on Case. In the last-cited case, by this court, the original suit, and both having appeared and Judge Speer says: answered.

"The court, having heard and fully considered said application, is of opinion that same should be in all things denied and refused; and it is accordingly so ordered, adjudged, and decreed."

its motion in this court praying for an af-, Blassingame situated in Ochiltree county, firmance of the judgment and a recovery of and such lands were advertised for sale on 10 per cent. damages for delay. In answer September 2, 1915. to the motion to affirm, Blassingame filed in Thereafter, to wit, on or about August 1, this court a pleading to the effect that short- 1915, Blassingame presented to the presiding ly prior to the institution of the suit in judge of the district court of Tarrant county Tarrant county by the Cattlemens Trust a petition praying that said judgment in said Company he (Blassingame) had instituted a court and said execution sale be enjoined. suit in Ochiltree county, where he resided, to In this petition Blassingame, in substance, cancel for fraud the note which was the set up the facts, so far as necessary to here foundation of the suit and judgment in Tar-state, as we have hereinbefore recited them, rant county; that the case in Ochiltree coun- asserting the superiority of the judgment in ty had been tried upon the issues made by the district court of Ochiltree county, and the pleadings in that case, and that he further averred that he had been misinformed (Blassingame) had recovered a judgment can- as to his right or duty to plead the institution celing the note; that the Cattlemens Trust of the prior suit in Ochiltree county in the Company had duly prosecuted an appeal from suit in Tarrant county, and that he had omitthe Ochiltree county judgment to the Court ted to plead such matter in abatement upon of Civil Appeals for the Seventh Supreme the advice of his attorneys. The district Judicial District, where it was alleged the ap-judge of Tarrant county, to whom the petipeal was then pending. The prayer was that tion was presented, indorsed his fiat thereon, the motion to affirm be dismissed, or in the commanding the Cattlemens Trust Company alternative that this court postpone judgment to appear before him on August 11, 1915, on the motion until after disposition of the and show cause why the temporary writ of appeal from Ochiltree county by the Court injunction prayed for should not be granted. of Civil Appeals for the Seventh Supreme The Cattlemens Trust Company appeared, Judicial District. After due consideration, and on a hearing of the motion, on, to wit, we held, in effect, as will be seen from our the 26th day of August, 1915, Hon. Ben M. published opinion (Blassingame v. Cattle Terrell, judge of said district court of Tarmen's Trust Co., 174 S. W. 900), that the rant county, entered his order stating that: facts set up by Blassingame in answer to the motion constituted a good plea in abatement only, and not a good plea in bar of the action in Tarrant county, and that, Blassingame having failed, after due notice of the Tarrant county suit, to therein plead said matter of abatement, such matter could not be given effect for the first time in this court, and that the same would not constitute cause to refuse the prayer of the motion to affirm, or to grant Blassingame's prayer for a post-trict court of the Thirty-First judicial disponement of our action until after the determination of the appeal from the district court of Ochiltree county. The motion to affirm was accordingly, on, to wit, January 23, 1915, granted by us, and this court duly entered its judgment in favor of the Cattlemens Trust Company for the amount adjudged in its favor below, together with the further sum of 10 per cent. thereon as damages for delay and all costs of the proceedings, against Blassingame and the said sureties upon his supersedeas bond. From this judgment of affirmance Blassingame later sued out a writ of error to our Supreme Court, but the writ was dismissed by that court on the ground of a want of jurisdiction. Yet later, on, to wit, the 23d day of June, 1915, the mandate of this court was regularly issued and transmitted to the district court of Tarrant county, directing the enforcement of our said judgment. The district court of Tarrant county thereupon regularly issued execution, directed to the sheriff of Ochiltree county, commanding him to make the sums of money adjudged by this court, which exe

It does not appear that any appeal was taken from the order last named. The next step on the part of Blassingame was the presentation by him on the 1st day of September, 1915, of a petition to Hon. Frank Willis, respondent herein, judge of the dis

trict, seeking to enjoin the threatened execution sale herein before mentioned and the said judgment upon which it rested. The petition set up the institution of the conflicting judgments, as hereinbefore recited, and the fact of the appeal pending in the Seventh supreme judicial district, omitting any reference to the proceeding in this court which resulted in the judgment of affirmance we have described, and the prayer was that the sheriff of Ochiltree county be "restrained and enjoined from further executing or enforcing said judgment of Tarrant county district court until the decision of the honorable Court of Civil Appeals of Amarillo in this case, and that on final hearing hereof said judgment be made perpetual, and for general and special legal and equitable relief." Hon. Frank Willis indorsed his order upon the petition granting the issuance of the temporary writ of injunction as prayed for, and it is to further proceedings under the writ of injunction issued pursuant to said order that the relator, the Cattlemens Trust Company, now interposes its petition for a

