hours of hard fighting had sensibly exhausted a large number, my last reserves had necessarily been disposed of, and the enemy was evidently receiving fresh reinforcements after each repulse. Accordingly, about 1 P.M., I determined to withdraw from so unequal a conflict, securing such of the results of the victory of the day before as was then practicable." On two different occasions of this day Gen. Beauregard led the troops flag in hand, and by his conspicuous display of devoted courage arrested the tide of battle, and enabled his hard-pressed army at last to withdraw in perfect order from the field.

In the battle of Shiloh, Beauregard's forces consisted of 33,000, against 87,000 under Grant and Buell. His losses in killed and wounded amounted to thirty-three and a-third per cent.-a most astounding loss for new troops and raw volunteers. The evening of the 7th April found him back behind the rifle-pits of Corinth; and there he prepared to defy the immense army collected to crush him. Gen. Beauregard was never disposed to acknowledge the second day of Shiloh as a defeat. He declares that he retired to Corinth "in pursuance of his original design to make that the strategic point of his campaign;" and that he left the field of Shiloh on the second day "only after eight hours' successful battle with a superiour army of fresh troops, whom we had repulsed in every attack upon our lines; so repulsed and crippled, indeed, as to leave it unable to take the field for the campaign for which it was collected and equipped at such enormous expense and with such profusion of all the appliances of war."

His subsequent retreat from Corinth to Tupelo, about the end of May, 1862, was looked upon by European officers as a masterly performance, considering the quality of his troops, and the trifling loss attendant upon such a movement, confronted by so large a force there being about 125,000 of the enemy against 35,000 Confederates.

About this time the health of Gen. Beauregard was so much broken that his physicians insisted upon a period of rest and recreation; and having obtained a sick furlough, he left for Montgomery, Alabama, where he arrived on the 17th June, accompanied only by his personal staff. Opportunity was taken at Richmond of this sick furlough to give the command of the army at Corinth permanently to Gen. Bragg, to deprive Beaure

gard of his well-deserved post, and to attempt to consign him to a term of obscurity, if not of disgrace. This unworthy device at Richmond was characteristic of the little circles and conspiracies in which the government there was conducted. It was plain that Mr. Davis, instead of wisely forgetting the personal differences which had grown out of the battle of Manassas, had nursed his animosity against Gen. Beauregard, and now aimed a revengeful blow in what he thought an opportune moment.

There is nothing more repulsive in the personal history of President Davis' administration than his persistent persecution of this distinguished soldier. The severe justice of history must pronounce it mean and malignant. We are aware that there is a party in the South which constantly deprecates any personal criticism of the ex-President of the Confederacy, forgetting that Mr. Davis was of all public men himself the most profuse of personal recriminations, a merciless, inexorable adversary, and that, in a recent publication (his "Prison Life "), he is shown to continue his Life"), own style of personal allusion to those associated with him in the late war. When we write history we are compelled to state facts, no matter who is hurt by the declaration. The fact of President Davis' animosity to Gen. Beauregard was notorious at all times of the war. When he took from him the command of the army at Corinth, and a committee of Congressmen at Richmond earnestly sought his reinstatement, the President passionately replied that he would not consent to such a measure, though the whole world should urge him to it.* When at last public sentiment wrung from Mr. Davis a command of the coast defences for Gen. Beaure

Notes of an interview with the President relative to transferring back General Beauregard to the command of Department No. 2.

RICHMOND, September 13, 1862. General Sparrow and myself this day called on the President and delivered to him a petition signed by about fifty members and Senators from the Western and Southwestern States, in which the restoration of Beauregard to the command of the army, now under Bragg, was solicited, it being stated in the petition that it was known that Bragg would welcome the restoration of Beauregard. ***** The President remarked, that so far as giving Beauregard command of Bragg's army is concerned, that was out of the question. Bragg had arranged all his plans, and had co-intelligence with the Department, with Kirby Smith, and Humphrey Marshall, and to put a new commander at the head of the army would be so prejudicial to the public interests, he would not do it if the whole world united in the petition. ******

(Signed) THS. J. SEMMES.

gard, it was not only reluctantly bestowed, but only when the clamour of the people for a favourite commander had alarmed him, or could be no longer tolerated. And when Gen. Beauregard did take the new command, it was to find constant disfavour and suspicion at Richmond; to protest against his requisitions being unfilled, and his deprivation of troops; and to have his remonstrances disregarded, filed in obscure bureaux, or indorsed with fretful notes of inquiry or exclamation. A bureau officer in the War Department testifies: "Every letter Gen. Beauregard sends to the Department is sure to put twenty clerks at work in the effort to pick flaws in his accuracy of statement."

