"That all the bonds of the United States issued or authorized to be issued under the said act of Congress hereinbefore recited are payable, principal and interest, at the option of the Government of the United States, in silver dollars of the coinage of the United States, containing 4121⁄2 grains each of standard silver; and that to restore to its coinage such silver coins as a legal tender in payment of said bonds, principal and interest, is not in violation of the public faith nor in derogation of the rights of the public creditor."

My amendment was voted down without discussion, then Mr. Reed's substitute was rejected and Mr. Springer's bill defeated. Immediately after the defeat of the gold bond proposition the President entered into the Rothschild-Morgan contract and notified Congress in a special message that he had made the contract and at the same time called attention to the fact that he had reserved the right to substitute gold bonds at a lower rate of interest, and asked authority for the issue of such bonds. The Ways and Means Committee reported a bill granting to the President the authority for which he asked. To me fell the honor of preparing a minority report against this bill. Hon. Justin R. Whiting joined in the report; the other members of the minority explaining their positions upon the floor in the course of the debate. I give below the minority report and also a copy of the contract which gave rise to the discussion:

The Minority Report.

Owing to the limited time allowed for preparing a report (it being necessary to file the report within a few hours after the bill was agreed upon) the undersigned dissenting members of the committee are precluded from presenting their views with that elaboration which the importance of the subject would otherwise justify; but they beg to state briefly the most important reason which leads them to disapprove of the measure recommended by the majority of the committee.

First. The issue of bonds of any kind is only needed to replenish the gold reserve; and the gold reserve only needs replenishing because the Secretary of the Treasury redeems United States notes and Treasury notes in the kind of coins selected by the note holder. The note holder has no legal right to choose the coin in which the obligation shall be redeemed, but has been permitted to exercise that right by a policy inaugurated by the Treasury Department at or soon after the date of the resumption of specie payment. The opinion of the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Carlisle, recently given, is clear upon this point. On the 21st of January, 1895, a statement was made before the House Committee on Appropriations by Secretary Carlisle, in a printed report of which will be found the following question and answer:

"Mr. Sibley. I would like to ask you (perhaps not entirely connected with the matter under discussion) what objection there could be to having the option of redeeming either in silver or gold lie with the Treasury instead of the note holder?

"Secretary Carlisle. If that policy had been adopted at the beginning of resumption—and I am not saying this for the purpose of criticising the action of any of my predecessors, or anybody else—but if the policy of reserving to the Government, at the beginning of resumption, the option of redeeming in gold or silver all its paper presented, I believe it would have worked beneficially, and there would have been no trouble growing out of it, but the Secretaries of the Treasury from the beginning of resumption have pursued a policy of redeeming in gold or silver at the option of the holder of the paper, and if any Secretary had afterwards attempted to change that policy and force silver upon a man who wanted gold, or gold upon a man who wanted silver, and especially if he had made that attempt at such a critical period as we have had in the last two years, my judgment is, it would have been very disastrous. There is a vast difference between establishing a policy at the beginning, and reversing a policy after it has been long established, and especially after the situation has been changed."

No one contends that the executive department of the Government can bind the Government or pledge its faith and credit by the adoption of such a policy. To so hold would be to assert that the Executive can make and repeal laws without the concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives. Believing that the Secretary of the Treasury has now by law the right to redeem legal tender notes by the payment of either gold or silver coin, whichever is most convenient for the Government; and believing that the exercise of this discretion by the Secretary of the Treasury is absolutely necessary to protect the Government from organized and unorganized raids upon the coin reserve, we are not willing to indorse, directly or by implication, the administrative policy which has precipitated the present financial conditions. Neither are we willing, by authorizing bonds for the purchase of gold, to pledge the Government to a policy which discriminates against silver as a standard money and recognizes gold as the only money of ultimate redemption. So long as the note holder is allowed to choose the coin in which he is to be paid, so long will it be futile to attempt to maintain a gold reserve.

Recent experience shows that gold secured by the issue of bonds is at once drawn out by those who are interested in having more bonds issued, and thus the public debt is increased to the detriment of the taxpayer and for the benefit only of those who desire a safe investment for surplus funds. We do not believe that any real advantage will be gained by securing the gold abroad.

It is urged that a change of policy at this time will cause embarrassment. If that be true the blame must be borne by those who first inaugurated the policy and by those who have adhered to it in spite of the clear intent and letter of the law. We have only to consider whether it is wiser to resume an exercise of rights preserved by existing laws or to aggravate our present difficulties by delaying relief and entering upon new experiments. We have no hesitation in declaring it as our conviction that there is no remedy, permanent in character or promising in results, except an immediate exercise by the Secretary of the Treasury of the right to redeem United States notes and Treasury notes in standard silver coin whenever it is more convenient for the

Government to do so, and we further believe that the greatest dangers which can possibly attend such a course are infinitely less than the evils which are certain to follow an adherence to the present policy.

Second. If we were willing to authorize the issue of bonds at this time to purchase gold, we would still be opposed to bonds payable specifically in gold, because an issue of such bonds would either pledge the Government to the redemption of all obligations in gold or make a discrimination against coin obligations now outstanding. There is no question that the issue of gold bonds now would at once be followed by a demand for an act making existing bonds payable in gold, and it would be urged that it would be disastrous to depart from the policy of gold bonds when once inaugurated, just as it is now urged that it will be disastrous for the Government to resume a discretion which has been temporarily surrendered to the note holder.

It is impossible to overestimate the evil influence which would be exerted by the issue of gold bonds by the Government, because such action would naturally and necessarily encourage if not actually compel the issue of gold bonds by all public and private corporations and the making of gold contracts by individuals generally. Such an increased strain upon gold would manifest itself in a further rise in the purchasing power of the dollar and in a further and distressing addition to the load of debt now borne by the people.

Third. If we were in favor of an issue of gold bonds we would still be opposed to the issue of bonds running for thirty years. According to the terms of the contract the bond purchasers agree to accept 3 per cent gold bonds without mentioning the date of payment, but it can not be doubted that the purchasers will insist upon a thirty-year bond if discretion is given to the Secretary of the Treasury to issue such a bond.

Fourth. If we were willing to authorize the issue of thirty-year gold bonds we would still be opposed to recognizing or ratifying a contract as harsh in its terms and as imperious in its demands as the contract insisted upon by the bond purchasers.

Fifth. If we were willing to approve of such a contract under ordinary circumstances we would still be opposed to approving it when made by a sovereign government with foreign financiers under circumstances which suggest a desire upon the part of the subjects of another country to purchase a change in the financial policy of this nation for a sum stated.

These are some of the reasons which lead us to withhold our support from the measure recommended by a majority of the committee, and they are, in our judgment, sufficient to justify our dissent. If further reasons were necessary they might be found in the fact that the contract provides for the sale of coin bonds at about 1042, which would sell in the market at about 119; in the fact that the contract agrees to sell thirty-year gold bonds, drawing 3 per cent interest, for less than the Government three months ago sold twelveyear coin bonds, and in the additional fact that foreign investors are by the contract given a preference over American investors in the purchase of any bonds which may be issued before next October, and are also given a preference now over the American investors who but a short time ago stood ready to purchase more bonds than were then offered.

WILLIAM J. BRYAN. JUSTIN R. WHITING.