vigore beyond its territorial jurisdiction and limits; (2) statutes generally apply to those only who owe obedience to the legislature which enacts them, and whose interests it is its duty to protect; and (3) it is usual in conceding or granting rights to nonresident aliens to make express mention of them.

But we think the better reason, as well as the greater weight of adjudged cases, forbids that nonresident aliens be excluded, by interpretation, from among the beneficiaries designated in the statute. The decedent, though a foreigner, not being an alien enemy, if he had survived the injury, might have maintained an action therefor, if not otherwise specially disabled by law. (2 Cyc. 107.) The wife, having a vested right in the cause of action resulting from his death, should not be excluded as a beneficiary, though a nonresident alien. The injury to her may well be the same as if she were a resident. The legislature had power to include nonresident aliens, and they are within the natural and ordinary import of the language employed. Neither the context nor the corrective purpose of the statute suggests any reason for a restrictive interpretation. The act is in its highest sense remedial, and is entitled to receive the liberal construction which appertains to such statutes. (Haggerty v. Central Railroad Co., 31 N. J. Law, 349; Gottlieb v. North Jersey St. Ry. Co., 72 N. J. Law, 480, 63 Atl. 339.) The question of giving a statute intrinsic force proprio vigore beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the State is not involved. The act merely removes a common-law obstacle to recovery for a wrongful act. It merely provides a remedy for a wrong, committed within the State, by those within the State and subject to its authority, to others within its jurisdiction and entitled to its protection, whereby injury is done to still others within or without its jurisdiction. Had the legislature intended to restrict recovery to a resident widow or resident next of kin or both, or to a widow and next of kin who are citizens of the United States, it would have so said. Moreover, our statute has been under consideration in the United States courts. In Dennick v. Central R. Co., 103 U. S. 11, 26 L. Ed. 439, in denying a contention that the provisions of the act that "every such action shall be brought by and in the names of the personal representatives of such deceased" limited the right of action to a personal representative appointed in the State, it was said: "The advocates of this view interpolate into the statute what is not there. *** The statute says the amount recovered shall be for the exclusive benefit of the widow and next of kin. Why not add here, also, by construction, if they reside in the State of New Jersey? It is obvious that nothing in the language of the statute requires such a construction. Indeed, by inference, it is opposed to it. The first section makes the liability of the corporation or person absolute where the death arises from their negligence. Who shall say that it depends upon the appointment of an administrator within the State?" In Hirschkovitz v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (C. C.) 138 Fed. 438, the court, construing our statute, held that a nonresident alien who is next of kin to the person killed is entitled to the benefit of a statute giving a right of action for the death of a person caused by the wrongful act or negligence of another. It will be seen, therefore, that the United States courts in the construction of our statute are in harmony with the views here expressed.

The judgment of the court below will be affirmed.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-CONTRACTS BETWEEN PULLMAN COMPANY AND RAILWAY COMPANY-WAIVER OF EMPLOYEE'S RIGHTSSan Antonio and Aransas Pass Railway Company v. Tracy, Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, 130 Southwestern Reporter, page 639.—Kate Tracy was employed by the Pullman Company as a car cleaner and was injured in February and in April, 1908, by the negligence of this company and the railway company named. A judgment for damages against the railway company was given in the district court of Bexar County, from which an appeal was taken, on which appeal judgment was rendered in June, 1910.