In the interval of ill-health, and at a time when a cruel and infamous report was circulated in Richmond that Gen. Beauregard was losing his powers, and that his sickness verged on insanity, he wrote the following remarkable letter, intended to be private. As a just and striking commentary on the growing spirit of the war, and on many of the mistaken and short-sighted views then prevalent at Richmond, it will interest the reader:

BLADEN, ALABAMA, Aug. 3, 1862.

MY DEAR GENERAL:-I regret much to hear of being wounded. I hope he will soon be able to face the Abolitionists. In this contest we must triumph or perish; and the sooner we make up our minds to it the better. We now understand the hypocritical cry of "Union and the Constitution," which means, and always did mean, "spoliation and murder."

We will yet have to come to proclaiming this war "a war to the knife," when no quarter will be asked or granted. I believe it is the only thing which can prevent recruiting at the North. As to ourselves, I think that very few will not admit that death is preferable to dishonour and ruin.

Our great misfortune is, that we have always relied on foreign intervention "and peace in sixty days." No nation will ever intervene until it is seen that we can maintain alone our independence; that is, until we can no longer require assistance. England is afraid to admit that she cannot do without our cotton, for then she would virtually be in our power. France is unwilling to interfere, for fear of the treachery of the latter. She always remembers her as "la perfide Albion."

! But if France concludes to take Mexico, she will require the alliance of the Southern Confederacy to protect her from Northern aggression. Nations as well as individuals always consult their own interests in any alliance they may form. Hence, our best reliance must be in our "stout hearts and strong arms."

I have been very unwell for several months, but could not rest until now. I hope shortly to return to duty, with renewed health and vigour. I know not yet to what point I shall be ordered. I hope to do something shortly by taking the offensive with a wellorganized army. However, "l'homme propose et Dieu dispose;" hence, I shall go with alacrity wherever I am ordered. With kind regards, etc., I remain, yours sincerely, P. G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Gen. WM. E. MARTIN, Pocotaligo, S. C.

CHAPTER XXII.

Gen. Beauregard in command at Charleston-Military importance of "the City of Secession."-Gen. Beauregard's appeal to the patriotism of the Carolinians.-Naval attack on Charleston, 1863 —Gen. Beauregard's department stripped of troops.— Unavailing remonstrance to President Davis.-Gen. Gillmore's attempt on Charleston.-Its impotent conclusion.-Fame of Gen. Beauregard as an engineer.-He receives the thanks of Congress.-Returns to Virginia in 1864.-"Battle of the Falchion and the Buzzard."-Gen. Beauregard's plan of campaign before the battle of Drewry's Bluff.-Remarkable interview with President Davis.-Connection of Gen. Beauregard with Hood's campaign.—He advises the evacuation of Richmond-Merits of Gen. Beauregard's military career.-Description of his person and habits.

IN September, 1862, we find Gen. Beauregard taking command of the defences of Charleston, which were pronounced by his predecessor-Gen. Pemberton-no longer tenable. The place, however, had as yet been but slightly molested by the enemy; and the friends of Gen. Beauregard were rather disposed to resent the appointment to a position, apparently so unimportant, and in any event so little likely to be adorned with victory, of one who had already distinguished himself in as high places as the Confederate army could then afford. But in this respect, Gen. Beauregard was "fortune's favourite; " and in looking back upon his memorable defence of the "City of Secession," we must declare that no other position during the war could have presented like opportunities to display what was undoubtedly Gen. Beauregard's speciality-his engineering genius. He himself appears to have been well satisfied with the appointment to Charleston, and to have anticipated there the tremendous conflict of valour and skill which ensued.

There was a mixed reason, indeed, for a powerful Federal demonstration on Charleston. It was the city most meriting, in the Federal eye, the condign punishment due to the nursery of treason and rebellion. Military forecast, too, had already observed in Charleston a point bound to grow into importance as the war progressed. The requirements to the vitality of the body politic of the Confederacy made necessary a constant communication between