The additional depth of sludge chamber necessary was computed for each type on the basis of 2 cu. ft. per capita sludge room. Excavation to the top of each tank was included in the cost of each type.

On the above basis, the cost of the Baltimore tanks equal those of Fitchburg and Atlanta.

The average unit costs of the plants are $7,500 per m. g. d. capacity and $1.50 per inhabitant.

Mr. Vaughan: Our next paper is

The Legal Phase of Stream and Lake Pollution

E. D. RICH

Member M. E. S., State Sanitary Engineer

The opinion that some check should be placed upon the irresponsible fouling of our streams and lakes by municipalities and private citizens seems to be taking a firm hold on the minds and consciences of many of our citizens. It seems to be recognized quite clearly that it is desirable to preserve as far as possible the original purity of our inland waters but the path of least resistance still leads to the easy way of disposing of liquid waste by discharging them into the most convenient water course by way of the shortest route. The result of this has already, in some instances, reached a stage which has given rise to vigorous protest against the course pursued by someone else but there is little if any evidence that many city officials have arrived at the point where they are willing to urge the expenditure of public funds in preventive measures. The mental attitude of a majority of office holders seems best summed up in the expression, "Let the other fellow keep the streams clean," or "Let the law compel the other fellow to cease or refrain from fouling the streams." This viewpoint seems well calculated to encourage the passage of such laws as are necessary to regulate the use of streams and lakes for disposal purposes in such a way as to insure an equitable adjustment of their advantages between all who are likely to be effected, but it would seem that public sentiment ought to proceed in its development to such an extent that an unselfish vision of the future would call for prevention at home as well as among the neighbors.

A vast proportion of the litigation entered into concerning the regulation of streams in regard both to sewage disposal and irrigation has had for its basis the doctrine of riparian rights. This principle had its origin in the common law of England, and was promulgated at a time when streams played a more prominent part in the domestic economies and as highways of travel than is the case in these days. It was primarily appli

cable to navigable rivers but in later years has been extended to cover a variety of cases. Briefly stated the doctrine asserts that "a riparian owner has the right to the reasonable use of the stream adjacent to his land undiminished in quantity and unimpaired in quality on account of any use made of the water by an owner above him." Upon the clause relating to impairment of quality rests the arguments in legal cases of pollution and most suits of this character have been brought to court on complaint of an alleged nuisance and not on the possible effect. of contamination upon the public health. This is undoubtedly due to the fact that a nuisance can be easily detected and its damaging effect more readily shown than would be the case if the disease bearing phases of the situation were in question. It is to be expected that as direct transmission of the water borne diseases is proved more and more by concrete examples, the real danger to public health resulting from stream and lake pollution will be recognized by the courts. In other words, the menace should and probably will take precedence over the nuisance. What we need, therefore, are laws which will protect the public from danger to life rather than from annoyance to the senses. That some substantial progress has been made by the courts is shown by a decision reported in the "Engineering News" Oct. 5, 1911, page 407, rendered by Justice Jaggard of the Minnesota Supreme Court, and relating to two cases against the city of Mankato, Minn., viz., Delia Keener vs. the City of Mankato and Kate Flannigan vs. the City of Mankato. These suits were each brought by widows to recover $5,000 for the deaths of their husbands from typhoid fever contracted by reason of drinking impure city water. The complaints charged that the city negligently allowed the water supply "to become polluted with poisonius substances and large quantities of filth and sewage to escape into and saturate its water supply, by reason whereof plaintiff's intestate contracted typhoid fever and died as a consequence." The court held that (1) "The municipality was liable for its negligence in its private or corporate capacity, and was not exempt because it was carrying out a governmental function;" (2) "An administrator of a person whose death was due to the wrongful act of a municipality may maintain an action for damages consequent thereon." Another

similar case is mentioned editorially in "Engineering News," May 6, 1915, page 897. A decision was rendered by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the case of B. H. Jones vs. The Mount Holly Water Co., brought to recover for expenses and loss of time due to the illness of three of the plaintiff's children from typhoid or paratyphoid. The court held that the evidence showed that the water supply was polluted with sewage and that the company had known of the fact for three and a half years prior to the epidemic and that it was the duty of the Company to furnish pure and wholesome water. It also held "that pure and wholesome water necessarily means such as is reasonably free from bacteria and coli, or any other infection or contamination which renders water unfit for domestic use, and unsafe and dangerous to individuals. Moreover, it was necessary for the plaintiff to do no more than make it reasonably appear that the drinking water was the probable efficient cause of the typhoid fever."

In the case of the New Jersey State Board of Health vs. the City of Phillipsburg brought to compel the city to treat its sewage before discharging it into the Delaware River, the Chancery Court held that threatened pollution would be sufficient cause for an injunction, even though actual pollution could not be proved. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Errors and Appeals, Nov. 15, 1915.

Actions at law for the remedy of a nuisance or a menace generally occur after such a nuisance or menace is existant and reminds one very much of "locking the barn after the horse is stolen." The physicians have made noble progress in preventive medicine but it is doubtful if as much can be said of preventive engineering and preventive law as far as stream pollution is concerned, but that there is a hopeful trend in legal procedure will be seen from the above citations.

There appear to be two classes of legislation possible for the remedy of existing or anticipated objectionable conditions; (1) the passage of a general law to cover all the streams of the State, specifying in a broad general way what uses of the streams are lawful and what are not, what classes of organizations or individuals are subject to the provisions of the Act and delegating supervision of the waters to some central authority such

as the State Board of Health. The supervisory board should have power and money to study the requirements of each particular case, and to lay down standards of purity from time to time applicable to the particular circumstances. It should have power to compel violators of the law to build such treatment works as, in the opinion of the board, based on scientific determination are necessary, and provision should be made for assessing the cost upon the property and persons benefited without submission of the question to vote.

(2) The passage of separate laws applying to particular localities and constituting certain specified areas into sanitary or drainage districts. Provision should be made for a properly organized governing body composed of representatives of all the interests to be affected and with power to carry out construction work and apportion the cost of installation and maintenance. These districts should of course be held accountable to a considerable extent to the State Board of Health.

A slight modification of the second plan consists in the passage of acts permitting certain municipalities to join voluntarily into a partnership for the purpose of building sanitary works and for apportioning the cost of construction and maintenance.

Act 98, P. A. 1913 is a partial example of the first plan above mentioned. Just how far its provisions extend is something of a question which cannot be definitely known, until the courts have passed upon some of the points at issue.

The State of Wisconsin seems to have embodied some useful and convenient features in its law in Chap. 412, passed by the Legislature of 1911. Under the provisions of this Act complaints of stream pollution may be made to the State Board of Health, by the governing body, or the Board of Health, of any municipality or township of the State. If the Board finds that the complaint was warranted and that contamination exists which is detrimental to the public health, it must so notify the municipality or individual causing the pollution, and give a hearing thereon within fifteen days. If the Board concludes after such hearing that improvements or changes in sewage disposal are necessary for the preservation of health, it must report its findings to the Governor and upon his approval must then notify the municipality or person involved to install necessary works