the latter could not justly be held responsible for his negligence. While the law was held to be constitutional in parts, the provisions that were contrary to the above findings were declared to be unconstitutional and void. It may be said that the basis of this finding has been negatived by practically the entire trend of recent legislation and court decisions. (a) Recent opinions of the supreme court of Pennsylvania recognize fully the power of the legislature to modify the common-law rules as to employers' liability. (')

Laws affecting liability must show a proper basis of classification, so that a statute abolishing the defense of common service in an action for injuries to employees of corporations generally (Mississippi, Acts of 1898, p. 85) was declared unconstitutional as imposing restrictions on all corporations without reference to any differences arising out of the nature of their business; and as such restrictions were not imposed on natural persons, corporations were denied the equal protection of the law. (c) The same criticism was made of a statute of Indiana (Acts of 1893, p. 294), abrogating the defense of fellowservice for all corporations other than municipal corporations. The court held in a case arising under the statute, as was held in the Mississippi cases above cited, that a law abrogating the defense of fellow-service could properly be enacted with reference to the operation of railroads on account of the peculiar hazards connected therewith, but that to include all corporations within its scope was to depart from any proper basis of classification. The law was therefore declared unconstitutional, except in its application to employment involving railroad hazards. (4) The same statute contained a provision to the effect that if a citizen of Indiana was injured in another State by the negligence of a fellow-servant on a railroad operating into or through Indiana, the railroad company could not offer as a defense in an action for injuries the decisions or statutes of the State where the injury occurred. This provision of the law was rejected by the courts as an attempt at extrastate legislation, the courts saying that there is a recognized vested right of defense to an action which is, in a sense, property, and that such a law would operate as a confiscation of property rights; nor could it be invoked to give a right of action for an injury sustained in another State if such right does not exist under the laws of that State. (e)

a Missouri P. R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205, 8 Sup. Ct. 1161; Tullis v. R. Co., 175 U. S. 348, 20 Sup. Ct. 136; Vindicator Co. v. Firstbrook, 36 Colo. 499, 86 Pac. 313; Rhodes v. Sperry, etc., Co., 193 N. Y. 228, 85 N. E. 1097.

b Valjago v. Steel Co., 226 Pa. St. 514, 75 Atl. 728.

c Ballard v. Mississippi Cotton Oil Co., 81 Miss. 507, 34 So. 533; Bradford Co. v. Heflin, 88 Miss. 314, 42 So. 174.

d Bedford Quarries Co. v. Bough, 168 Ind. 671, 80 N. E. 529; American Car & Foundry Co. v. Inzer, 172 Ind. 56, 87 N. E. 722.

• Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co. v. Read, 158 Ind. 25, 62 N. E. 488.

A statute of South Dakota (Acts of 1907, ch. 219), abolished the defense of fellow-service and modified the doctrine of contributory negligence in cases of injury to employees of "every common carrier engaged in trade or commerce in the State." No distinction was made between common carriers by railroad and those by street car, carriages, omnibuses, wagons, drays, etc.; all employees were also included without reference to the hazard of their employment. In a case before the United States circuit court of appeals (4) the failure to make proper classification in respect of the above points was held to invalidate the statute as imposing unequal and unwarranted burdens upon common carriers as compared with other employers, without reference to the dangers of the employment. The court conceded that the hazards of railroad transportation warranted special legislation applicable thereto, but declared that it was impossible for it to separate the invalid from the valid portions and sustain the latter, since to do so would vary the expressed will of the legislature and result in a form of judicial legislation, which the court could not attempt. The statute was therefore declared unconstitutional in its entirety. A federal statute (Acts of Congress of 1905-6, ch. 3073; 32 Stat. 232) abolished the defense of fellow-service in actions for injuries to employees of common carriers engaged in interstate commerce. This law failed to discriminate between employees engaged immediately in commerce restricted within state boundaries and those properly amenable to federal legislative action, and it was for this reason declared unconstitutional. (") The act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat. 65) undertook to reenact the valid provisions of the above law, omitting such as were objectionable. In a case arising under this law in the State of. Connecticut, the court of last resort of that State held the law invalid, except as applicable to interstate commerce, declaring that it could not interfere with intrastate commerce in order to remotely affect the former. An interstate employee would therefore have no redress in case of an injury caused by the act of an employee engaged only in intrastate commerce. The law in question prohibited contracts waiving the rights secured to employees by the statute and allowed employees guilty of contributory negligence to recover damages in cases where the negligence of the employer was greater than that of the employee. Both these provisions were declared unconstitutional by the same court, the first as infringing on the freedom of contract and the second as arbitrarily depriving the defendant of his property. The law also contained a provision as to the distribution of the amounts recovered as damages for the death of injured employees, the rule therein laid down differing from the statute of distributions of the State of Con

a Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Westby, 178 Fed. 619.
b Howard v. I. C. R. Co., 207 U. S. 463, 28 Sup. Ct. 141.

necticut, and this was held to be an infringement on the rights of the State, and therefore void. (a) The law has been amended (see p. 1155) to meet some of the above objections, and an appeal taken to the Supreme Court on some of the points. The same view as that indicated above as to the provision prohibiting waivers was taken by a federal court in passing on the Ohio statute (Acts of 1890, p. 149), which declared contracts for the acceptance of relief benefits and waiving the provisions of an employers' liability law to be void. (") A statute of New Mexico (Acts of 1903, ch. 33) prescribed procedure in actions for injuries, establishing limitations and prohibiting the trial of actions for injuries arising within the Territory in the courts of other jurisdictions. This law was condemned and ignored in a case tried in the courts of Texas where the injury on which the action was based was received within the limits of New Mexico.(c) The law was declared null and of no effect by a joint resolution of the United States Congress, May 13, 1908, in the exercise of federal supervision over territorial legislation.

The subject of the employers' liability was taken up by the Maryland legislature (Acts of 1902, ch. 139) in a manner differing from any hitherto attempted in this country. The act established rules to govern the liability of employers in certain industries, including mining, quarrying, steam and street railways, and certain forms of public works. It then provided that by contributions to a cooperative-insurance fund paid in at a fixed rate per employee, onehalf of which might be deducted from the wages paid, the employer should be relieved from the liability imposed upon him by the statute. From the fund thus formed, which was to be administered by the state insurance commissioner, $1,000 was to be paid to the heirs of any employee whose death resulted from accident, if the insurance. commissioner was satisfied on inquiry that such payment would be in accordance with the evidence and the provisions of the law. A case under this law was tried in the court of common pleas of Baltimore, resulting in its being declared unconstitutional on the ground that it invested one man with judicial or quasi judicial powers without any provision for a trial by jury or any appeal from his conclusions. It also embraced cases where, under existing law, the employer was negligent and a clear right of action against him existed, yet provided that employers contributing to the fund should be exempt from any further liability. (d)

a Hoxie v. New York, etc. R. Co., 82 Conn. 352, 73 Atl. 754. Shaver v. Pennsylvania Co., 71 Fed. 931, citing Cox v. R. Co., 1 Ohio N. P. Rep. 213.

d Franklin v. United R. & E. Co. of Baltimore, Court of Common Pleas. (Case reported in Bulletin No. 57 of U. S. Bureau of Labor, p. 689.)

INSPECTION AND SAFETY OF FACTORIES, WORKSHOPS, ETC.

