define this word "heirs" as meaning the children of his own children. In Campbell v. Stokes,1 the testator devised lands to trustees in trust for his children, and directed them, upon the death of a child, to convey its respective share to its "lawful issue." And in Losey v. Stanley," the testatrix devised lands in trust for her son, for his life, with remainder to his "children" or their descendants living at his death. 3 The final result seems to be that the cases do not establish Judge Woodruff's opinion that a remainder must necessarily be vested merely because (regardless of the terms of description employed in the instrument to designate the remainderman), there is a human being in existence who (though not now answering to the description employed) would, under the terms of the instrument, become immediately entitled to possession if the precedent estate were now to cease. STEWART CHAPLIN. 1 142 N. Y. 23. 2 147 N. Y. 560. See also Matter of Brown, 154 N. Y. 313. at pp. 322, 323. 3 With the cases last cited compare Matter of Crane, 164 N. Y. 71. THE TRIALS OF JURY TRIALS. AN American lawyer in London can find no more instruc tive and fascinating occupation than wandering about the Inns of Court. He will see much that is familiar and much that is new and strange. In comparing English procedure with our own he will loyally maintain the superiority of the latter, but, probably, will be candid enough to admit that we may yet learn many valuable lessons from the former. A few years ago I drifted into the court room of Mr. Justice Hawkins. A negligence cause was on trial. The defendant's horse had kicked the plaintiff's shin bone, with resultant damage direct and consequential. The bone had not been fractured, but the kick had produced all the familiar symptoms of permanent and progressive mental and physical disintegration, which happily, on both sides of the Atlantic, disappear soon after the verdict is affirmed on appeal. The Judge delivered a brief charge and the jury, after a short conference, during which several questions were asked of the court and answered, without leaving their seats, rendered a verdict of thirty pounds for the plaintiff. From the commencement of the charge to the rendition of the verdict scarcely ten minutes had elapsed. Another cause was called and, to my surprise, the barrister upon whose shoulders rested the burden of proof arose and began divesting himself of that burden by an opening address to the same jury. No challenge was interposed and no questions were asked. The nature of the litigation was not stated, the names of the parties were not mentioned. It seemed to be taken for granted on all hands that the jury were a part of the court, sworn to do justice, and that both court and jury could safely be relied on to be honest and impartial. Naturally, this scene was contrasted in my mind with similar ones in the courts of this country. In such a controversy the American judge would probably consider it his duty to expound the law of negligence in extenso in its relation to horses, kicks and shin bones. Having devoted half an hour or so to the law, he would deem it expedient to enter upon a discussion of the facts, concluding with the helpful, luminous and original admonition to the jury to find for the plaintiff if they believe the plaintiff's witnesses, but in no event to do so if they believe the defendant and his witnesses. At the conclusion of the Judge's address more valuable time would be wasted in requests to charge. This ceremony, as an exhibition of legal gymnastics between court and counsel, is sometimes interesting, but no one familiar with the inconsequential nature of the proceeding can hear without indignation of a righteous verdict being upset because of an "error" then committed. So far as influence upon the jury is concerned the requests might as well be propounded in Greek and answered in Hebrew. The practice of handing up written requests before the charge is wise and helpful, but oral requests afterwards, if taken seriously, as they sometimes are by technical appellate minds, become a grotesque and lamentable travesty on justice. When neither court nor counsel can think of anything else to say, a situation which sometimes occurs, an officer is sworn and the jury retires. After wrangling for hours and being marched back several times for additional “instructions," a verdict is reached or a disagreement is recorded. Let us follow a little further the American parallel. After the last exception has been noted and the jury has left the court room, another cause is called and the work of empaneling a jury commences. From twenty to thirty busy men have been compelled to remain in the court room awaiting the conclusion of the previous cause, and from these the new jury is to be chosen. Twelve men are called and take their seats in the box; this is done to start the proceedings. Then begins a series of questions which proceed upon the basal presumption that though there may be honest and competent men in the box, the competent men are not honest, and the honest men are not competent. Each juror is separately interrogated. Nothing relating to his past, present or future is omitted. Does he know the defendant, or his partner, or his wife, or his counsel ? Can he read and write? Does he own property, and, if so, how much? What is his age and the nature of his business? He is then informed as to the nature of the controversy, and should it chance to relate to an injured shin, he is asked if he has conscientious scruples against rendering a verdict for the plaintiff in a negligence suit. A number of metaphysical problems are set before him relating to the burden of proof, and he is invited to explain his probable action in case the presiding judge encroaches upon his province. When all have been interrogated, those who know too much and those who know too little are excused, and the catechism begins anew with those who fill the vacated chairs. At length the plaintiff's counsel sinks down exhausted but satisfied, and the twelve are turned over to the defendant's counsel, who desires information upon an entirely new list of subjects. At last the jury is ready to hear the testimony, but not until hours of valuable time has thus been lost. My own experience is that this minute and prolix examination, always personal and often impertinent, is not conducive to good results. I have frequently noticed that the more experienced members of the profession accept the jury, as was done in the English case, without a word. The men are pleased at the confidence reposed in them and are incited to unusual efforts by the implied compliment that a glance alone is sufficient to convince counsel that they are entirely competent to discharge their duties honestly and faithfully. But these are trivial and unimportant considerations when compared with the really serious defects of the jury system-defects so serious that many thoughtful men have advocated its abolition altogether. In trials of wide public interest the delay in procuring a jury often extends to weeks and months. Hundreds of busy men are inconvenienced, an enormous expense is incurred and the time of bench and bar is frittered away. As a simple and effi cient means of arriving at truth, trial by jury, when so impeded, becomes not only an intolerable burden, but a reproach to our jurisprudence. Consider also the time and labor wasted by mistrials occasioned by the illness, misconduct or ignorance of some member of the jury. A short time ago we read of a verdict, which it had taken months to secure, being set aside because eleven jurors who were in accord placed blue ribbons in their button holes, thus making the one recalcitrant so conspicuous that he consented to a verdict in order to avoid publicity and criticism. Few people pause to consider what a disagreement means. After years of preparation, involving irksome labor and the expenditure of large sums of money, the witnesses are assembled, expensive counsel are employed and the trial begins. At the end of weeks of arduous and anxious toil, when mind and body are taxed to their utmost, the cause is finally submitted to the jury with the result that they are unable to agree. It is in vain that the presiding judge points out the hardship of the situation. If he urges an agreement with too much vehemence there is danger that the verdict will be set aside by the appellate court whose members, never, perhaps, having sat at nisi prius, fail to appreciate the agonizing travail which usually accompanies the birth of a verdict. It is the delay, the uncertainty, the expense, the inability to reach results, which has put the jury system out of touch with an age of intense material activity-an age when even theology and jurisprudence are taught by electricity and steam, when the survivors are not the fittest, but the swiftest, and when one who is not quick might as well be dead. In civilized sections of our land men who seek speedy results have established their own tribunals of arbitration, while in the half-civilized and savage sections the rifle, the rope and even the stake have been substituted for the slow processes of the law. What, then, is the remedy? It is idle to advocate the abolition of trial by jury; its foundations are laid in the organic law of the nation and of all the States, and, deeper still, in the hearts of all libertyloving Anglo-Saxons. The general sentiment was well |