Examination, registration, etc., of workmen-Continued. Plumbers: Georgia (city ordinance), Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Washington, Wisconsin. Electricians: Louisiana. Mine foremen: Pennsylvania. Railroad employees: Alabama, Ohio. Employment of women in wine cellars: California (city ordinance). Employment of children in mines: Pennsylvania. Citizens to be employed on public works: Illinois, New York Employment of Chinese: California, Colorado. Working of mining claims by Chinese: Oregon. Restrictions on immigration: California (two laws), Loui- Use on public works of stone dressed outside the State: New Sale of convict-made goods: New York, Ohio. Employment offices: Limitation of fee: California. Free public offices furnishing workmen where strike is in progress: Illinois. Emigrant agents: Alabama, North Carolina. Rates of wages: Wages on public works: Indiana, New York. Deductions for imperfect weaving: Massachusetts. Weighing coal at mines: Colorado, Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania. Mechanics' liens: Sundry provisions: California, Minnesota, Pennsylvania. Actions to recover wage debts: Attorneys' fees: Alabama, California, Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah. Running of process: Michigan. Exemptions from judgments: Michigan. Garnishment and assignments of salaries and wages: Sundry provisions: Illinois (two laws), Missouri, Texas. Payment of wages: Time: Arkansas, California (two laws), Illinois, Indiana (two laws), Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas. Use of scrip: Arkansas (two laws), Illinois, Missouri, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia. Payment of wages-Continued. Company stores: Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Ohio, West Virginia. Hours of labor: On public works: California (city ordinance), Illinois (city ordinance), New York, Ohio, Washington (city ordinance). In private employments: Colorado (two laws), Illinois, Missouri (two laws), Nebraska, New York (two laws), Ohio, Wisconsin. Sunday labor: Sundry provisions: California (three laws), Illinois, Indiana, Liability of employers for injuries to employees: Sundry provisions: Indiana, Maryland, Mississippi, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, United States (two laws). Inspection and safety of factories, workshops, etc.: Sundry provisions: California (law and city ordinance), Hawaii, Protection of employees on street railways: Inclosed platforms: Texas. Mine regulations: Wash rooms: Illinois. Labor organizations: Antitrust exemptions: Illinois, Nebraska. Trade-marks and badges: Montana, New Jersey. Union label on public printing: Illinois (city ordinance), Tennessee (city ordinance). Employment of union labor on public works: Illinois (city Protection of workmen as members: Illinois, Kansas, Missouri, Injunctions and contempts: Restriction of power of courts: California, Missouri, Oklahoma, Arbitration of labor disputes: Excessive grant of power: Kansas, Missouri. Protection of employees as voters: Federal limitations: United States. The above laws are considered in the following pages, the point involved being first set forth briefly and the grounds of its disapproval indicated. Besides the cases in which the decisions as to unconstitutionality were arrived at, a number of cases are introduced for purposes of illustration or as setting forth views at variance with those enounced by the courts holding the laws unconstitutional. LAWS AFFECTING THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT. A statute of South Carolina (sec. 357 of the Criminal Code, amended by an act, p. 428, Acts of 1904) declared that any farm laborer who had received advances either in money or supplies and who thereafter willfully and without just cause failed to perform the reasonable service required of him by the terms of his contract was guilty of a misdemeanor, and punishable by a fine or imprisonment. By a federal court and by the supreme court of the State, this law was held to be unconstitutional, as an attempt to secure compulsory service in payment of debt; as violating the equality clause of the fourteenth amendment, since it applied only to agricultural labor; and, lastly, as creating a system of involuntary servitude, in contravention of the provisions of the thirteenth amendment.(") Another law of this State (General Statutes of 1882, sec. 2084) prescribed penalties for the punishment of employers and employees who broke their contracts. The penalty against employers was limited in amount, while that against employees was not, and this difference of treatment was held by the state supreme court to be an unjust and unlawful discrimination between the two parties. (') The legislature of Alabama enacted a law (No. 483, Acts of 19001901) which forbade any person who had made a contract in writing, either as an employee or as a lessee of lands, to abandon his contract or lease or to abandon the leased premises and make a second contract of any form of a similar nature with a different employer without the consent of the original employer and without sufficient excuse, which was to be adjudged by the court. The act was held by the court of last resort of this State to contravene the guaranties of both the federal and the state constitutions as to the rights of life, liberty, and property, placing, as it did, the right of contract of one individual under the power of another. "Because of the restrictions it purports to place on the right to make contracts for employment and concerning the use and cultivation of land, this act is wholly invalid."() In discussing the same law, a federal judge condemned these provisions, saying that "the only constitutional method of enforcing a contract for personal service is to get judgment and execution and have compensation for the broken contract by seizure and sale of the defendant's property."