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Entente that is to say, France, Great Britain and Russia should be allies, France should assume and maintain control of the Mediterranean, whereas Great Britain and Russia should concentrate their naval forces in the North Sea in such a way as to protect not only Great Britain but France from attack. The Admiral went so far as to say that the allied fleets would prevent their enemies presumably the Triple Alliance Germany, Austria and Italy - from entering the English Channel, by controlling the Straits of Dover, and he expressed his personal opinion that at the outbreak of war France and Great Britain would serve notice upon neutrals that the Straits of Dover would be considered as territorial waters from which neutral ships would be excluded during the war. The Admiral considered the concentration as peculiarly advantageous from a naval point of view, as well as from the standpoint of defense, for it would concentrate the French fleet in waters which were likely to be the scene of action and would secure the unity of command so necessary to naval success by having the entire French fleet thus concentrated under the direction of a single commanderin-chief.

It is better, however, to quote the material portions of the interview, rather than to rely upon a summary. Thus, the Admiral is reported to have said:

This concentration of our forces in the Mediterranean, which had been long under consideration, is good strategy. Since the Entente Cordiale the rôle of the French navy is clearly defined. It consists in gaining and holding the mastery in the Mediterranean. *** We are playing strictly our own game, as it is our interest which we are defending. It is so much the better if the result is that we kill two birds with one stone and defend English interests as well. Besides, if we consider the eventuality of a war between Germany and England, or between the Powers of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, the situation in the North would be analogous. The rôles would be reversed, in the sense that Great Britain, in defending its coast against the German navy, will assure at one and the same time the safety of our northern and western ports. The rule of the French navy in the North should be to close the Straits of Dover to every hostile fleet by means of the judicious and strategical disposition of our flotillas, and prevent the presence of a hostile fleet in the English channel. * * *

1 go further and express to you my personal opinion: I am persuaded that upon the declaration of war, Great Britain and France, rightly considering the Straits of Dover as French and English territorial waters, will take steps to notify neutrals of the closing of the Straits of Dover. By this means the task will be simplified. We will know exactly with whom we have to deal. This is, in my opinion, an act of elemental defense and the absolute right of a belligerent.

The views of Admiral Germinet have been supported by his brother admirals, who have been interviewed and exploited in the French press. As is to be expected, the members of the Triple Alliance have devoted very great attention to the motives which appear to have dictated the concentration of the French fleet in the Mediterranean. It seems indeed strange that an admiral should talk so freely of the probable plans of his country in case of a struggle between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, and that he should mention the prospective enemy by name. The incident will not tend to promote better feeling between Germany and France, and the tension between Germany and Great Britain will be increased rather than diminished by the apparent readiness of the Entente, if attacked by the Alliance. For however we may seek to delude ourselves, preparations for probable war are not the best means of maintaining peace. The consequences of concentration and the frank statement of the reasons for it were pointed out in the English Nation, in its issue of September 14th, as follows:

The country will hear with great surprise that practically the entire force of French battleships is in future to be concentrated in the Mediterranean, instead of being divided between that sea and the Channel and the Atlantic. Next month the six battleships of the third French squadron are to be transferred from Brest to Toulon, giving the French Admiral a force of eighteen battleships, including the new Dreadnoughts, and six cruisers. The Temps, the organ of the French Foreign Office, obligingly explains this movement as part of a combined arrangement under which Russia holds the Baltic and prevents the whole German Fleet from concentrating in the North Sea; we pen it up in that waterway, and, in conjunction with France, close the Channel, and bar the passage between England and Norway; while France "deals" with the "extreme left wing" of the German Fleet - i. e., the Austrian and Italian squadrons. A more open and offensive statement of the naval side of the policy of "penning in" Germany could hardly be conceived. It points to a virtual naval alliance between France and ourselves, with Russia as a third (and slippery) partner. It seems to make an Anglo-German rapprochement impossible, and to open up a fresh and indefinite war of building programmes and counter-programmes.

THE MAGDALENA BAY RESOLUTION

Midway in the southerly third of the west coast of Lower California, and perhaps 3,000 miles from Panama, is a large bay. The back country is barren and thirsty, but on the shore and off it is moss which contains a dye and fish. Lumber and cattle are said to be possibilities also. An American company secured here from Mexico a large tract of land, several million acres, which border on the bay and run back from it.

This company was unprofitable. Its chief creditor, a New Hampshire lumberman, has taken it over and tried to secure himself by making a sale to certain Japanese subjects. Before concluding any bargain, however, his agent very properly consulted the United States Department of State to learn its attitude. This was adverse, it being aware of the outcry sure to be made if a Japanese coaling, fishery or other station or colony were to be established on our side of the Pacific. Nor did Mr. Knox look with more favor upon a sale limiting the ownership of the Japanese to a minority. The owner and creditor of the concession seem to have sought Japanese aid in colonization because no other labor there was available. The Japanese Government had nothing whatever to do with the scheme. Moreover by Mexican law no concession holds good under heavy penalty, if transfer is sought by the concessionaires to a foreign government.