ning of this opinion. The respondents Blas-tition for the injunction. It is so, as we singame and Willis, in obedience to the notice think, in form and in substance. The judgof this court to show cause why the writ ment decrees the payment by the respondent should not issue, have appeared and filed Blassingame and the sureties on his superwritten answers. There is no denial of the sedeas bond, not only of the amount adjudgmaterial facts stated; the contention of re- ed against Blassingame below, but also of the spondents constituting in its essence a mere certain sum of 10 per cent. of the judgment denial, for various reasons, of a power, in of the district court as damages, besides the this court to issue a writ of prohibition such costs of this court, for all of which it is dias sought in this case. rected that execution may issue. The fact [1] While it seems to be true, as respond- that under the statute the judgment is certients insist, that no Court of Civil Appeals in fied to the court below for observance, and Texas has ever issued such a writ, yet we that the execution enjoined was issued out of have no doubt of the power of such court that court, instead of from this court direct, to do so in a proper case. Section 6, article does not alter the character of the judgment, 5, of our Constitution, after providing for a or change the basis of its legal effect. Its division of Texas into supreme judicial dis- vital force has its source in the power vested tricts, and for the establishment of a Court in this court and in issuing the execution the of Civil Appeals in each of said districts, de- lower court only acted in a ministerial caclares, among other things, that such courts pacity. As to this it had no discretion, but "shall have appellate jurisdiction coexten- was required to obey the mandate of its susive with the limits of their respective dis-perior in authority. Burck v. Burroughs, 64 tricts, which shall extend to all civil cases Tex. 445; Moore v. Chamberlain, 152 S. W. of which the district courts or county courts have original or appellate jurisdiction, under such restrictions and regulations as may be prescribed by law." Said section of the Constitution further specially provides that said Courts of Civil Appeals "shall have such other jurisdiction, original and appellate, as may be prescribed by law." Later the Legislature, in defining the jurisdiction of the Court of Civil Appeals, among other things, enacted that:

"The said courts and the judges thereof shall have the power to issue writs of mandamus and all other writs necessary to enforce the jurisdiction of said courts."

195. Such judgment, too, perforce of the statutes and decisions of this state was final (Vernon's Sayles' Texas Civil Statutes, article 1591; Cole v. State [Sup.] 170 S. W. 1036; Gray v. Eleazer, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 417, 94 S. W. 911), and a writ as here sought for restraining

an unauthorized interference with a final judgment of this court must, in its very nature, constitute an aid to our ju

risdiction.

It is doubtless true that in certain exceptional cases a court of equity would entertain an action in the nature of an original suit to restrain a judgment of a trial court, even

See Vernon's Sayles' Texas Civil Statutes, after affirmance, as, for instance, upon proparticle 1592.

Clearly the legislative act quoted was authorized by the terms of the Constitution also quoted, and has all the force that could be given to it, had the same been specifically embodied in the Constitution itself. So that it seems apparent to us that there is no force in the contention that we are without constitutional power to issue a writ of prohibition. And, as we think, in a proper case it is whol ly immaterial whether the jurisdiction exercised by a Court of Civil Appeals in the is suance of such a writ be classified as "original" or as "appellate." Whatever be the proper classification of the power, it is clear that this court and all other Courts of Civil Appeals have been expressly given jurisdiction to issue any writ known to the law found to be necessary to enforce the jurisdiction of the court. The question therefore is: Does the said petition of respondent Blassingame, and the said action thereon of the respondent Hon. Frank Willis, constitute attacks upon the jurisdiction of this court? We think they do.

[2] As we construe the judgment enjoined, it is the judgment of this court, and not that of the district court, as respondents contend,

er allegations of subsequently discovered fraud or perjury in its procurement. But here we have no such state of facts presented. The material facts, in substance, are those that might have been presented in the district court of Tarrant county, which rendered the judgment by default, and which were later in fact presented to this court, as before stated, in opposition to the motion to affirm on certificate. If, after a litigant has had his day in court and exhausted his legal remedies in both the trial court and on appeal, he can avoid the orderly effect and operation of the final decree against him by invoking the aid of other and inferior courts on the same state of facts, then indeed it would be idle for a court of final jurisdiction to attempt an exercise of its power. Such a construction of the law would deprive this court of all real power, contrary to the manifest purpose of the Constitution and Legislature in declaring that our judgments in cases such as the one before us should be final. See McCrimmin v. Cooper, 37 Tex. 423; Kendall v. Mather, 48 Tex. 585. We think it plain, therefore, that the writ of injunction issued out of the district court of the ThirtyFirst judicial district constitutes an attack

as against any objections thus far noticed to the territorial limits of our judicial disthe writ of prohibition herein sought will lie to restrain the district court of Ochiltree county from interpreting our said judgment or from interfering with its proper execution. See Hovey v. Shepherd, 105 Tex. 237, 147 S. W. 224; State v. Spokane Co. Super. Ct., 8 Wash. 591, 36 Pac. 443; State v. Whitney, 66 Fla. 24, 63 South. 299; 32 Cyc. 609, text (e); State v. Drew, 38 La. Ann. 274; In re State, 18 La. Ann. 102.

