It may be noted that, following the action of the people of New York in adopting an amendment to their constitution authorizing the legislature to regulate the conditions of employment on public works, whether the work be done by the State or municipality directly, or through the agency of a contractor, the legislature reenacted the above law, in practically its original form, including the regulation of the hours of labor (which had also been declared unconstitutionalsee p. 948 below), and that the present law has been upheld by the courts. (")

An Indiana statute (act of Mar. 9, 1901) provided that unskilled laborers employed upon any public work of the State, counties, cities, and towns, should be paid at a rate of not less than 30 cents an hour. The supreme court of the State held that counties, cities, and towns are corporations with a right to make contracts for the expenditure of money raised by local taxation, and are not subject to the arbitrary and unlimited control of the legislature. The law was said to be obnoxious also in that through its operation a citizen might be deprived of his property without due process of law, and that inasmuch as the law merely attempted to fix a minimum rate of wages to be paid a single class of laborers, it undertook an unnatural classification, rendering the statute invalid, as class legislation. () In contrast with the above view as to the rights of municipalities, is the declaration of the Supreme Court of the United States that municipalities are but the agents of the State for the performance of certain duties best attended to locally, but none the less entirely under the control and regulation of the State where it chooses to exercise such power. (c)

The regulation of private contracts was attempted by a law of Massachusetts (Acts of 1891, ch. 125), providing that "no employer shall impose a fine upon, or withhold the wages of, an employee engaged at weaving for imperfections that may arise during the process of weaving." This statute was condemned as interfering with the right to make reasonable contracts, (d) and has been succeeded by a law which permits deduction for imperfect weaving according to a rate previously agreed upon by the parties in interest.

The determination of the amount of wages earned by coal miners has been made a frequent subject of legislation, the gist of the statute usually being that coal should not be screened until it has been weighed and credit given to the miner for the full amount mined by him. Laws of this class (Illinois, acts of June 14, 1883, June 29, 1885, June 10, 1891, and July 1, 1891; Ohio, act of Mar. 9, 1898;

a People ex rel. Williams Eng. & Cont. Co. v. Metz, 193 N. Y. 148, 85 N. E. 1070. Street v. Varney Electrical Supply Co., 160 Ind. 338, 66 N. E. 895.

c Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 218, 24 Sup. Ct. 124.

d Com. v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 28 N. E. 1126.

and Pennsylvania, act of July 15, 1897) were declared unconstitutional as depriving property owners and laborers of the right of making contracts concerning their respective interests, without advancing the general welfare or the public health or morals. They were also declared invalid as affecting the freedom of contract of only one class of persons. (*) A bill before the legislature of Colorado in 1895 proposing to regulate the weighing of coal and the mode of determining the basis of compensation for mine labor was submitted to the supreme court of the State, which held that such a law would be in conflict with the cpnstitutional provisions to the effect that no person shall be deprived of liberty or property without due process of law. () Such laws as those considered above have, however, been declared constitutional. ()

MECHANICS' LIENS.

The laws of most States give a lien on the property worked on as a security for the payment of the wages of labor or value of material. These laws are, in themselves, approved by the courts, but certain incidental provisions or methods of enforcement have been incorporated in the statutes of some States in such form as to receive the condemnation of the courts. Thus a law of California (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 1203), was declared invalid because it made the owner of the property and the contractor for labor thereon jointly liable for wage debts, thus virtually charging the owner with all debts a contractor might incur, and destroying the value of his agreement with the contractor, by this means depriving the owner to some extent of his property, interfering unduly with contracts of a certain class, and effecting unconstitutional discriminations. (") Much the same defect was found to exist in the act of June 8, 1891, of the Pennsylvania legislature, which declared contractors to be the agents of the owner in ordering work or materials in or about the construction or erection of any work, and gave the subcontractor a lien, notwithstanding stipulations to the contrary between the owner and the contractor, unless the subcontractor had agreed in writing to waive his lien. This statute was held to change without their consent the contract entered into by the owner and his contractor, thus violating the provision of the state constitution which declares indefeasible the right of acquiring, possessing, and protecting prop

a Ramsey v. People, 142 Ill. 380, 32 N. E. 364; Millett v. People, 117 Ill. 294, 7 N. E. 631; Harding v. People, 160 Ill. 459, 43 N. E. 624; In re Preston, 63 Ohio St. 428, 59 N. E. 101; Com. v. Brown, 8 Pa. Super. Ct. 339.

