But, where the work of construction or repair is as closely connected with the actual operation and use of the railroad as the work of the present plaintiff, it seems clear that it is within the class of hazards covered by the act.

LAUNDRIES-REGISTRATION-POLICE REGULATIONS-CONSTITUTIONALITY-District of Columbia v. Shong Lee, Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, 38 Washington Law Reporter, page 460.-A police regulation of the District of Columbia requires every person who commonly launders for pay, on the premises occupied by him or her, the wearing apparel or bed and table linen of another to report such fact in writing to the health officer of the District. Shong Lee, a Chinese laundryman, contended that failure to so report constituted no offense; that the regulation is in conflict with the act of Congress which imposes a tax on laundries in the District; that the regulation is unreasonable and oppressive and therefore void; and that, as the regulation was meant to reach washerwomen working in their homes, his laundry was not of the class intended to be covered by it. The police court of the District sustained the contention of Lee, but this judgment was reversed by the court of appeals and the regulation held valid and applicable to all persons doing domestic laundering for pay on premises occupied by them.

Judge Robb, speaking for the court, said in part:

We see nothing unreasonable or oppressive in this regulation. The defendant in error is simply required to report to the health officer that he is conducting the kind of a laundry mentioned in the regulation, giving his name and the location of the premises. That he has given similar information to the assessor for a different purpose is of no consequence. We think the regulation both reasonable and conducive to the public health.

The language employed is general and there was just as much, if not more, reason apparently for including such a business as that of the defendant in error as any other.

PAYMENT OF WAGES-SEMIMONTHLY PAY DAY FOR RAILROAD EMPLOYEES CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE-New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company v. Williams, Court of Appeals of New York, 92 Northeastern Reporter, page 404.-This was a suit in equity brought by the company named to secure an injunction against John Williams, labor commissioner of New York, to prevent hiin from instituting proceedings against the company for violations of sections 10 and 11 of the labor law of the State (C. L. ch. 31), the contention being that the provisions of the law in question violate the constitution of the State and of the United States. Judgment. had been against the company in the supreme court of the State,

appellate division (see same case, 64 Misc. Rep. 15, 118 N. Y. S. 785, Bulletin No. 86, p. 340), and on this appeal that judgment was affirmed. The contentions of the company and the rulings of the supreme court are set forth in full in the Bulletin above referred to. Of the full discussion of the case by the court of appeals it is necessary to state only that the law was upheld as within the power of the legislature to amend the charters of corporations, and that the provisions relative to individuals and partnerships operating railroads are separable, so that even if unconstitutional as to them, the law is not invalid as to corporations operating railroads. The law was upheld also as a valid exercise of the police power of the State in behalf of the parties to whom it applies. Many cases were considered, the opinion, which was delivered by Judge Willard Bartlett, concluding as follows:

There is an irreconcilable conflict in the decisions in different jurisdictions as to the constitutional validity of labor legislation fixing the medium and time of payment of the wages of those who work for corporations. After the foregoing review of the leading cases, I find no difficulty in sustaining our New York statute on the ground which has been stated. It does not confiscate corporate property directly or indirectly. It does impose a greater future burden upon the corporations to which it relates; but that, I think, is within the power of the legislature to the extent to which it has been exercised in this case.

For the foregoing reasons, I advise the affirmance of this judgment, with costs.

DECISIONS UNDER COMMON LAW.

BLACKLISTING-CONSPIRACY-EVIDENCE-Rhodes v. Granby Cotton Mills, Supreme Court of South Carolina, 68 Southeastern Reporter, page 824.-Following a strike in the Granby Cotton Mills, the superintendent prepared a list of striking employees and furnished the same to a number of superintendents of other mills as a matter of so-called mutual courtesy, as a result of which the plaintiff, Olin M. Rhodes, was unable to secure employment as a mill worker, though it was in evidence that, while members of his family struck, he himself was not a striker. Judgment was rendered for actual and punitive damages, and an appeal taken, the result being that the judgment of the court below was affirmed.