There was a contract between the two companies by virtue of which the Pullman Company agreed to indemnify the railway company for any loss it might suffer by reason of accidents or injuries to employees of the Pullman Company while in the discharge of their duties or being transported by the railroad company. The Pullman Company had been held not liable in damages in the court below, and its dismissal from the suit was held by the railway company to be error. On this point the court of appeals, speaking by Judge Fly, held that the court below had ruled incorrectly, the contract not being one against the negligence of the carrier, but a form of guaranty corresponding to insurance contracts. As between the two companies, therefore, there was a reversal of judgment and the case was remanded for a new trial to determine which party was ultimately liable on the judgment in favor of Kate Tracy and against the railroad company, which was itself affirmed. It was held, however, that no contract of waiver by the employee herself would be valid. On this point Judge Fly said:

The authorities cited herein which sustain and uphold the right of appellant to implead the Pullman Company under the contract between them denounce a contract against negligence, as affecting the rights of Kate Tracy, whether entered into between her and appellant or between her and the Pullman Company. That company may bind itself to indemnify appellant for damages resulting to the employees of the former, but it can not evade its responsibility by compelling its employees to waive all damages that may be inflicted by appellant. Such a contract is a monstrosity that will meet with condemnation in any court of Texas, whatever may be the rule in federal courts and other state courts. The contract in question is condemned and rendered invalid by article 45601, Sayles' Ann. Civ. Rev. St., 1897. If the contention of appellant that the statute does not apply because the contract was not made between an employee and a railroad or street railway should be sustained, railway companies could annul the law by having the contract made with some other corporation or person, and then claim immunity by reason thereof.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-FELLOW-SERVANT LAW-COMMON CARRIERS-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE-Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company v. Westby, United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, 178 Federal Reporter, page 619.-Marie Westby, widow and administratrix of the estate of Martin Westby, had recovered a judgment for damages in the circuit court of the United States for the district of South Dakota for the death of her husband while in the employment of the company above named, from which judgment an appeal was taken and a reversal secured. Apart from certain questions as to evidence and procedure the decision turned on the constitutionality of the statute of South Dakota, chapter 219, Acts of 1907. This statute abolished the defense of fellow-service in cases of injury to employees of "every common carrier engaged in trade or commerce in the State of South Dakota," and enacted the doctrine of comparative negligence.

On the ground that the phrase "every common carrier" includes all classes of transportation of persons, goods, or information for hire, the law was held not to be a railroad statute simply, and since on account of improper classification it bore unequally upon different groups of employers and employees it was declared unconstitutional and void. It was also held to be impossible of separation so as to retain any valid portion, excluding others. This is set forth in the concluding portion of the opinion of the court, which was delivered by Judge Sanborn and which is in part as follows:

The act of the legislature of South Dakota expressly includes within the same general term "every common carrier engaged in trade or commerce in the State of South Dakota shall be liable to any of its employees, or in case of his death to his personal representative," carriers, and employees in the constitutional and those in the unconstitutional class, those engaged in hazardous and dangerous, and those employed in comparatively safe occupations. The part of the statute applicable to the former class can not be separated from that applicable to the latter class, so that each may be read and may stand by itself, because both classes are embodied in the general words "every common carrier" and "any employee" and are included in a single declaration. The unconstitutional part can not be eliminated from the law by striking out or disregarding any words or clauses of the act. That result can be attained only by introducing into the statute words of limitation which would expressly restrict the general terms "every common carrier" and "any employee" to common carriers using dangerous power and machinery and their employees engaged in dangerous occupations about them, a species of legislation the courts are without the power to enact. The statute can not be restricted lawfully by construction to the constitutional class because the part applicable to that class is not separable from the part applicable to the unconstitutional class so that each may be read and may stand by itself, because it is not apparent that the legislature would have passed the act if it had been limited to the constitutional class,

because the legislature excepted neither class, and the legal presumption is that it intended to except none, and because the statute can not be restricted to the constitutional class by the elimination of words or clauses; but this result can be attained only by the introduction into it of express words or terms.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-INSPECTION OF FACTORIES-VIOLATIONS OF STATUTES-DEFENSES-CONSTRUCTION-Caspar v. Lewin, Supreme Court of Kansas, 109 Pacific Reporter, page 657.-Kate Caspar, widow of Tony Caspar, sued William Lewin and others for damages for the death of her husband, resulting from injuries received while employed in a shop in which old iron and scrap metal were being cut into lengths for sale. The suit was brought under the factory law of Kansas (chap. 356, Acts of 1903), and involved questions as to the applicability of the statute to the establishment in which the injury was received and the construction of the statute. The defendants' contentions were to the effect that the business of buying and selling scrap iron gave character to their operations, and the mere fact that they cut iron into lengths did not bring it within the act; and, further, that the statute in question was patterned after a law of New York which had been construed by the courts of that State so as to relieve the employer from liability in like circumstances. An important question was the admissibility of the defense of contributory negligence in cases of accident following from the employer's failure to comply with the requirements of the statute.

