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A Brief Confideration of the Remarks made upon the foregoing Reflections by the Gentlemen of the Athenian Society, in the Supplement to the Third Volume, &c.

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HE Gentlemen of this new Society undertake two things, to Report, and to Judge of the Contents of the most confiderable Books that are Printed in England which I acknowledge to be a very useful and laudable Undertaking, if performed Skilfully and Faithfully, with Judgment and Integrity. But whether they have thus acquitted themselves in reference to the foregoing Reflections, the Liberty they have taken with the Author, will I think warrant him to Examin.

Supplement, Pag. 2. Paragraph 1. It will be fufficient to obferve that Mr. Norris is a Cartelian, and as it feems, of thofe of the Cartesians that are of Father Malebranche's Opinion. This occafions that being full of thefe Thoughts, he feems not always to have well comprehended his meaning whom he Criticifes upon. Why the being a Cartefian, and according to the way

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of M. Malebranche, fhould make me less apt to comprehend Mr. Lock's Book, I cannot divine. Were the thing it felf never so true, yet I think the Reason here given of it, is as odd as may be. But 'twill be time enough to feek out for the Reafon of my mifunderftanding Mr. Lock's Book, when it is better proved than at prefent, that I have done fo. But as to that, if Mr. Lock himself had told me fo, his bare Authority without any Reafon would have obliged me to fufpect my Apprehenfion, and to think once again; it being a Deference owing to every Author to fuppofe that he best understands his own Meaning. But from you Gentlemen, who ftand upon the fame Level with me, I expect Reason, and to be fhewn where and how I have mistaken him. For the present I am rather apt to think that I have comprehended Mr. Lock's Senfe well enough, but that you understand neither Me, nor Mr, Lock. Paragr. 2. He upbraideth Mr. Lock of attempting to treat of Ideas, without defining what he understood by this Word. Here is a falfe Report. I did not cenfure Mr. Lock for undertaking to difcourfe of Ideas, without premifing a Definition of the Name or Word, (for that I grant he has done) but for offering to account for their Origination, without giving a Definition, or any Account of the thing. My Words are, But fure by all the

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Laws of Method in the World, he ought first to have Defined what be meant by Ideas, and to have acquainted us with their Nature, before he proceeded to account for their Origination. And again, This therefore ought to have been his First and indeed main Business, to have given us an account of the Nature of Ideas: And yet this is not only neglected in its proper place, but wholly omitted and pass'd over in deep Silence, which I cannot but remarque as a Fundamental Defect in this Work. What is it pray, that is here remarqu'd as a Fundamental Defect? Not fure his not defining the Term Idea for that I grant pag. 22. where Efay, that fomuch my Lexicon would have told me;) but his giving no account of the nature of Ideas, That is there remarquid as a Fundamental Defect; and I find no caufe yet to think otherwife. I

Ibid. But Mr. Norris may fee that be's miz faken, if he'll read over again the end of the Firft Chapter of Book I. where the Author begs his Readers Leave, &c. Miftaken indeed, if he had charged the Author with not defining the Term Idea, but not at all mistaken, in cafe the thing charg'd upon him was the not defining the Nature of Ideas; for of that the Author givesno account, neither in the place thefe Gentlemen refer to, nor any where elfe..

Ibid. It was fufficient to bin (viz. Mr. Lock,) to fhew in what manner, or if ye will, on what occafion we come to have different Ideas, without

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without its being neceffary to speak of the Ideas themfelves. Here is an implicit Conceffion that Mr. Lock does not undertake to open the nature of Ideas, and withal that that was the thing laid to his Charge, which fufficiently clears the Reflecter from the pretended Miftake. But then withall 'tis affirmed here, that there was no need he fhould undertake fuch an Account. Now this being matter of Judgment, not of Report, the thing must be a little argued. Thefe Gentlemen fay it was fufficient to fhew how we come by our Ideas, without fpeaking of the Ideas themselves. Against this I contend it was not fufficient, it being impoffible to give any fatisfactory account how we come by them, till their nature be in fome meafure difcover'd. For how can any thing be affirm'd or denied of any thing, unlefs its Nature be known? How can any Attribute be given with any certainty to an unknown Subject? Indeed when the nature of the thing is fufficiently known and agreed upon, we need only define the Term whereby we express it: As when tis fuppofed to be known what the Nature of an Angle is, I need only fay that a Triangle is that which has Three Angles. Which is the Reason why Euclid in his Geometry thought himfelf concern'd only to give Nominal Definitions. For the nature of Figures is evidently known; we fee the very

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Effence of them, and therefore there needs no other Definition but that of the Term only, whereby we fignify them, that fo there may be no mistake of our meaning, that we may not be fuppofed to mean a Square when we talk of a Circle. But when the nature of the thing is not known or agreed up on (as in the prefent cafe) then a bare Definition of the Term is not fufficient; but the thing it felf must be (at least in general) explained, before any Propofition can be with any certainty advanc'd concerning it. For fuppofe instead of faying that our Ideas come from our Senfes, I fhould fay that the immediate Object of our Conception (which is the Nominal Definition) comes from our Senfes, what advantage would this be to the certainty of the Propofition; or how could it be decided whether the immediate Object of our Conception be from our Senfes or no, unless it be first made known what this immediate Object of our Conception is? We must know its Nature, before we can derive its Pedigree.

Paragr. 3. Mr. Lock hath maintain'd that there are no Innate Ideas, fince there is no Principle wherein all Mankind agree. But to that the Author oppofes the Evident Propofitions which all the World agrees to, &c. To that; To what? Here is either a great Blunder, or a very grofs Prevarication, What Mr, Lock is

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