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found in the several great divisions of the body-head, trunk, chest, abdomen, upper and lower extremity, respectively. In the case of each special region there is given first an excellent and most serviceable résumé of the anatomy and physiology of the part, by means of which even the non-medical reader can easily understand the pathological points that follow. Then comes an account of the various injuries and resulting diseases and deformities affecting the region. In these accounts brief notice only is given to the symptomatology and surgery of the original injury, since such matters do not come within the scope of the book. The subject discussed is the matter of the sequels of the injury—the nature of such sequels, their recognition, their probable duration and possible change of character, their effect on life, health and physical ability, their proper treatment (when this is of importance), and, if disabling, the proper indemnity from the insurance point of view. Illustrative cases are cited and in connection with these are given numerous and excellent illustrations, both in black and in color. Among the illustrations of the former class are many reproductions of X-ray photographs, representing chiefly the results of fractures and dislocations of bones of the extremities. The illustrations in color consist of forty beautiful lithographic plates after original watercolor drawings.

The book covers the field within its scope, with the exception, as acknowledged, of injuries of certain special organs. The treatment is concise, as is to be expected in a handbook, but the style is clear and the subject-matter is well arranged for easy reference. The book is beautifully printed on good paper.

AN EPITOME OF PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW. By W. H. Hastings Kelke, M. A. London: Sweet & Maxwell, Limited. 1901. pp. XV, 144.

This is the second volume of a series of epitomes by Mr. Kelke, and is described by the author as supplementary to the first volume of the series, An Epitome of Real Property Law. In the preface he calls attention also to the facts, (1) that personal property has become closely entangled with the law of contract, (2) that he attempts to avoid the discussion of questions of contract and to confine himself to the property side of his subject. That he has succeeded in this attempt is apparent from the headings of the nine chapters into which this little handbook is divided. They are as follows: Absolute Property; Qualified Property; Shipping Property; Choses in Action-Negotiability; Annuities—Insurance-Debentures; Partnership and Company Shares; Patent-CopyrightTrademark—Goodwill-Options; Involuntary Alienation; Administration.

While the author has been successful in “keeping off contract," and in confining himself to the nature, the acquisition and the transfer of personal property, it is not quite clear to us why the work should have been undertaken. Certainly there is no demand for such a book in this country. It is too abstruse and too much epitomized for an elementary treatise, and its citations of authorities are too meager to make it valuable to the practicing lawyer. There is no place for it in the law school curriculum; nor do we think that young men would find it suited to their needs in cramming for bar examinations. If it supplies a want in England, it bears witness to methods of legal training there which are quite different from those which are approved here.

COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE. By Seymour D. Thompson, LL. D. Indianapolis: The Bowen-Merrill Co. 1901. Vol. I, lvii, 1254.

This is the first volume of a stupendous work, a work in striking contrast with the Epitome of Personal Property noticed above. That is concise to a fault; this is prolix in the extreme. That is kept within narrow limits by its author's adherence to his resolution to stick closely to his subject and to disentangle it from allied topics; this has been expanded from the three volumes originally intended, to six, in order to avoid “throwing away large portions of the material which had been collected,” as we are told in the preface. The Epitome reads like jottings for lectures; the Commentaries like the diffuse judicial opinion which has come into vogue with the stenographer and typewriter. Indeed, Judge Thompson tells us again, in his preface, that he “is now convinced that the treatise form, so-called, is the best form in which to present legal doctrines and their applications—the same being substantially the form and style employed by a judge in writing an opinion.”

That the work, when completed, will be a mine of valuable material, is beyond doubt. Not only the contents of this volume, but the learning and industry of its distinguished author, give full assurance of that. Perhaps, the term “mine” is not a happy one; certainly, we do not wish to give the idea that the material in this volume is a conglomerate mass. It is far from that. It has been carefully analyzed, arranged and labeled. There is no confusion of thought and no jumbling of topics. All that can be said in the way of criticism is, that the book contains a great deal of valuable matter never before collected under the head of Negligence. The chapter on Dogs furnishes a fair illustration. Two of the sections are devoted to “ The Status of Dogs as Property,” and to the “ Liability of Corporations Keeping Dogs.” In neither of these sections is the subject of negligence referred to.