The court held that the statute was an original one, even though embodying features common to the laws of other States, and that the defense of contributory negligence could not be pleaded where the employer's negligence consisted in failure to meet the requirements of the law. The opinion, which was delivered by Judge Burch, is of unusual interest and traces the development of factory legislation and the modes of interpretation by the courts at considerable length. Particular attention was called in the opinion to the New York labor law (chap. 415, Acts of 1897), requiring machinery, including gearing, belting, and shafting to be "properly guarded" and to the earlier law of Wisconsin (chap. 549, Acts of 1887), which requires that they shall be "securely guarded or fenced so as to be safe to persons employed" in any manufacturing establishment when they are "so located as to be dangerous to employees when engaged in their ordinary duties."

The fourth section of the statute of Kansas directs belt shifters or other devices for throwing belts on and off to be supplied in all manufacturing establishments using machinery and calls for the proper and safe guarding where practicable of machinery of every description. The fifth section declares the employer's liability for injuries resulting

from the failure to comply with the provisions of the statute. Caspar was killed while attempting to adjust a belt to a pulley on a shaft about 9 feet above the floor, no belt shifter having been provided. He stood upon a ladder to do the work, and his clothing was caught in an unguarded and roughly burred end of the shaft which was without a guard.

Taking up the seventh section first, in order to present the definition given therein of a manufacturing establishment, Judge Burch said: The only purpose of incorporating section 7 in the act was to preclude a roving quest for the meaning of words. The section was designed to make the meaning of the term "manufacturing establishment" as it had been used in the previous sections so clear that there could be no misunderstanding of just what establishments were included. It first includes by name a number of establishments some of which may not be popularly known or regarded as manufactoriessmelters, oil refineries, cement works, mills of every kind, machine shops, and repair shops. By force of the definition these all become manufacturing establishments. Then all other manufacturing establishments were included by the clause "and in addition to the foregoing any other kind or character of manufacturing establishment of any nature or description whatsoever." Then, in order that the full scope of the act might not be mistaken, the broadest possible definition of a manufactory was added, "(a place) wherein natural products or other articles or materials of any kind, in a raw or unfinished or incomplete state or condition, are converted into a new or improved or different form."

The process of manufacturing may be very complicated, or it may be simple in the extreme. There are primary and secondary stages. But the legislature has said that all establishments for the modification of natural objects to adapt them to human needs are embraced in the act. Very clearly that of the defendants is included. It is all the more easy to say this because it is apparent from the description given that the defendants operate what in all essential respects fulfills the popular notion of a mill for the production of a staple article. Besides this, the interpretation given the act serves to carry out the remedial and humanitarian purpose which it seeks to accomplishthe protection of working people from mutilation, physical deformity, physical pain, mental anguish, and death, occasioned by the absence of practicable safeguards from the environment of their toil.

The contention of the defendants next considered was that the shafting was so located as not to be dangerous to employees while engaged in their ordinary duties, and was therefore not within the requirements of the law as to guards, citing the law of New York and the construction put thereon by the courts of that State. Judge Burch traced a number of the provisions of the law through the enactments of several States, and continuing, said:

Different methods were employed in different States to secure compliance with their factory acts. In New York violations of article 6 of the Code of 1897 (Laws 1897, c. 415) were made punishable as misdemeanors, with increasing penalties for repeated infractions. No civil remedy was provided.