(d) With reference to the provision requiring the employee to secure his former employer's consent the judge in the latter case laid down the rule that no man can lawfully be compelled to disclose differences with former employers or breaches. of contracts with others as a condition to the making of a new con a Ex parte Drayton, 153 Fed. 986; Ex parte Hollman, 79 S. C. 9, 60 S. E. 19. b State v. Williams, 32 S. C. 123, 10 S. E. 876. Toney v. State, 141 Ala. 120, 37 So. 332. d Peonage Cases, 123 Fed. 671. tract. Such a provision would be, in effect, a compulsory method of collecting debts or securing the performance of a contract and would amount to making an employee blacklist himself. The Georgia legislature (act, p. 63, Acts of 1901, as amended by act No. 307, p. 91, Acts of 1903) provided penalties for any person who should, during the life of the contract, employ or rent lands to any employee or tenant who was under written contract or under parol contract duly witnessed and partly performed, or who should "disturb in any way" the relation of employer and employee or of landlord and tenant without first obtaining the written consent of the original employer or landlord. The object of this act is evidently the same as that of the act of the Alabama legislature noted above, i. e., to secure the stability of contracts of employment and tenancy, but the mode of approach differs, since in the Georgia law it is in form the interference by third parties that is prohibited, and not the free action of the employee or tenant. This act was held by the supreme court of the State to be constitutional in the main. (") Since, however, the constitution of the State requires that no law shall contain more than one subject-matter, or matter that is not set forth in the title, it was held that the clause prohibiting the disturbance "in any way" of the relations mentioned must be stricken out, since it was not covered by the title of the act. In the State of Georgia an act of October 21, 1891, provided that railroad, telegraph, express, or electric street-railway companies should on written request, furnish to any employee, on his discharge or removal from employment, a specific statement in writing of the reason or cause therefor; and if the discharge was made on account of complaint or information, the statement should disclose the nature of the same, the name of the person making it, and the time when the complaint was made. Failure to comply involved a liability of $5,000, to be recovered in an action for damages. On suit to recover damages for failure to comply with the request of a discharged employee for a statement of the reasons, it was held that a statute of this nature served no public interest and was violative of private rights, since the guaranty of the liberty of speech and writing requires as its correlative the liberty of silence; it was said by the court that "statements or communications, oral or written, wanted for private information, can not be coerced by mere legislative mandate at the will of one of the parties and against the will of the other." The act was therefore declared unconstitutional. (") A similar view was taken of a statute of Kansas (G. S. 1901, sec. 2422), which directed "any employer of labor" within the State to furnish to a discharged employee, on his request, a statement in writ a Pearson v. Bass, 132 Ga. 117, 63 S. E. 798. Wallace v. G. C. & N. R. Co., 94 Ga. 732, 22 S. E. 579. ing of the true reason for his discharge. Section 2421 contained a prohibition against blacklisting. A case arose under section 2422 in which a railroad employee sued his former employer for refusal to give any other statement than that contained in a letter declaring that he was discharged "for cause." It was also charged that there was a conspiracy between this and other companies to prevent employees from procuring employment without the consent of former employers. The evidence showed that employment had been refused after the letter furnished had been exhibited at the request of prospective employers; but since there was no means of knowing that employment could have been secured if the true reason for discharge had been fully set forth, the supreme court of the State ruled that there was no proof of damage resulting from a failure to state the actual cause of discharge, and that a law requiring such a statement could not be enforced. The Wallace case, above, was not mentioned, but the same argument was used, and the law declared unconstitutional as an interference with personal liberty in a matter in which the public has no interest. (a) Opposed to the views of these courts is that of a Texas court of civil appeals in upholding a statute of that State which required the reason for discharge to be furnished on request of the employee. The Wallace and the Brown cases were mentioned and the views therein expressed specifically rejected, the statute in question being held a proper one to prevent misrepresentation and blacklisting.() A statute of Indiana (A. S., sec. 7077) addressed to the subject of blacklisting and the protection of discharged employees, contained in its body but not in its title provisions relative to employees who voluntarily left service. The court held that the protection of discharged employees was a proper subject for an act of the legislature, with which the prevention of blacklisting was properly connected; but that the provision as to employees voluntarily leaving service did not come within the scope of the act as expressed by the title nor was it properly connected therewith. As it was in conflict with a provision of the state constitution similar to that noted above in the Georgia case, Pearson v. Bass, requiring each statute to relate to a single subject, which must be expressed in the title of the statute, this portion of the statute was held to be void. (c) EXAMINATION, REGISTRATION, ETC., Of workmen. Restrictions on employment have resulted in many States from enactments that prescribe a form of examination, to be followed by the registration or licensing of such persons as show themselves qualified for the employment in view. These provisions may affect independent workmen in the matter of the pursuit of their trades, or a Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown, 80 Kans. 312, 102 Pac. 459. b St. Louis S. W. R. Co. of Texas v. Hixon, Tex. Civ. App. -, 126 S. W. 338. c Wabash R. Co. v. Young, 162 Ind. 102, 69 N. E. 1003. 64181°-No. 91-11-5 |