The case of the Exchange (1812, 7 Cranch, 116), referred to in the portion of the judgment just quoted, is universally considered as the leading authority on the immunity from suit of property belonging to sovereigns. The opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in this case is too well known to justify quotation, and it is believed that its reasoning, coupled with the judgments in the cases previously cited, forbids interference through judicial process with property belonging to a foreign state, and the coffee in question is stated by the court to belong to a foreign state.

The theory and practice of nations do not go to the extent of rendering sovereigns unaccountable for their actions in withdrawing them from the jurisdiction of courts of justice. The channels of diplomacy are open, though the courts be closed, as was admirably stated by Mr. Pinkney arguendo in the case of the Exchange. Thus he said, "When wrongs are inflicted by one nation upon another in tempestuous times, they cannot be redressed by the judicial department. Its powers cannot extend beyond the territorial jurisdiction. * *The right to demand redress belongs to the executive department, which alone represents the sovereignty of the nation in its intercourse with other nations."

The final decision of the District Court upon trial of the case of the United States of America v. Herman Sielcken, et al., will be looked upon with more than common interest, for, unless precedents are rejected, or the circumstances of the present case are distinguished from them, the success of the government would seem to be inconsistent with hitherto recognized principles of international law.

THE CLOSING AND REOPENING OF THE DARDANELLES

The recent action of Turkey in closing, and then after a short period, reopening the Dardanelles, recalls the somewhat anomalous position which those straits occupy in international law. The Dardanelles and the Bosphorus are Turkish territorial straits. The condition required to constitute territorial straits is that they shall be sufficiently narrow that navigation through them can be controlled by coast batteries erected either on one or both sides of them, and that the territory on both sides of them shall belong to the same country. They connect the Mediterranean Sea, about which there has never been any question as to its international character, and the Black Sea, which has only within the last century and a half become international.

In 1774, through the intervention of Russia, the Crimea secured its independence of Turkey, and the Black Sea ceased to be a territorial sea. In the same year Russia obtained from Turkey, by treaty, the right to free navigation through the Dardanelles, and similar privileges were soon secured by other Powers. Turkey, however, never recognized the right of foreign vessels of war to have passage through the straits. In 1841 the rule as to the exclusion of foreign vessels of war from the Dardanelles was accepted by the Powers, and again in 1856, by a separate convention of March 30, the traditional right asserted by Turkey was recognized by the Powers signatory of the Treaty of Paris. Again in 1871 the rule was confirmed by the Treaty of London. The United States was not a party to this treaty, and refused to recognize the claim of Turkey "as a right under the law of nations." It has, however, been deemed expedient by the United States to acquiesce in the exclusion of vessels of war from the Dardanelles until the proper occasion should arise to dispute the claim of Turkey.

The rule of international law with respect to territorial waters which are so placed that passage through them is necessary or convenient for the navigation of the open seas, is that they are subject to the right of innocent use by all nations for purposes of commercial intercourse. They are not, however, thereby thrown open to the passage of vessels of war. The state within whose dominion they lie, or whose shores they border, is not necessarily bound to permit the passage of vessels of war through them. The reason for the exception of vessels of war is founded on the right of a state that its peace and security shall not be threatened by the presence of war vessels so near to its territories.

It would seem, however, that while we must thus admit the abstract right of a state to exclude foreign vessels of war from even the innocent use of its territorial water, in so far as such vessels are a menace to its peace, it is hardly in accord with the friendly intercourse of nations, that a state which is in possession of a territorial strait, such as the Dardanelles, should, as a general and permanent rule, exclude foreign vessels of war from the right of innocent passage in time of peace through the strait. In this respect, the guarantee of the Powers, by the Treaty of London, that Turkey may permanently exclude foreign vessels of war from the Dardanelles would seem to be introducing a rule not in accord with international custom under conditions substantially similar.

On April 18 last, Italy, in pursuance of her policy of extending the war nearer to the center of the Turkish Empire, began the bombard

ment of the Dardanelles. In response to the Italian attack, floating mines were set adrift by Turkey in the straits and all commercial navigation was thereupon suspended. Neutral commerce immediately felt the effect of the closure. On April 29, as many as ninety-nine foreign merchantmen were detained at the port of Constantinople and in neighboring waters. The value of their cargoes was put at between fifteen and twenty million dollars, and their detention caused a loss to the underwriters estimated at over fifteen thousand dollars a day. In response to the inquiries of the foreign ambassadors and ministers at Constantinople, the Turkish Government replied that although it was anxious to avoid inflicting injury upon the interests of neutrals, at the same time it could not undertake the removal of the mines without weakening the defenses of the Dardanelles, which were all the more important, inasmuch as Italy had cut off communication by cable with the Ægean archipelago, thus making it impossible for Turkey to obtain timely warning of an intended Italian attack. The Turkish Government insisted upon obtaining guarantees from the Powers for the security of the Dardanelles against further attack on the part of Italy.

