Treasury the right to redeem coin obligations in gold or silver, at his discretion," and read as follows:

Whereas an act entitled "An act directing the purchase of silver bullion and the issue of Treasury notes thereon, and for other purposes," approved July fourteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety, provides "that upon demand of the holder of any of the Treasury notes herein provided for, the Secretary of the Treasury shall, under such regulations as he may prescribe, redeem such notes in gold or silver coin, at his discretion, it being the established policy of the United States to maintain the two metals on a parity with each other upon the present legal ratio, or such ratio as may be provided by law;" and,

Whereas this provision and other similar provisions for redemption in coin have been construed to mean that the Secretary of the Treasury has no discretion, but must redeem in that coin which the holder of the obligation demands; and

Whereas such construction violates both the letter and the spirit of the law, destroys the principle of bimetallism, and places the Treasury at the mercy of any who may conspire to reduce the gold reserve for the purpose of forcing an issue of bonds; therefore,

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all obligations heretofore or hereafter incurred by the Government of the United States, whether such obligations bear interest or not, which, according to their terms, call for payment in coin, shall be payable in gold or silver coin of present weight and fineness, at the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury, and the right of the holder of any such obligation to demand payment in a particular kind of coin, whether gold or silver, is hereby expressly denied; and that the Secretary of the Treasury is directed to maintain gold and silver coin on a parity with each other upon the present legal ratio, or such ratio as may be provided by law, by receiving the same without discrimination against either metal, in payment of all public dues, customs, and taxes.

During the last campaign the relative merits of national bank currency and government paper were discussed to some extent, and the question is one which will grow in importance until the people finally determine whether the banks or the people shall control the volume of paper money. The demand for the retirement of greenbacks comes largely from the national banks, and the reason for the demand is found in the desire of the banks to exercise a control over, and derive a profit from, the issue of all paper intended to circulate as money. For several years there has been an effort on foot to so change existing laws as to permit banks to issue notes up to the par value of the bonds and to reduce the tax upon the circulation from I per cent. to of 1 per cent. I gave in my letter of acceptance the three general objections to banks of issue, and it may not be out of place here to enlarge somewhat upon those objections. The first is, that the right to issue paper money is a valuable privilege, and to grant

it, unless imperatively demanded by public interests, is to violate the Democratic principle, "Equal rights to all and special privileges to none." It is sometimes urged that the bank is only permitted to issue its notes in the same manner that an individual is permitted to issue his. It does not necessarily follow that a corporation can safely be permitted to do everything that an individual does, but, in this case, the coporation asks for a privilege which no individual desires. When an individual issues his notes, he issues them for the purpose of obtaining money and pays interest upon the money, while the bank desires to issue its notes as money and draw interest upon them. It has sometimes been suggested that the banks might be allowed to issue up to the face of the bonds and be relieved from all tax upon circulation, provided the interest on the bonds is forfeited to the Government while the bank notes are in circulation. But this has never commended itself to the bankers, because it takes away the profit upon the issue.

A few years ago it was proposed by some to have the Government issue paper money and loan it upon farm lands at 2 per cent. per annum, the loan not to exceed 50 per cent. of the value of the land. This proposition was merely an application of the banker's idea to the farmer. The bank puts up Government bonds for security, the farmer wanted to put up land for security. The banker borrows 90 per cent. of the par value of his security, while the farmer was willing to stop at 50 per cent. The banker now pays I per cent. and wants it reduced to of I per cent., while the farmer was willing to pay 2 per cent. Those who oppose the national bank of issue can, upon principle, oppose the loaning of money by the Government to any particular class of citizens. But how can the advocate of a national bank of issue oppose the principle which underlies the sub-treasury? I have opposed both. In answer to the charge of favoritism, it is said that any person can go into the banking business and thus enjoy the benefits of the law. I reply that the same argument would justify a bounty to lawyers or to the members of any other profession or occupation, because all professions and occupations are open to all citizens.

The second objection to the bank of issue is that the volume of the currency, when controlled by private individuals, may be so adjusted as to benefit those who exercise the control, regardless of the interests of the rest of the people. It was upon this ground, largely, that Jefferson opposed banks of issue. A great deal is said about the desirability of an elastic currency, but it must be remembered that the power to expand or contract the currency, when a change in the volume is desirable, carries with it the power to contract or expand

it when the change may not be desirable. No one will insist that banks are conducted by men who are entirely unselfish, and until they are, it will not be safe to place in their hands so great a power as that involved in the right to control the volume of paper money. Wendell Phillips pointed out this danger so felicitously that I incorporated his remarks in my Boston speech.