As

trict. While the Constitution already quoted in general terms limits our appellate jurisdiction to the territorial limits of this district, it is apparent from the whole, when considered in connection with the legislative grants of power, that we have full authority to conclude litigation and render final judgments in causes, such as here in question, arising in our judicial district and properly brought before us. Such power, in accord with the very familiar rule of construction, carries with it by necessary implication the power to issue such process as may be essential to the maintenance of the integrity and vital force of our final decrees. Otherwise the supremacy evidently intended by the Constitution is meaningless. It follows, if necessary to the end, that such process, in the absence of any specific inhibition, will be operative anywhere within the limits of the sovereign power by virtue of which this court exists. Any doubt of this that can arise from a construction of the Constitution alone is dissipated by the statute quoted and already referred to several times, which gives to this court power to issue the extraordinary writs therein named. As stated, the enactment of this statute was clearly authorized by section 6 of article 5 of the Constitution, and the statute expressly authorizes this court to issue all writs necessary to enforce our jurisdiction, whether in doing so we are in the exercise of original or appellate functions, and without any territorial limitation as to the operation of the writs when issued. It follows, we think, that such writs, when issued in a proper case, must, except perhaps in cases having no application here, be obeyed by all persons and courts of inferior jurisdiction or authority in this state.

[3] It is further insisted, however, that inasmuch as Ochiltree county, where the respondent Blassingame resides and where the land levied upon is situated, and the ThirtyFirst judicial district, are beyond the territorial limits of this supreme judicial district, we are for this, if for no other, reason without power to issue the writ prayed for. But if otherwise authorized to issue the writ, we do not think this contention is maintainable. The writ sought by relator is in character very similar to the writ of injunction. As to the respondent Blassingame the very same result is to be brought about. As to him, at least, the only difference is in name. As against the other respondent, Hon. Frank Willis, the writ is sought and operative only as the judicial officer at this time authorized to perform the functions of the district court of Ochiltree county. As against him the real purpose of the writ sought is to restrain the threatened action of that court, whosoever may happen to be its presiding judge. Such writs were designated in the common law as writs of prohibition, as contradistinguished from writs of injunction, and our authorities have adhered to that nomenclature. But in nature and judicial results obtainable there can be but little, if any, difference between writs of injunction and writs of prohibition. This being true, we see no reason why we should not, in this case, apply the familiar rule relating to writs of injunction, to wit, that an injunction operates against all persons, their agents and attorneys, who were parties to the cause, whether they reside within or without the territorial jurisdiction of the court awarding the writ. See Alexander v. Tolleston Club, 110 Ill. 65; State v. Fredlock, 52 W. Va. 232, 43 S. E. 153, 94 Am. St. Rep. 932; Frank v. Peyton, 82 Ky. 150; Jennings Bros. v. Beale, 158 Pa. 283, 27 Atl. 948; 22 Cyc. 785. The respondent Blassingame was a party to the judgment that he now seeks to enjoin. He, as also the respondent Willis, voluntarily appeared before this court and answered in this proceeding, thus submitting themselves to our jurisdiction, and hence, as we think, cannot be indulged in now saying that we are without power to make and enforce such orders as the other facts before us author-See Revised Statutes, articles 4643 and 4653. ize.

[4] Moreover, for a yet better reason, perhaps, we are of opinion that in the respect now under consideration our power is not limited

[5] Several other objections have been urged by the respondents, but they are, we think, of minor importance, easily answered, and hardly require discussion. We should however, perhaps briefly notice the further insistence that the proper remedy of the relator was to present its complaint in the district court of the Thirty-First judicial district; the contention being that it must be assumed that the court issuing the injunction would properly administer the law upon the facts. As to this contention, it is to be observed that, even if the judgment enjoined should be construed as a judgment of the district court of Tarrant county, as respondents insist, and if the district judge of the Thirty-First judicial district had any authority at all to direct the issuance of the writ, it was returnable to and triable before the district judge rendering the judgment.

In such cases the law evidently contemplates that the court rendering the judgment shall be the judge of its validity. The reason for this rule is of special force, we think, in