The present volume contains a general discussion of the principles of the law of Negligence. The second volume will be devoted to the negligence of telegraph companies and of railway companies, except as carriers of passengers. Volume three will deal with the negligence of carriers of passengers by land and by water, with the negligence of municipal corporations and of public officers. Negligence in the relation of master and servant will be the topic of volume four, while the fifth volume will deal with the negligence of carriers of goods, and with remedies, procedure and damages. The sixth volume will embrace topics not included in the predecessors, as well as an exhaustive index and a table of the thirty-five thousand cases, which, it is supposed, will be cited in the entire work. We shall await the forthcoming volumes of this series with much interest.

AN EXPOSITION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF ESTOPPEL BY MISREPRESENTATION. By John S. Ewart. Chicago : Callaghan & Company. 1900. Pp. xli., 548.

This is an original and suggestive book. It displays a careful study of leading cases, an unusual ability to analyze decisions, to criticize authorities and to announce broad generalizations. That the author's conclusions are as trustworthy as they are daring is open to question. His own confidence, however, in their absolute accuracy is unbounded, reminding one not a little of Sidney Smith's remark, that he wished he was as sure of anything as Tom Macaulay was of everything.

The readers of this book will agree with Mr. Ewart, that the law of estoppel, as set forth by him, is very modern ; so modern, in fact, as to raise serious doubts whether it yet exists. Certainly no one can peruse this work without being convinced that neither any judge nor any other writer has discovered the true principles of estoppel, if Mr. Ewart has set them forth here. Every statement of those principles by his predecessors has been wofully inadequate or positively erroneous. And yet, the learned author is able to quote sentences or paragraphs from their writings in support of almost every proposition which he lays down. Indeed, the deftness with which he weaves these quotations into the fabric of his argument is one of the striking characteristics of the book. The force and smoothness of that argument, we have to confess, swept us with it for some time. Perhaps the first thing to give us pause was the author's attempt to show that every peculiarity of negotiable instruments usually ascribed to the law merchant is really an example of estoppel. He admits that the authorities are against his views. He does not hesitate to quote Lord Mansfield, Barons Pollock and Wilde, Justices Williams and Byles, Lord Herschell, Mr. Bigelow and Sir Frederick Pollock, with a view to writing them all down opposed to him, and egregiously mistaken. In his opinion, there is no "law of merchants, in any other sense than there is a law of financiers or a law of tailors." There is no antagonism between the principles of the law merchant and the common law, nor do the doctrines of the former constitute exceptions to those of the latter. What Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice Cockburn, Lord Blackburn and their associates on the bench and at the bar have designated as the law merchant is not a well-defined body of legal rules at all ; it is but a misleading figure of speech for which the one word “estoppel” should be substituted.

This being granted, it follows that every such statement as this: “The law merchant validates in the interest of commerce a transaction which the common law would declare void for want of title or authority,” is erroneous, and that every decision based upon the doctrine that negotiable instruments are governed by different rules from those applicable to non-negotiable writings is unsound. Young v. Grote, 1 " that fount of bad argument,” as Lord Esher styled it, is repeatedly cited and approved by Mr. Ewart, while the latest decision of the House of Lords, dealing with estoppel by negligence, 2 is criticised without mercy. It is not strange that the author disapproves of this decision, although the distinguished judges who rendered it were unanimous in their conclusions and entirely in accord in their reasoning. He is bound to consider it erroneous or to modify one of his leading propositions, which he states in the following form: “The person putting in circulation a bill of exchange owes a duty to all parties to the bill to take reasonable precautions against the possibility of fraudulent alterations of it.” In the case just referred to, the House of Lords declared that such was not and ought not to be the law; that judicial authority and business usage were opposed to the imposition of any such duty, and held that one who accepted a bill for £500, with spaces in the body which made it possible for the drawer thereafter to raise the bill to £3,500, was not liable on the bill as so raised; that it was not a case of estoppel by carelessness. Said Lord Shand: “I agree with your Lordships in holding that there is no sound reason or legal principle to support the view that, on the ground of negligence, an acceptor of a bill becomes liable to a subsequent holder for a sum beyond the amount of his acceptance because the form of the document and the stamp used admit of a forgery in the hands of a dishonest person, such as occurred in this case.”

