See also Assignments, II; Charter Party; Dent Act; Eminent Domain, I, II, III; Jurisdiction, II; Leases; Lever Act; Refor- mation of Contract; Sale of Supplies; Settlement Contracts; Taxes, VIII, XV, XVI.
COST-PLUS CONTRACTS.
See Contracts, VIII; Dent Act, III.
See Contracts, V; Eminent Domain, II. DEMURRAGE.
See Charter Party.
DENT ACT.
I. The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims does not attach in Dent Act cases where no appeal has been taken by the plaintiff to the Secretary of War from the decision of the Board of Contract Adjustment and the Secretary of War has not acted on the claim. Baum, trustee, 323. II. To bring a case within the Dent Act the pleadings and proof must show an agreement, express or implied, made by an officer duly authorized thereunto. III. A Government contractor, engaged in cantonment con- struction at cost plus determinable fees not exceeding a certain maximum, was directed by an officer of the Army who was without authority to contract, to do cer- tain work which the contractor considered to be outside his contract, and accordingly requested therefor a sup- plemental contract, which was refused. Without fur- ther protest he proceeded with and completed the work so directed. Held, that the circumstances did not raise the implication of a contract under the Dent Act to pay additional compensation for the disputed work. McKenzie Construction Co., 645.
See also Settlement Contracts, II.
DEPENDENTS.
See Navy Pay, I.
DEPLETION.
See Taxes, XVIII.
DEPRECIATION.
See Taxes, VI, VIII, XVIII.
See Taxes, II, IV, XXI, XXIII.
EMINENT DOMAIN.
I. Where the plaintiff had a contract with a shipbuilder for the construction of a ship and before said ship was completed the Government, under the act of June 15, 1917, requisitioned the ship and expropriated plaintiff's rights
EMINENT DOMAIN-Continued.
under its contract, plaintiff is entitled to just compen- sation for its contract rights (1) as of the date of the taking, and (2) by way of interest thereon to the date judgment is paid. Following Brooks-Scanlon v. United States, 265 U. S. 106. Consorzio Veneziano, etc., 11; Connelly S. 8. Co. et al., 38; Brooks-Scanlon Corporation, 80; Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, 119.
II. Plaintiffs had a contract with a shipbuilder, subject to delay on account of commandeering by the Government, for the construction of certain power-driven cargo- carrying ships and before construction had begun the Government served upon plaintiffs and the shipbuilder identical orders under the act of June 15, 1917, requisi- tioning all ships of that description under construction in their respective yards. The shipbuilder refused to build the agreed ships according to the terms of the requisition, but an understanding was reached by it with the Government whereby the construction would go forward until an express contract for the price to be paid should be entered into. The said express contract was thereafter entered into between the shipbuilder and the Government fixing the price which was finally paid upon completion of the ships and their delivery to the Gov- ernment. Held, that there was an expropriation of plain- tiffs' rights and contract by the Government, for which they are entitled to just compensation under the rule laid down in Brooks-Scanlon v. United States, 265 U. S. 106. Luckenbach S. S. Co. et al., 59.
III. Plaintiff had a contract with a shipbuilder for the con- struction of two combined passenger and freight ships and before the keels had been laid the Government, by virtue of the act of June 15, 1917, took vessels of the plaintiff under construction by the said shipbuilder and contracts of the plaintiff with said shipbuilder for their construction. Thereafter the Government ordered the said shipbuilder to suspend work on the said vessels, and they were not constructed. Held, that under the rule of Brooks-Scanlon v. United States, 265 U. S. 106, plaintiff was entitled to just compensation for the expropriation of its said contract. Ocean Steamship Co., 98. IV. The fair and reasonable market value of plaintiffs' prop- erty found as of the date of taking. Reilly et al., 299. V. Plaintiffs given judgment for the fair and reasonable market value of their property as of the date of taking. Vilsack et al., 310.
VI. The Army appropriation act of July 11, 1919, withdrew otherwise available appropriations for the purchase of
EMINENT DOMAIN-Continued.
real estate or for the construction of Army camps, with certain exceptions, but did not repeal the act of July 2, 1917, as amended by the act of April 11, 1918, and by the act of July 9, 1918, which conferred jurisdiction of con- demnation proceedings upon the United States district court of the district in which the lands sought to be con demned were located. King et al., 325.
VII. A judgment of condemnation obtained in a court of com- petent jurisdiction is not subject to impeachment in a collateral proceeding. The ascertainment of the time of taking is a question within the issues in the condemna- tion proceeding and the court's judgment thereon is conclusive upon the Court of Claims. Id.
VIII. In awarding just compensation to a municipality a claim for potential revenue based on taxes derivable from the property taken will not be considered. City of Cape May, 407.
IX. Where the Government sets up coast-defense guns that may be fired over plaintiffs' lands, but does not so fire them, and the facts fail to show an intention to fire them in times of peace, there is no servitude imposed or intended to be imposed upon the said lands and there is no taking thereof. Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. et al., 572.