The physical conditions afecting workpeople in their places of employment are the subject of laws known as inspection laws, the fun lamental principle of which is that the State may properly act to secure the health and safety of employees, and such laws are universally recognized as being valid. Defects of discrimination or improper classification, however. have caused some of the laws of this particular class to be declared unconstitutional. Thus an act of the New York legislature Acts of 1884, ch. 272) which made it a misdemeanor to manufacture cigars in any city of more than 500,000 population in any tenement house occupied by more than three families, but excepting houses in which there was on the first floor a store for the sale of cigars and tobacco, was declared unconstitutional because of such discrimination. (3) The factory-inspection law of California (act of Feb. 6, 1889) provided that certain installations might be required if, in the opinion of the factory inspector, their use would to a great extent prevent unhealthful conditions. It was held that this law was a delegation of legislative authority to an executive officer whose proper duties were to enforce prescribed regulations, and it was for that reason declared unconstitutional in so far as this provision extended. (*)

Laundrymen have been a special object of legislation in a few instances. Thus section 4079 of the Political Code of Montana contained a provision that male persons engaged in the laundry business other than in steam laundries should pay a license fee of $10 per quarter, or if more than one person was engaged of $25 per quarter; such fee to permit the operation of one place of business only. The license fee for steam laundries was fixed at $15 per quarter regardless of the number of employees. A federal court declared this law violative of the provisions of the fourteenth amendment, as discriminating against one class of laundrymen and in favor of another. () An ordinance of the city of San Francisco which gave the city board of supervisors discretion to grant or withhold licenses for laundries unless located in buildings of brick or stone was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court of the United States, and was there condemned as invalid. In operation there was an admitted discrimination against the Chinese, licenses being granted to Caucasians under identical conditions as those prevailing in cases in which they were uniformly denied to the Chinese. On this showing the court condemned the ordinance, laying it down as a principle of law that it was a violation of the fourteenth amendment to give to

a In re Jacobs, 33 Hun 374, 90 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636.
Schaezlein v. Cabaniss, 135 Cal. 466, 67 Pac. 755.

In re Yot Sang, 75 Fed. 983.

any man or set of men absolute and unrestrained discretion to give or to withhold permission to carry on a lawful business in any place, citing the language of the Massachusetts bill of rights that government should "be a government of laws and not of men." (") A statute of the Territory of Hawaii declared that "it shall be unlawful for any person to eject water or other fluid from his mouth upon any clothing," etc., in ironing or preparing for ironing the same. Whether or not a properly drawn law of this intent would be constitutional was not decided by the court, but since by its terms it would restrict one from sprinkling his own clothing in his own way it was declared to be an unwarranted interference with individual rights.(")

Section 10089 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri prescribed provisions for plumbing and ventilation in biscuit, bread, and cake bakeries, but made no mention of pie and pastry bakeries, cracker bakeries, or confectioneries. The court held that such omission amounted to an unjustifiable discrimination between industries of like nature, denying the equal protection of the law, and the statute was declared to be unconstitutional. (c)

PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEES ON STREET RAILWAYS.

A number of States have laws requiring the provision of inclosed vestibules or platforms on street cars for the protection of motormen from the inclemency of the weather, and such laws are regarded as valid. A Texas statute (ch. 112, Acts of 1903) was so drawn as to be applicable only to corporations operating street railways, thus relieving firms or individuals carrying on a similar undertaking from the necessity of making such provision. For this discrimination and because of vagueness and uncertainty in defining what would constitute an offense against the law it was declared unconstitutional. (d)

MINE REGULATIONS.

Similar to the sanitary features of factory-inspection laws was a provision of an Illinois law (act of May 14, 1903) requiring owners or operators of coal mines to maintain wash rooms at their mines for the use of miners and as a place for drying their clothes. This was condemned as special legislation, the court holding that the conditions of employment of miners were not so different from the conditions in other occupations in respect of the matter sought to be remedied as to warrant such a discrimination as was attempted by this statute. ()

a Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064.

b Hawaii v. Ching Geung, 11 Hawaii Reports, 667.

c State v. Miksicek, 225 Mo. 561, 125 S. W. 507.

d Beaumont Traction Co. v. State, - Tex. Civ. App. —, 122 S. W. 615.

e Starne v. People, 222 Ill. 189, 78 N. E. 61.