Another proposition for which the learned author contends is stated as follows: “If an owner of shares will execute blank transfers of them prior to their being required, and allow them to escape, he, and not an innocent purchaser of them, ought to loose.” This he declares to be the New York law, as shown by McNiel v. Tenth National Bank. 3 But he seems to be unaware of the later decision of the same court, in Knox v. Eden Musee Co., 4 which is inconsistent with his proposition, and which explains the McNeil case as holding “that an agent to whom the owner has delivered a certificate of stock, duly indorsed for transfer, with a limited power of disposition for a special purpose, may bind the title thereto as against the true owner by transferring it to a bona fide transferee who has no notice of the limitations of the agent's authority.” Certainly if the proposition laid down by Mr. Ewart is law, the New York Court of Appeals did not know it in 1896, nor was it known to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1899, as shown by Scollans v. Rollins, 5

Notwithstanding our belief that the author's views are frequently unsound, and that the book cannot be accepted as a safe exposition of the principles of estoppel, we are convinced that it is

* 4 Bing., 253. * Schofield v. Earl of Londesborough, (1896) A. C., 514. 3 46 N. Y., 325. * 148 N. Y., 441. $ 173 Mass., 275.

worthy of the most respectful treatment; that every lawyer will profit by a careful reading of it; that it is a valuable contribution to legal learning.

Reviews to follow :


PROBATE REPORTS ANNOTATED. Vols. IV and V. New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1900. pp. xxxiii, 767. 1901. pp. xxxix, 774.

AN EPITOME OF ROMAN LAW. By W. H. Hastings Kelke, M. A. London : Sweet & Maxwell, Limited. 1901. pp. vi, 268.

AN EPITOME OF LEADING CASES IN Equity. Founded on White and Tudor's Selection. By W. H. Hastings Kelke, M. A. London : Sweet & Maxwell, Limited. 1901. pp. xx, 240.

A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE. Edwin H. Woodruff. New York : Baker, Voorhis & Company. 1900. pp. xiii, 591.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. By Francis Newton Thorpe. Chicago : Callaghan & Co. 1901. pp. Vol. I, xxi, 595 ; Vol. II, xix, 685; Vol. III, xvi, 718.

A SELECTION OF CASES AND STATUTES ON THE PRINCIPLES OF CODE PLEADING, with notes. By Charles M. Hepburn, of the Cincinnati Bar. Cincinnati : W. H. Anderson & Co. 1901. pp. xxxvi, 651.

A TREATISE ON CANADIAN COMPANY LAW. By W. J. White, Q. C., assisted by J. A. Ewing, B. C. L. Montreal : C.' Theoret. 1901. pp. xxiii, 708.

DIGEST OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. Being a synopsis of the Code. By Charles W. Disbrow, of the New York Bar. 'Albany : Matthew Bender. 1901. pp. 151.

FALSTAFF AND EQUITY: An interpretation. By Charles E. Phelps. Boston and New York : Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1901. pp. xvi, 201.


THE LIABILITY OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS FOR TORt. Treating fully Municipal Liability for Negligence. By Waterman L. Williams, A. B., LL.B., Author of Statutory Torts in Massachusetts. Boston : Little, Brown & Co. 1901. pp. xxxix, 345.

COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE IN ALL RELATIONS. [Including a complete Revision of the Author's previous works on the same subject.] By Seymour D. Thompson, LL.D. Vol. II. Indianapolis : The Bowen-Merrill Co. 1901. pp. li, 1134.

SELECTED CASES ON THE LAW OF SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. Arranged to accompany Burdick's Law of Sales. By Francis M. Burdick, Dwight Professor of Law in Columbia University School of Law. Second Edition. Revised and enlarged. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1901. pp. xiii, 792.

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