X. A district supervisor of the Emergency Fleet Corporation did not have authority, under the act of June 15, 1917, or orders issued thereunder, to act for the corporation in the requisitioning of property. Notice on plaintiff by that officer that it would be necessary "to take over as a war measure" the premises occupied by him and requesting him to vacate, did not constitute a taking for which he was entitled to just compensation. Schumann, 607.
See also Charter Party; Special Jurisdictional Acts, I. FEDERAL CONTROL OF RAILROADS.
See Jurisdiction, I; Railroad Transportation, I; Taxes, XV. FOOD CONTROL ACT.
See Lever Act.
GOOD WILL.
See Taxes, V, XVI.
IMPLIED CONTRACTS.
See Dent Act, II, III; Jurisdiction, II; Lever Act. INDIANS.
Where the cause of action as stated by plaintiff grows out of a ratification by the United States of a convention of the Seneca Tribe of Indians, of which he is a member, the Court of Claims is prohibited under section 153 of the Judicial Code from tak-
ing jurisdiction. Jurisdiction in such cases is only acquired by special act of Congress.
See also Taxes, XVII.
INTEREST.
See Eminent Domain; Taxes, XXII.
INTERVENOR.
See Assignments, I.
JURISDICTION.
I. The transportation act of 1920, 41 Stat. 456, conferred exclusive jurisdiction upon the Interstate Commerce Commission in cases coming under section 204 thereof, entitled "Reimbursement of deficits during Federal con- trol," and the decision of the commission thereunder is not subject to review by the Court of Claims. Wyandotte Terminal R. R. Co., 329.
II. An implied contract of which the Court of Claims takes jurisdiction must be one implied in fact as distinguished from one arising by implication of law. Enid Milling Co., 396.
See also Army Pay, I; Contracts, V; Dent Act, I; Eminent Domain, VI, VII; Indians; Special Jurisdictional Acts; Treas- ury Pay, I.
I. Where in accordance with the terms of a lease the Gov- ernment gives the lessor notice of surrender of the premises, but continues thereafter to occupy the same, the notice so given is of no value, and the lessor is en- titled for the entire period of occupancy to rent at the rate named in the lease. McKnight, 291. II. Where a lease obligates the Government to keep the prem- ises in good repair "to the satisfaction of the Govern- ment officer in charge," and after occupancy has terminated a properly constituted board, assembled by the said officer and of which he is a member, finds the amount necessary to restore the premises to good condi- tion, the lessor is entitled to recover the same. Id. See also Taxes, VIII, XVII. LEVER ACT.
The plaintiff company, a licensee under the President's proclama- tion of August 14, 1917, issued in pursuance of the Lever Act (food control act of August 10, 1917), agreed with the Food Administration, in consideration of the milling license issued to it, to obey the rules and regulations prescribed by the President or by the Food Administrator. The Food Administrator issued
an order prohibiting profits in excess of 25 cents per barrel, and upon termination of food control auditors of the Food Admin- istration reported that plaintiff had taken profits in excess thereof, the amount reported by them being thereafter adjusted and reduced. Plaintiff paid the Food Administration the re- duced amount and upon report thereof to the Bureau of Inter- nal Revenue received an appropriate refund of excess-profits taxes. Held, (1) that the Food Administrator had authority to issue the order regulating the profits of licensees; (2) that the Lever Act does not require moneys so paid the United States to be refunded; (3) that the circumstances do not in fact imply a contract to make such refund. Enid Milling Co., 396.
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES.
See Contracts, V.
LONGEVITY PAY.
See Marine Corps Pay.
MARINE CORPS PAY.
A major in the Marine Corps, retired as such September 30, 1911, with the pay fixed by the act of May 11, 1908, and on account of wounds received in battle, and thereafter rendering at divers times up to April 1, 1926, additional active service making a total active service of 17 years, 11 months and 25 days, is entitled to base pay of the fourth period only. Section 1 of the act of June 10, 1922, that "for officers in the service on June 30, 1922, there shall be included in the computation all service which is now counted in computing longevity pay," does not include retired officers, nor does the act otherwise authorize the inclusion of inactive service in computing base pay. The pay of the officer so retired being as much under the act of May 11, 1908, as for an officer of equal rank and length of service retired subsequent to June 30, 1922, the equalization provided for in the act of May 8, 1926, is fully complied with, and he is not entitled, by reason of inactive service, to more. Leonard, 384.
Where in response to telephonic communication from the com- manding general of the Eastern Department, United States Army, the State of Massachusetts orders the hire of horses for the purpose of mob lizing units of the National Guard that had Been ordered to camp to be mustered into the service of the United States, the sum paid by the State for such hire, reason- able in amount, is recoverable. Massachusetts, 337. NAVY PAY.
I. Section 4 of the act of June 10, 1922, is not to be strictly construed, and where a mother is dependent upon a
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