The third objection is one which is becoming more and more apparent every day, namely, that banks of issue, when once established, claim a vested right in the nation's financial policy. The national banks today seem to resent any attempt upon the part of the people generally to hold or express an opinion adverse to the banker's policy. They assume that they alone are able to understand such questions and that their interests alone are to be considered. The controversy between the advocates of national bank currency and the advocates of Government currency will continue until the banks retire from the note issuing business, or until the Government retires from the business of issuing its notes. Government notes which, like the greenbacks, are redeemable in coin on demand, are not fiat money; they have all the advantages which can be urged in favor of national bank currency and, in addition thereto, have the advantage of the legal tender function.

During the campaign I endeavored to center public attention upon the money question, but on several occasions spoke of the growth of trusts and argued in favor of their extermination. The trust is in our midst; its influence is on the increase; it must be grappled with and overthrown. President Cleveland, in his last message to Congress, treats of this evil in the following language:

Another topic in which our people rightfully take a deep interest may here be briefly considered. I refer to the existence of trusts and other huge aggregations of capital, the object of which is to secure the monopoly of some particular branch of trade, industry or commerce, and so stifle wholesome competition. When these are defended, it is usually on the ground that though they increase profit they also reduce prices, and thus may benefit the public. It must be remembered, however, that a reduction of prices to the people is not one of the real objects of these organizations, nor is their tendency necessarily in that direction. If it occurs in a particular case, it is only because it accords with the purpose or interest of those managing the scheme. Such occasional results fall far short of compensating the palpable evils charged to the account of trusts and monopolies. Their tendency is to crush out individual independence and to hinder or prevent the free use of human faculties and the full development of human character. Through them the farmer, the artisan and the small trader is in danger of dislodgment from the proud position of being his own master, watchful of all that touches

his country's prosperity, in which he has an individual lot, and interested in all that affects the advantages of business, of which he is a factor, to be relegated to the level of a mere appurtenance to a great machine, with little free will, with no duty but that of passive obedience, and with little hope or opportunity of rising in the scale of responsible and helpful citizenship.

To the instinctive belief that such is the inevitable trend of trusts and monopolies is due the widespread and deep-seated popular aversion in which they are held and the most unreasonable insistence that whatever may be their incidental economic advantages, their general effect upon personal character, prospects and usefulness cannot be otherwise than injurious.

Though Congress has attempted to deal with this matter by legislation, the laws passed for that purpose thus far have proved ineffective, not because of any lack of disposition or attempt to enforce them, but simply because the laws themselves, as interpreted by the courts, do not reach the difficulty. If the insufficiencies of existing laws can be remedied by further legislation, it should be done.

The fact must be recognized, however, that all federal legislation on this subject may fall short of its purpose because of inherent obstacles, and also because of the complex character of our governmental system, which, wihle making the federal authority supreme in its sphere, has carefully limited that sphere by metes and bounds which cannot be transgressed. The decision of our highest court on this precise question renders it doubtful whether the evils of trusts and monopolies can be adequately treated through federal action-unless they seek directly and purposely to include in their objects transportation or intercourse between states, or between the United States and foreign countries.

It does not follow, however, that this is the limit of the remedy that may be applied. Even though it may be found that federal authority is not broad enough to fully reach the case, there can be no doubt of the power of the several States to act effectively in the premises, and there should be no reason to doubt their willingness to judiciously exercise such power.

If the trust could be exterminated by messages it would long ago have passed into "innocuous desuetude"; but it requires more than official criticism to eradicate such an evil. If trusts exist in violation of law, they can be exterminated only by the enforcement of the law. If present laws are insufficient, new and sufficient laws can be devised. If the Constitution, which has been so construed as to prevent the taxation of the incomes of corporations, can be so construed as to protect trusts, it is high time for a constitutional amendment which will enable the American people to protect themselves from trusts.

Our country has, in my judgment, much to fear from the political influence exerted by large corporations. The business of the country is falling more and more into the hands of corporations, and since a lawyer receives both his reputation and his experience from his