In re House Bill No. 203, 21 Colo. 27, 39 Pac. 431.

c McLean v. State, 211 U. S. 535, 29 Sup. Ct. 206; Peel Splint Coal Co. v. State, 36 W. Va. 802, 15 S. E. 1000.

d Gibbs v. Tally, 133 Cal. 373, 65 Pac. 970.

erty;(") so also of a similar statute of Ohio (Annotated Statutes, sec. 3184, as amended by act, p. 135, Acts of 1894).(") The Minnesota legislature enacted a lien law (ch. 170, Acts of 1887) which was condemned by the supreme court of that State on six separate grounds. It was held, first, that a provision making homesteads subject to liens was invalid, since homesteads can not be made the subjects of liens in the absence of an agreement between the parties; secondly, that a provision making a mere failure of a contractor who has received his pay from the owner to pay his laborers and material men from such fund, though not guilty of fraud, a felony punishable by imprisonment, violated that provision of the state constitution which prohibits imprisonment for debt; third, that making the fact that the person who performed the labor or furnished the material was not enjoined by the owner from doing so conclusive evidence that the service was rendered with his consent was an attempt to make evidence conclusive which is not so necessarily in and of itself, thus precluding a party from showing the truth, and practically depriving of vested rights without due process of law. Another invalid provision was one that declared that the deed of a sheriff after sale under a lien should take precedence over any other title; also one that assumed to give a mechanic's lien precedence over prior incumbrances, the court ruling that liens must take effect in the order of time, since to hold otherwise would deprive other creditors of property without their consent. The last ground named for condemning this act was its provision making it the duty of the courts, where there was doubt as to the construction of the act, to so construe it as to give a person performing any labor the full amount of his claim, this provision being pronounced to be an invasion of the function of the judiciary, to which alone belongs the right of construing such laws as legislatures may enact.(©)

ACTIONS TO RECOVER WAGE DEBTS.

Suits for wages have been made the subject of legislation with the intention of giving special privileges to a class of small claimants on whom the costs and delays of legal procedure are supposed to be unduly burdensome. Thus in connection with the enforcement of mechanics' liens, a provision has frequently been incorporated giving to lien claimants an award of a limited sum for attorneys' fees in cases where they establish their claim. Such laws are found in Illinois (Revised Statutes (1905), ch. 82, sec. 31); Colorado (Acts of 1893, ch. 117, sec. 18); Utah (Revised Statutes, sec. 1400); Kansas (General Statutes, sec. 5125); Alabama (Acts of 1890-91, p. 578, sec. 2); California (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 1195), etc. In each of a Waters v. Wolf, 162 Pa. St. 153, 29 Atl. 646. b Palmer v. Tingle, 55 Ohio St. 423, 45 N. E. 313. c Meyer v. Berlandi, 39 Minn. 438, 40 N. W. 513.

the States named the courts of last resort have condemned the provisions as being unlawful discriminations in favor of certain suitors who are not distinguishable from other litigants on any proper basis, the laws being, therefore, subject to condemnation as special or class legislation. Inasmuch also as the rights are not reciprocal, a defendant property holder is subjected to the liability of a compulsory payment of additional costs without the privilege of recovering like costs in case of its successful defense. In one court it was said that the provisions of such a statute are in utter conflict with the fourteenth amendment of the federal Constitution. (a) Such a provision has been held constitutional.()

More general laws have been enacted in a few States (Ohio, Rev. Stat. sec. 6563a (89 O. L. 59); Oklahoma, Acts of 1895, ch. 51; and Texas, act of Apr. 5, 1889), giving the privilege of recovering attorneys' fees in suits for wages without regard to the establishment of lien claims. These laws were condemned on the same basis as were those cited above. (c) The courts are not uniform, however, in their rulings on this point, some courts holding that such fees were taxed not as a penalty but as a fair award of costs.(d)