In spite, however, of its inability to obtain the required guarantees, the Turkish Government decided on May 1st, to reopen the straits, owing, it is said, to very emphatic representations on the part of Russia. It was apparently a case where Turkey realized that although Italy might be held responsible by the nations for the closing of the Dardanelles, the ill-feeling on the part of neutrals caused by the loss to their trade would soon be turned against Turkey for keeping the Dardanelles closed. The following note was addressed by the Porte to the Ottoman representatives abroad and to the representatives of the Powers at Constantinople:

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has the honor to inform you that the Imperial Government has decided to reopen the Dardanelles to neutral vessels on the same conditions as those which obtained before their closure — that is, on condition that they should submit to being towed through the passage.

On the expiration of the period required for clearing the channel the straits will be opened under the above conditions.

It is unnecessary to add that the Imperial Government maintains the legitimate right completely to close the channel whenever the necessity arises.

The attitude of the Italian press upon the question is somewhat illogical: Turkey should not interfere with neutral commerce by closing the Dardanelles even at the cost of weakening her defenses, but Italy

cannot be expected to hinder her freedom of belligerent action by limiting her program of naval operations in the Ægean.

THE CANEVARO CASE AT THE HAGUE

On April 25, 1910, Italy and Peru negotiated a special agreement under the general treaty of arbitration of April 18, 1905, by virtue of which the claims of the Canevaro brothers were submitted to international arbitration at The Hague. The arbiters were Mr. Guido Fusinato for Italy, Mr. Manuel Alvarez Calderon for Peru, and the distinguished French jurist, M. Louis Renault, was chosen as umpire. The temporary tribunal thus composed held its first session on April 20, 1912, and, after hearing counsel, delivered its award on May 3, 1912. In his opening address, M. Renault, as president of the tribunal, stated:

It is not a matter of indifference to state that the practice of arbitration has become more and more a matter of international custom, and that general conventions concluded in this sense do not rest a dead letter but are regularly executed. Political opinion must become accustomed to see thus settled differences which arise between governments and which, without forming conflicts properly so called, are of a nature to embarrass the relations of the two countries and to render them less cordial. There are often cases in which, notwithstanding good will on both sides, it is impossible to arrive at an amicable settlement. An impartial tribunal can alone furnish the solution, which shall be thereupon accepted without difficulty by both of the litigants. You will excuse a jurisconsult by profession, who for many years past has devoted himself to the theoretical and practical study of international arbitration, in emphasizing the interest of this new case to be tried at The Hague.

The question submitted to the tribunal is thus stated in the special agreement of April 25, 1910:

Ought the Peruvian Government to pay in coin, or in accordance with the provisions of the Peruvian law on the domestic debt of June 12, 1889, the drafts (lettres à ordre, cambiali, libramientos) now in the possession of the brothers Napoleon, Carlo, and Raphael Canevaro, and which were drawn by the Peruvian Government to the order of the firm of José Canevaro & Sons for the sum of 43,140 pounds sterling, plus the legal interest on the said amount?

The tribunal first considers the status of Raphael Canevaro, who was born in Peru of Italian parentage. It considers him as having a twofold nationality: first, by birth in Peru, and second, as the child of an Italian father. It considers, however, that for the purposes of this case the claimant, Raphael Canevaro, had elected to consider himself a

Peruvian citizen and that, by virtue of such election, he acquired not merely Peruvian, but lost Italian citizenship. Not being an Italian citizen, his rights in the premises are such rights as a Peruvian would have against the Government of Peru, and his claim is therefore dismissed from further consideration.

The Italian nationality of the brothers Napoleon and Carlo Canevaro was admitted and therefore was not a subject of dispute. The tribunal then passed to the consideration of the claim upon its merits. Briefly stated, it appears that the dictator Pierola issued a decree on December 12, 1880, by virtue of which there were created, under date of December 23, 1880, pay checks (bons de paiement, libramientos) to the order of the firm of José Canevaro & Sons for the sum of 77,000 pounds sterling, payable at different periods, that the pay checks drawn to the order of Canevaro & Sons were not paid as they fell due, that in 1885 the Peruvian Government paid 35,000 pounds sterling on account, thus leaving due and outstanding to the firm, which had been reorganized in 1883 owing to the death of José Canevaro, the sum of 43,140 pounds sterling. By a law of 1886 the Peruvian Government confirmed the pay orders (libramientos), bonds, etc., issued before January, 1880, in order, it would seem, to invalidate the acts of the dictator Pierola subsequent to that date, which, if strictly interpreted, would exclude the Canevaro claims, which arose on December 23, 1880. As, however, the Peruvian Government subsequently recognized the validity of these claims, the tribunal felt justified in disregarding the act of 1886, in so far as it applied to the claims in question.

The tribunal found that the firm of Canevaro & Sons, reorganized in 1885 upon the death of the father, was composed of José Francisco, Cesar and Raphael Canevaro, Peruvian citizens, so that it was Peruvian by domicile as well as by the nationality of its members, and that the firm remained in existence until it was dissolved in 1900 by the death of José Francisco Canevaro. The tribunal, therefore, found that the debt was domestic in its origin and subject to the laws of Peru, just as any other portion of the domestic debt. The law of 1889 issued, it would appear, 1 per cent. bonds for the domestic debt, and it would seem that the provisions of the law applied to the claim of the firm of Canevaro & Sons, which was the claim of a Peruvian firm against the Peruvian Government. The firm had attempted unsuccessfully to avail itself of the provisions of the law regarding debts created for a military purpose, but in seeking the benefit of the law it naturally recognized the appli