This was the situation then when the susceptibilities of the Senate were aroused last July, and Mr. Lodge introduced the following Resolution: Resolved: That when any harbor or other place in the American continent is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or the safety of the United States, the Government of the United States could not see without grave concern the possession of such harbor or other place by any corporation or association which has such a relation to another Government not American as to give that Government practical power of control for national purposes.

It is understood that in secret session for the last word but one "national" was substituted "naval or military."

A Senate resolution is an expression of its opinion. This resolution was intended to be an announcement of national policy to foreign Powers. It was introduced after information had been sought from the President on the subject. This went to show that the conduct of other Powers in regard to those lands had been entirely correct. In the discussion which led up to and which followed the introduction of this resolution it appeared that its mover chose not to regard it as an extension of the Monroe Doctrine but as based upon the law or right of self-defense which is fundamental, the Agadir incident being a precedent. But in Africa, the German action was official, governmental. Whereas at Magdalena Bay, as Senator Rayner had well brought out in May, it was a question of private commercial use only. Has the United States a right to assume that private commercial use of such a harbor as this, could be so easily converted into government use as to warrant its prohibition before

any sign whatever of abuse or of danger was visible? That the Senate so believes is clear, for it passed the Lodge resolution. That the legal mind shares this view is not so clear. Let us state it in general terms. On the ground of self-defense a state may forbid its neighbor to sell lands of strategic value to the private subject of a third Power, there being no act, but mere suspicion to warrant the fear that the third Power will make sinister use of its subjects' property. What becomes of the sovereign right of the neighbor to dispose of its lands, for commercial development? If the principle of self-defense is unduly stretched, will it not break down and become ridiculous? Is an attitude of constant suspicion consistent with international good-will? These are doubts which fairly arise from the Lodge resolution.

THE CHRISTIANIA MEETING OF THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW The Institute of International Law held its annual session at Christiania from August 24th to and including August 31, 1912, and the meeting was in every respect highly successful. Two projects were adopted one dealing with the conflict of laws, namely, the regulation of conflicts of law in matters of real rights in the case of bankruptcy; and a second dealing with international law, namely, the effects of war on treaties and international conventions.1

It would be unfair, however, to judge the session by the projects actually adopted, for the discussion which they underwent was searching and valuable, and forms not merely a commentary upon the text, but furnishes the reasons as well. It had been expected that M. Fauchille's elaborate report concerning the laws and customs of maritime warfare between belligerents would be discussed. This project is in the form of a code. M. Fauchille unfortunately was not able to be present, and the Institute decided that it was inadvisable to discuss the project article by article. It did, however, indicate its views as to the form and content of the project, and referred it to M. Fauchille as reporter, in order that it might be revised in accordance with the views expressed at the Christiania session. It would seem probable that an acceptable manual dealing with the subject will be presented at the forthcoming session, to be held at Oxford. If this should prove to be so, to the Oxford manual of land warfare there would be added the Oxford manual of naval warfare.

1 An editorial comment in the next (January) number will be devoted to the effects of war on treaties and conventions.

At the Paris session of 1910 a committee was appointed to consider and report to the Institute projects which should properly appear in the program of the Third Hague Conference, and which the Institute. should study in advance of the Conference. Among these was the question of the court of arbitral justice, the establishment of which the Conference recommended as soon as an acceptable method of appointing the judges should be reached through diplomatic channels. The committee was composed of the following members: Messrs. von Bar, Fauchille, Fromageot, Hagerup, Holland, Renault, Edouard Rolin, J. B. Scott, and Westlake. They met on October 6-7, 1911, and, among other matters, expressed themselves in favor of the establishment of the court of arbitral justice, and so reported to the Institute. A large part of the afternoon of August 29 was devoted to the recommendation of the committee. The question of the advantages which a permanent court of arbitral justice would render in the judicial settlement of international disputes and in the development of international law was discussed by various members, who are not only interested in judicial settlement but who have had experience with international arbitration; such as, Dr. Lammasch of Austria; Mr. Gram of Norway, who as far back as 1892 was a member of the Bering Sea Commission, and has since served both as member and president of arbitral tribunals; Mr. Hagerup, umpire in the recently decided Cerruti case; and J. B. Scott. After a lengthy discussion and a full exchange of views, the Institute unanimously recommended the establishment of the court of arbitral justice as voted by the Second Hague Conference in 1907.

The importance of this action can hardly be overestimated, because it is the first time that the Institute has pronounced itself squarely in favor of the institution of the court of arbitral justice, and the importance of the favorable action is enhanced by the fact that the publicists who participated in the proceedings and the vote represent fourteen different nations. Had the Institute done nothing more than approve the court of arbitral justice, it would have justified the Christiania session, for the deliberate judgment and approval of the Institute as a body of the need of the court of arbitral justice and of the advantages to be derived from its successful operation, is in itself an international event of capital importance.

It is perhaps not generally known that the bureau of the Institute had consented to serve as general adviser to the Division of International Law of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. This action,

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