Numerous exceptions were taken to the rulings of the judge in the court below, and especially to his rulings in confusing, as it was alleged, conspiracies and lawful agreements and his refusal to grant a nonsuit on the grounds that there was no sufficient evidence to support the charge of a conspiracy. Judge Gary, who delivered the opinion of the court, reviewed the evidence at considerable length, showing the existence of the custom of mill superintendents to exchange lists and

to refuse to employ blacklisted employees, though there was no agreement or obligation to do so other than a tacit understanding and mutual courtesy with reference to the matter. It was also shown by the testimony of the plaintiff and his witnesses that employment was refused at a number of mills in a designated association to all workmen whose names were on these lists.

Judge Gary then said:

It will be observed that the foregoing testimony is of two kindsdirect and circumstantial. Even though it be conceded that the direct testimony only tended to prove that the defendant and other mills sustained toward each other a relation denominated a courtesy or understanding, but that it did not tend to show an agreement that they would not employ those blacklisted by any of said mills, still it does not follow that there was error in refusing to grant a nonsuit, direct a verdict or order a new trial. If the circumstantial evidence tended to show that the relation which the mills sustained toward each other was so intended and did have the direct effect of preventing those who were blacklisted by one mill from getting employment at the others, then it would make very little difference whether such relation was called a courtesy, or an understanding, or an agreement, as it is the result which is expected to follow from the relation, and not the name by which it is called, that characterizes it. (Blackwell v. Mtge. Co. 65 S. C. 105, 43 S. E. 395.) In other words, a person is presumed to intend the natural consequences that may reasonably be expected to result from his act. (State v. Chemical Co., 71 S. C. 544, 51 S. E. 455.) Therefore, if the plaintiff was prevented from getting employment at the other mills as the direct or proximate result of being blacklisted by the defendant, then it could reasonably be inferred that there was such an understanding or agreement between the mills as naturally to cause such result, and such understanding or agreement would in effect constitute a conspiracy; the name by which it was called being immaterial.

In considering the circumstantial evidence, even if no single fact is sufficient to establish prima facie a conspiracy, nevertheless, when the several circumstances are considered together, they may have such effect. The rule is thus stated in Dantzler v. Cox, 75 Š. C. 334, 55 S. E. 774: "The ninth exception assigns error in overruling the motion for a new trial on the ground that there was no testimony to support the verdict. While there was no direct and positive testimony sustaining the defenses set up in the answer, still there were facts and circumstances from which the jury might properly have drawn the inference in favor of said allegations. The rule is thus stated in Railroad v. Partlow, 14 Rich. Law, 237: 'It may be that no one of the facts would of itself warrant the inference, and yet, when taken together, they may produce belief, which is the object of all evidence. In 1 Greenleaf, Ev. sec. 51a, it is said: 'It is not necessary that the evidence should bear directly upon the issue. It is admissible if it tends to prove the issue, or constitutes a link in the chain of proof, although alone it might not justify a verdict in accordance with it. All the circumstances mentioned in this ground may be regarded as links in the chain of proof, from which the jury might deduce the inference of the defendants' privity and direction in the acts of tres

pass. This is usually the case where an issue depends on circumstantial evidence." This principle is affirmed in Wertz v. Railway, 76 S. C. 388, 57 S. E. 194. The circumstances tending to show a conspiracy are (1) the keeping of a blacklist by the mill discharging the employee, not only as a matter of information for itself, but also for the benefit of those mills with which it sustained a certain relation denominated a courtesy or understanding; (2) the fact that as a result of such courtesy or understanding a discharged employee was prevented from getting employment at any of the other mills. These facts at least tended to establish an implied agreement which was in effect a conspiracy, and the exceptions raising this question are overruled. As the appellant's attorneys concede that the charge of the presiding judge upon the question of conspiracy was free from error, it is unnecessary to discuss the law upon that phase of the case.

Having reached the conclusion that there was testimony tending to show a conspiracy, we proceed, lastly, to consider the twenty-first and twenty-fifth exceptions, which assign error on the part of the presiding judge in refusing to charge when requested by the defendant's attorneys that the plaintiff was not entitled to punitive damages. There are two reasons why the request to so charge was not erroneous: (1) The conspiracy alleged in the complaint imports an intentional wrong, and for such wrong punitive damages are recoverable. (Pickens v. Railway, 54 S. C. 498, 32 S. E. 567.) (2) The refusal of the defendant to withdraw the name of the plaintiff from the blacklist after becoming aware of the fact that he was not a striker, and that he could not get employment at the other mills while his name remained upon the blacklist, tended to prove malice. It is the judgment of this court that the judgment of the circuit court be affirmed.

EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE INTERFERENCE WITH RELATIONCONSPIRACY TO DESTROY TRADE-Globe and Rutgers Fire Insurance Company v. Firemen's Fund Fire Insurance Company, Supreme Court of Mississippi, 52 Southern Reporter, page 454.-The first company named had sued in the circuit court of Adams County to recover damages from numerous rival companies for tort. The company's declaration alleged a conspiracy by the various companies named to deprive it of the services of its experienced and valuable agents and to compel it, as far as they were able, to leave the State. The declaration was demurred to as not offering facts constituting grounds of action and for other reasons. This demurrer had the effect, so far as the hearing thereon was concerned, of admitting the truth of the statements contained in the declaration. The demurrer was sustained by the lower court, whereupon the complainant company appealed, and secured a reversal of the judgment of the lower court. The grounds for this ruling appear in the following portion of the opinion of the supreme court, as delivered by Judge Mayes.

Having stated the facts, Judge Mayes said:

The declaration states facts which show that defendants are not in the mere exercise of just rights, but that they are wickedly, unlaw

fully, and maliciously interfering with plaintiff's employee for the sole purpose of harming it. Under the facts alleged in the declaration, it may have been perfectly permissible for the defendants to have employed the agent of plaintiff and paid him better for his services. They might employ him, or any number of plaintiff's agents similarly in the employ of plaintiff, without violating any principle of lawful right, if the object of the employment was in the honest furtherance of their own business enterprises. But the facts stated in the declaration show a determination to destroy and drive plaintiff out of business, and the declaration alleges a conspiracy for this purpose. Surely no individual or corporation may maliciously and wantonly set about to ruin a competitor. As an incident to the advance of one's own business and for the purpose, he has the right to use all proper methods, and his competitors must be able to cope with his ingenuities. As is said in the case of Martell v. White, 185 Mass. 260, 69 N. E. 1087 [Bulletin No. 53, p. 958]: "Competition in business is permitted, although frequently disastrous to those engaged in it. It is always selfish, often sharp, and sometimes deadly." The fact that a rival in business is vanquished is not of itself sufficient to give rise to a cause of action against his competitor; but the facts must go further, and show that the contest was carried on by methods not allowable in such warfare.

For an association of persons to conspire together for the sole purpose of destroying one's business certainly transcends legitimate and lawful competitive methods. Every person must be free to ply his own calling. If he may be interfered with by having his employees driven from his service by fraud, misrepresentation, intimidation, obstruction, or molestation, and in this way have his business destroyed, the effect upon his business operations is as deadly as if the law permitted an incendiary to burn or a mob to destroy. If his business is to be destroyed, it can make little difference in result whether it be by the unlawful use of fire or unlawful intimidation or molestation. Legitimate competition he must meet, or surrender; but legitimate competition only means that all may make the best lawful use of their faculties and their means. If in so doing their competitor's business is destroyed as a mere incident of his inability to successfully contend against superior skill or means, that is but the hardship of legitimate warfare. The world is always in search of improved methods and reduction of cost.

In the case of Employing Printers' Club v. Doctor Blosser Company, 122 Ga. 509, 50 S. E. 353 [Bulletin No. 59, p. 361], there is to be found a lengthy and exhaustive discussion of the question involved In that case it was held that, wherever there is a malicious interference with one's employees, an action can be maintained against the party so interfering. The gist of this action is the malicious and unlawful interference with plaintiff's business, to his dam

The action would lie as well against one as against all the defendants; but the charge of the conspiracy is the basis of the right to join all in the same suit as parties defendant. It becomes, by reason of the conspiracy, the joint wrong of all conspirators.

As we have already seen from the authorities, the right to recover for malicious interference extends to all kinds of contracts; that is to say, all contracts of service whatever may be their nature. But it is argued on the part of appellees that there was no contract for