Britain to action of France in Morocco of a kind calculated to establish a protectorate.

The Anglo-French declaration recognized the interest which Spain has in Morocco "from her geographical position and from her territorial possessions on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean," and as French ambitions were likely to meet with opposition from Spain, it was provided in Article VIII that the French should come to an understanding with the Spanish Government and that any agreement reached between the two should be communicated to Great Britain. The third of the Secret Articles of the declaration contemplated that Spain should become a party to the agreement, and stipulated that in this event certain advantages should accrue to Spain. Thus:

The two governments agree that a certain extent of Moorish territory adjacent to Melilla, Ceuta, and other présides should, whenever the sultan ceases to exercise authority over it, come within the sphere of influence of Spain, and that the administration of the coast from Melilla as far as, but not including, the heights on the right bank of the Sebou shall be entrusted to Spain.

Nevertheless, Spain would previously have to give her formal assent to the provisions of Articles 4 and 7 of the declaration of to-day's date, and undertake to carry them out.

She would also have to undertake not to alienate the whole, or a part, of the territories placed under her authority or in her sphere of influence.

But the non-accession of Spain was not to prevent the agreement between France and Great Britain from going into effect. (Article 4.)

A glance at the map shows the interest that Spain has in Morocco and the advisability, if not the necessity, of consulting it and acting in cooperation with it. The possession of Ceuta, the Alhucema Isles, the Chaferinas, Melilla, Peñon de Velez, etc., makes Spain deeply concerned in any modification of conditions in Morocco, and the traditional friendship which has existed so long between Great Britain and Spain, and the desire of France to be on good terms with its European neighbor, required that Spain be consulted as to prospective changes. Therefore the declaration stipulated that Spain should be consulted and that it be given an opportunity to adhere to the treaty. In accordance with this understanding the declaration was communicated to Spain by France, and on October 3, 1904,5 Spain adhered to the agreement. The adherence was preceded by a treaty of the same date defining the interests of France and Spain in Morocco, but the text of this treaty was not made

5 See declaration of adherence printed in SUPPLEMENT, p. 30.

public at the time. The agreement of November 4, 1911, will necessitate a readjustment of French and Spanish claims in Morocco, and negotiations are in progress to adjust outstanding claims inconsistent. with the terms of the Franco-German agreement.

The Anglo-French declaration of April 8, 1904, may be considered as the starting point of the negotiations leading to the Franco-German agreement under discussion. The declaration seemed to have the approval of the Powers, but the events of 1905 showed that France, Great Britain and Spain had made a serious tactical blunder in not consulting Germany. The visit to Morocco of the German Emperor, who landed at Tangier on March 31, 1905, caused uneasiness, for he is reported to have declared that he had come " to enforce the sovereignty of the Sultan, the integrity of Morocco, and the equality of commercial and economic interests." However that may be, the Sultan rejected the reforms proposed by France, and, at the suggestion of Germany, issued an invitation to the Powers for a conference in order to consider the question. It is well known that M. Delcassé, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, opposed the idea of a conference, but Germany insisted, Delcassé resigned, and France yielded. The Powers thereupon met in conference at Algeciras, on January 16, 1906, and remained in session until April 7th, when the Act of Algeciras was signed by the delegates. Without analyzing this important convention, it is sufficient to say that it recognized the dominant interest of France and Spain in Morocco, safeguarded the principle of economic equality, and negatived the ambition of France to establish, either in law or in fact, a protectorate. The Sultan accepted the convention on June 18th, and the ratifications of the other Powers were deposited at the Spanish Foreign Office on December 31, 1906. The period following the conference was unfortunately marked by domestic troubles, the armed intervention of France, the deposition of the Sultan, and the accession of his brother, Hafid. The desire of Germany for the immediate recognition of Hafid took expression in the form of a circular to the Powers, dated September 2, 1908, which caused anxiety in diplomatic circles, and France and Spain insisted that Hafid's recognition should be conditioned upon guarantees from him that the Act of Algeciras would be respected. The views of these two govern

6 This treaty, as well as other relevant documents, will be published in a subsequent issue when France and Spain have reached an agreement upon the Moroccan question.

7 For the text of this act, see SUPPLEMENT for January, 1907 (Vol. I), p. 47.

ments prevailed, the guarantees were given, and Hafid was recognized as Sultan in the beginning of 1909.8

From this brief account, it is evident that the intervention of Germany blocked the action of France contemplated by the parties to the declaration of April 8, 1904, although Germany did not succeed in discouraging France from continuing its efforts. The success of German diplomacy coupled, perhaps, with the feeling that French preponderance was inevitable, led Germany to come to an agreement with France, signed on February 9, 1909, in which Germany stated that its interests in Morocco were economic, that it recognized that the political interests of France were closely bound up with the maintenance of order and domestic peace in Morocco, and that it would not oppose obstacles to these interests. At the same time France declared itself as attached to the maintenance of the integrity and independence of Morocco, as determined to safeguard economic equality, and as determined not to interfere with the commercial and industrial interests of Germany. The literal interpretation of this agreement would have postponed indefinitely the realization of French hopes and ambitions in Morocco, but its negotiation served to relieve the tension which existed between the two countries. Disorder and lawlessness continued to mark the Sultan's administration, and in 1909 Spain sent a force of fifty thousand men to Morocco, defeated Hafid's army, and secured a treaty favorable to its rights and pretensions.10 The resources of the empire had been wasted by misgovernment and foreign complications. Money was needed to meet claims of European creditors; most of this money was advanced by France, which took occasion to negotiate an arrangement to settle pending difficulties between the two countries.11

