the mistress of the world, and Athens the protectress of Greece. When was it that

Rome attracted most strongly the admiration of mankind, and impressed the deepest sentiment of fear on the hearts of her enemies? It was when seventy thousand of her sons lay bleeding at Cannæ, and Hannibal victorious over three Roman armies and twenty nations, was thundering at her gates. It was then that the young and heroic Scipio, having sworn on his sword in the presence of the fathers of the country, not to despair of the republic, marched forth at the head of a people, firmly resolved to conquer or die; and that resolution insured them the victory. When did Athens appear the greatest and the most formidable? It was when giving up their houses and possessions to the flames of the enemy, and having transferred their wives, their children, their aged parents, and the symbols of their religion, on board of their fleet, they resolved to consider themselves as the republic, and their ships as their country. It was then they struck that terrible blow, under which the greatness of Persia sunk and expired.

These means, sir, and many others are in our power. Let us resolve to use them, and act so as to convince France that we have taken the resolution, and there is nothing to fear. This conviction will be to us instead of fleets and armies, and even more effectual. Seeing us thus prepared she will not attack us. Then will she listen to our peaceable proposals; then will she accept the concessions we mean to offer. But should this offer not be thus supported, should it be attended by any circumstances from which she can discover weakness, distrust or division, then will she reject it with derision and scorn. I view in the proposed amendment circumstances of this kind; and for that, among other reasons shall vote against it. I shall vote against it not because I am for war, but because I am for peace; and because I see in this amendment itself, and more especially in the course to which VOL. 2 X

it points, the means of impeding, instead of promoting our pacific endeavours. And let it be remembered that when we give this vote, we vote not only on the peace of our country, but on what is far more important, on its rights and its honour.

SPEECH OF WILLIAM L. SMITH,

ON MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS.

To those who are not minutely versed in the detail of our history during the first ten years of independence, the following speeches of Mr. Smith and Mr. Ames will not be sufficiently intelligible, without an explanation of all the leading circumstances connected with the subject of them.

On the 23d of February, 1791, the house of representatives passed a resolution, requiring the secretary of state "to report to congress the nature and extent of the privi leges and restrictions of the commercial intercourse of the United States with foreign nations, and the measures which he should think proper to be adopted for the improvement of the commerce and navigation of the same."

Early in the session of 1793, the secretary of state* made a report in pursuance of that resolution, in which he stated, among other matters, that one half of the exports of the United States was carried to Great Britain and its dominions; and that of its imports four-fifths were brought from the same countries; while not quite a sixth part of the shipping belonging to America was employed

* Mr. Jefferson.

in the trade with Great Britain and its dependencies. That in England, the trade of the United States was in general on as good a footing as the trade of other countries. That by their celebrated act passed in the reign of Charles the 2d, foreign vessels were permitted to bring into the European ports of Great Britain articles which were the growth or manufacture of the country to which the vessel belonged-BUT that this privilege was not extended to the colonies. By an act, however, subsequent to the recognition of American independence, the crown was authorized to extend this principle to the vessels of the United States, and the extension had been made from year to year, by proclamation. That the insecurity of the tenure by which this right was held produced a discrimination between American and foreign bottoms, which, though hitherto inoperative in fact, was irritating in its tendencies.

That of the commodities of the United States imported into Great Britain, a large proportion was re-exported, subject of course to the charges of intermediate deposit and double voyage-charges which the report termed useless, and a continuance of which, it said, was dictated neither by reason, nor by national interest.

The report then proceeded in the following words: "France has of her own accord proposed negotiations for improving by a new treaty, on fair and equal principles, the commercial relations of the two countries. But her internal disturbances have hitherto prevented the prosecution of them to effect, though we have had repeated assurances of a continuance of the disposition."

"We have no reason to conclude, that friendly arrangements would be declined by other nations, with whom we have such commercial intercourse as may render them important. In the mean while, it would rest with the wisdom of congress to determine whether, as