The legislature of Michigan enacted two laws of somewhat the same nature as the above (Howell's Annotated Statutes, sec. 7317, and Acts of 1885, No. 14) which were declared unconstitutional by the supreme court of that State. The first of these provided that in actions for wages or earnings payable for services performed by any individual or company after action had been begun in the county wherein the work was done or the plaintiff or plaintiffs reside, the process or declaration might be served in any adjoining county of the State. This was held to be class legislation, since it applied only where services were rendered by individuals or companies, excluding corporations from its benefits; secondly, it allowed jurisdiction of a justice of the peace to be extended for certain classes of claims, denying this privilege to others. () The second law provided different exemptions from execution where the judgment was for a claim for labor than those allowed in other cases. This, too, was condemned as special legislation.(ƒ)

a Randolph v. Builders and Painters' Supply Co. 106 Ala. 501, 17 So. 721; Builders' Supply Depot . O'Connor, 150 Cal. 265, 88 Pac. 982; Davidson v. Jennings, 27 Colo. 187, 60 Pac. 354; Manowsky v. Stephan, 233 Ill. 409, 84 N. E. 365; Atkinson v. Woodmansee, 68 Kansas 71, 74 Pac. 640; Brubaker v. Bennett, 19 Utah 401, 57 Pac. 170. Schmoll v. Lucht, 106 Minn. 188, 118 N. W. 555.

e Coal Co. v. Rosser, 53 Ohio St. 12, 41 N. E. 263; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Mashore, 21 Okla. 275, 96 Pac. 630; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Ellis 165 U. S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.

d Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Wrenn, 35 Oreg. 62, 56 Pac. 271; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Fleming, 39 Nebr. 679, 58 N. W. 226; Vogel v. Pekoc, 157 Ill. 339, 42 N. E. 386; Coal Co. v. McGlosson, 166 Ind. 561, 77 N. E. 1044.

• O'Connell v. Lumber Co. 113 Mich. 124, 71 N. W. 449.

1 Burrows v. Brooks, 113 Mich. 307, 71 N. W. 460.

GARNISHMENT AND ASSIGNMENTS OF SALARIES AND WAGES.

A statute of the State of Illinois subjecting to garnishment the wages of employees of counties, cities, villages, school districts, and departments of either (Acts of 1905, p. 285) was declared unconstitutional as class legislation, since it discriminated between the employees of designated classes of municipalities and those of other municipalities.(°) Assignments of salaries and wages were regulated by an act of the legislature of Illinois (act of May 13, 1905), the law requiring compliance with certain formalities, such as acknowledgment before a justice of the peace, entry on his docket, service of notice on the employer, and joint signature by the husband or wife of a married assignor. The law also declared assignments tainted with usury invalid. This act was held to be unconstitutional, as interfering with the right to labor and to dispose freely of the compensation received therefor. The question was raised but not answered whether or not if the law applied to wages only it might stand, two judges holding that even so it would be invalid. As covering both salaries and wages, however, it was held not to be a proper exercise of the police power; while it was said to be unconstitutional also in its discrimination against usurious contracts of this particular sort, other usurious contracts being not so dealt with. () Persons engaged in the business of purchasing assignments of unearned wages were taxed by a law of Texas (Acts of 1905, ch. 111). This law, too, was held to be discriminatory and in restraint of the freedom of trade guaranteed by the federal Constitution. (c)

Several States have laws intended to conserve the rights of resident laborers under the laws of the State by forbidding holders of claims against a laborer to send their claims outside the State for the purpose of bringing action under laws less favorable to the defendant than are those of the State of his residence. A law of this nature (Missouri Revised Statutes, sec. 2356) was said to discriminate between wage-earners and other debtors and between residents of Missouri and other creditors. The statute is also condemned as an attempt at extrastate legislation and an infringement on the equal rights of citizens of different States. (d)

TIME OF PAYMENT OF WAGES.

Laws regulating the time of the payment of wages have been sustained in a number of jurisdictions, while in others they have been regarded as interfering with the right of private contract. Thus an Indiana statute (act of Feb. 28, 1899), which provided that every

a Badenoch v. City of Chicago, 222 III. 71, 78 N. E. 31.

b Massie v. Cessna, 239 Ill. 352, 88 N. E. 152.

c Owens v. State, 53 Tex. Crim. App. 105, 112 S. W. 1075.

d In re Flukes, 157 Mo. 125, 57 S. W. 545.