In view of the chronic disorder obtaining in Morocco, it can not be doubted that the establishment of stable government would be not merely in the best interests of the Powers, but of inestimable service to the Moroccans, who are plundered by officials, forced to take sides with various pretenders, and exposed to the armed intervention of their more powerful neighbors. It may be questioned whether an adequate native government could be easily established. A joint protectorate of the

8 See documents concerning the recognition of Mulai Hafid, SUPPLEMENT, Vol. III (1909), p. 101.

9 Printed in SUPPLEMENT, p. 31.

10 For text of this treaty, see SUPPLEMENT, p. 54.

11 For text of this document, see SUPPLEMENT, p. 43.

Powers would be possible, but the verdict of history is against joint protectorates. The determination of France to acquire political control in Morocco is outspoken and of long standing, and at last Germany has yielded to French insistence, or at least has promised in the agreement cf November 4, 1911, not to interfere, so far as it is concerned, with the political activity of France, provided that the principle of economic equality be accepted and enforced by France. When it is stated that the accord of February 9, 1909, between France and Germany, required thirty-two days for its conclusion, we are prepared to understand why the negotiations leading to the recent agreement were so prolonged and difficult. The fear that concession should be construed as a sign of weakness complicated a situation already sufficiently complex. Germany desired to come to direct terms with France without consulting other Powers; but the interest of Great Britain in the settlement could not be overlooked, in view of the declaration of April 8, 1904, by which Great Britain pledged to France at least its moral support in the realization of the latter's policy. The result was that relations between Germany and Great Britain became embittered, and, during the month of July of the past year, threatened to involve the two countries in war. The awful consequences which would result from a struggle between these two countries, the loss of life, and the economic ruin which it would entail seem to have given the parties pause before the final step was taken. Germany yielded to the representations of France, and consented to a recognition of the "right" of France, so far as Germany was concerned, to take political action in Morocco, provided economic equality was preserved. As a consideration for Germany's acquiescence, France bound itself to cede certain portions of the French Congo to Germany.12

The agreement of November 4, 1911, between France and Germany, abrogates by express terms any and all existing French and German conventions, treaties, or regulations in contravention of or inconsistent with its terms (Article 13). As the Madrid Convention of 1881 stands in the way, France and Germany agree to induce the signatory Powers to modify it (Article 12); and in like manner the Algeciras Act, which is an international convention, signed by twelve Powers, is to be communicated to them by France and Germany who pledge their mutual endeavors to obtain approval of the present agreement (Article 14). There may be considerable delay in securing the approval of the various.

12 For this part of the Moroccan agreement, see SUPPLEMENT, p. 4.

Powers to the agreement, and negotiations with Spain, by reason of its peculiar interests, may require much time; but given European conditions and the willingness of the great Powers, as evidenced by their history, to sacrifice the independence of a country in which they are not specially interested, it appears probable that their approval will be obtained without serious difficulty.

It may seem strange that two of the most advanced and most highly civilized Powers of the world, ancient or modern, should enter into an agreement affecting a third country (Morocco), which was not a party to the negotiations, for there is no evidence in the treaty that Morocco has agreed in advance to its terms. It will, it is believed, be persuaded or forced to yield: voluntas principis facit jus.

THE PENDING TREATY OF ARBITRATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN *

On the 3d day of August, 1911, the pending treaty of arbitration between the United States and Great Britain was signed by Secretary Knox on behalf of the United States, and by Ambassador Bryce on behalf of Great Britain, and the following day it was sent to the Senate for its advice and consent to its ratification. There has been comparatively little difference of opinion as to the advisability of negotiating treaties of arbitration which will bind the respective nations to submit their differences broadly and generally to this peaceful method of settling international disputes, and it may be said that public opinion in each of the countries is prepared for the widest possible extension and application of the principle of arbitration to any differences which may unfortunately arise between them and which the ordinary channels of diplomacy shall have failed to adjust.

While the general principle is thus admitted by the respective governments and their peoples, details of a domestic nature have given rise to much discussion and prevented prompt approval of certain provisions of the treaty. It is thought advisable to point out in this place the general purposes of the treaty, the means by which they are sought to be made effective, and to mention the points of controversy impartially by argu

* In this comment the pending treaty between the United States and Great Britain is considered without reference to the French treaty, which is, however, identical in terms.

1 Printed in the October, 1911, SUPPLEMENT, p. 253.