The final argument was heard in 1864, when Denio, Hogeboom, Mullin, and Ingraham, four judges, were for reversal as to the principal, and H. R. Selden, J., for reversal as to the interest.

Doubtless W. B. Wright and T. A. Johnson, JJ., were for affirmance.

Five of the seven judges who voted were for reversal, and of course the judgment should have been reversal. If they could not concur as to the grounds of reversal, no consequence could legitimately result from their failure except that it would prevent the decision from being a precedent.

But without a color of right or authority a compromise judgment of partial affirmance was entered corresponding to the conclusion of H. R. Selden's opinion. (Ante, p. 913.)

We have seen, first, that this case had not its proper venue; and, second, that the Albany judge who gave it first judicial sanction became the plaintiffs' counsel, such sanction controlling absolutely at every subsequent stage (except the second reversal).

Next we perceive that that reversal was wrongfully deprived of its legitimate effect.

Next some extrinsic history may be proper. The Albany law firm, often alluded to, had much influence upon Democratic nominations.

It had a mate in this respect on the other side. I have no doubt these dealers in party politics did in general earnestly oppose each other; but it is exceedingly probable that, in cases just like this, they mutually played into each other's

hands.

It is not to be overlooked that according to the ideas prevalent in 1857 and the amounts then and theretofore commonly involved in lawsuits, the claim in this case was a most temptingly large one.

It had not entered into the minds of political jugglers at Albany to hope for such prodigious swindles as have since been perpetrated with impunity.

The first two arguments of the second appeal were had in 1858. The Hon. Ira Harris, often above alluded to, was one of the judges throughout that year.

The court was equally divided. The vote on the argument in

1859 shows that Alexander S. Johnson and George F. Comstock were for the plaintiffs, the latter on the ground that the point was not appealable. (Ante, p. 749.)

We have seen that it was about 1851 that the Albany Democratic law firm came into the case.

A.D. 1859 was an unfortunate year for the plaintiffs. Mr. Hill, their leading counsel, died in it.

Their second judgment was then reversed on the third argument. (Ante, p. 741.)

By the autumn of 1860 they got ready for the new trial, with ex-Judge Cornelius L. Allen's letter denuding the reversal of its force, and reinstating their case on the unreversed authority of Harris's opinion in 3d Barbour.

That authority was enough to control Gould, J., at the Circuit, and to control both him and his associates at the General Term. (Ante, pp. 751, 709.)

And here also by the force of authority, i.e., a precedent, Hon. W. B. Wright was enlisted for the plaintiffs. (Ante, p. 709.)

His health was infirm, and for this and other causes he was not likely to review his own decision.

The last appeal from it, as above stated, was not reached in the Court of Appeals until 1861, and then the plaintiffs, on the pretence above mentioned, got the case over to the next year, i.e., 1862.

The course of things in that year (1862) is above narrated. But it is proper to state here that in the fall of 1861 the political managers on the anti-Democratic side nominated Judge William B. Wright for the Court of Appeals, and the Democrats nominated for reëlection Judge Comstock.

The former was elected. The plaintiffs doubtless considered their work was done when Wright's nomination was secured, and cared little which of the candidates succeeded in the canvas.

The result in 1862 was a division, the plaintiffs having Wright and Gould, JJ., committed to them by their own previous decisions founded on the Harris precedent, and W. F. Allen, the relative of precedent-reversing ex-Judge Cornelius L. Allen, also voting that way.

No more need be said. What happened in 1863 and 1864 is above stated.

Judge H. N. Selden on the Republican side, and Judge W. F. Allen on the Democratic, were the nominees of the rival parties in the fall of 1862.

Allen's opinion was known. I am persuaded Selden's was. In either result the plaintiffs might count upon a vote.

I strongly suspect that A. S. Johnson's ideas were in some way pumped from him before he was nominated in 1851.

Just after the final disposition of this case it was current talk in Albany that it had controlled a whole series of nominations. Take its history throughout, I never knew of so much management and malversation in any other case.

Its pendency covers a momentous period in the descent of our officials to the present political avernus.

In it an apprenticeship was served by the rural plunderers of the metropolis. Dates may serve to show this.

The advent of the Democratic firm at Albany into the case was in 1851.

The Tweed system of government commenced in 1857 in company with a multitude of villainies.

In that year the annual legislation first spread out to two volumes.

At this period the plaintiffs had recovered and the case was in the Court of Appeals. (Ante, p. 131.)

Nominally adverse politicians then first began openly and shamelessly to play into each other's hands.

The precise idea on which Judge II. N. Selden's opinion went finds an analogy in his views as counsel in the subsequent case of Miller v. Slate, 15 Wallace.

Mem. prepared in 1874.

APPENDIX B

THE DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM IN 1876.

WE, the delegates of the Democratic party of the United States in national convention assembled, do hereby declare the administration of the federal government to be in urgent need of immediate REFORM; do hereby enjoin upon the nominees of this convention, and of the Democratic party in each State, a zealous effort and coöperation to this end, and do hereby appeal to our fellow-citizens of every former political connection, to undertake with us this first and most pressing patriotic duty.

For the Democracy of the whole country we do here reaffirm our faith in the permanence of the federal Union, our devotion to the Constitution of the United States with its amendments universally accepted as a final settlement of the controversies that engendered civil war, and do here record our steadfast confidence in the perpetuity of Republican self-government.

In absolute acquiescence in the will of the majority — the vital principle of Republics;

In the supremacy of the civil over the military authority; In the total separation of Church and State, for the sake alike of civil and religious freedom;

In the equality of all citizens before just laws of their own enactment;

In the liberty of individual conduct, unvexed by sumptuary laws;

In the faithful education of the rising generation, that they may preserve, enjoy, and transmit these best conditions of human happiness and hope;

We behold the noblest products of a hundred years of changeful history;

But, while upholding the bond of our Union and great charter

of these our rights, it behooves a free people to practise also that eternal vigilance which is the price of liberty.

REFORM IS NECESSARY to rebuild and establish in the hearts of the whole people, the Union, eleven years ago happily rescued from the danger of a secession of States; but now to be saved from a corrupt centralism, which, after inflicting upon ten States the rapacity of carpet-bag tyrannies, has honeycombed the offices of the federal government itself with incapacity, waste, and fraud; infected States and municipalities with the contagion of misrule, and locked fast the prosperity of an industrious people in the paralysis of "Hard Times."

REFORM IS NECESSARY to establish a sound currency, restore the public credit, and maintain the national honor.

We denounce the failure for all these eleven years of peace to make good the promise of the legal tender notes, which are a changing standard of value in the hands of the people, and the non-payment of which is a disregard of the plighted faith of the nation.

We denounce the improvidence which, in eleven years of peace, has taken from the people, in federal taxes, thirteen times the whole amount of the legal-tender notes, and squandered four times their sum in useless expense, without accumulating any reserve for their redemption.

We denounce the financial imbecility and immorality of that party which, during eleven years of peace, has made no advance towards resumption-no preparation for resumption, but instead has obstructed resumption by wasting our resources and exhausting all our surplus income; and, while annually professing to intend a speedy return to specie payments, has annually enacted fresh hindrances thereto. As such a hindrance we denounce the resumption clause of the Act of 1875, and demand its repeal.

We demand a judicious system of preparation by public economies, by official retrenchments, and by wise finance, which shall enable the nation soon to assure the whole world of its perfect ability and its perfect readiness to meet any of its promises at the call of the creditor entitled to payment.

We believe such a system, well devised, and, above all, intrusted to competent hands for execution, creating at no time an artificial scarcity of currency, and at no time alarming the public