own. * * * of the stream to cover Richmond. Of the situation and McClellan's opportunity, Magruder writes: "After the battle of Friday, the 27th June, on the opposite bank of the Chickahominy, it was ascertained that the enemy had withdrawn his troops to the right bank, and therefore the whole of his forces were massed in front of our lines, and that he had destroyed the bridges over this river, thereby separating our army and concentrating his From the time at which the enemy withdrew his forces to this side of the Chickahominy and destroyed the bridges, to the moment of his evacuation, that is, from Friday night until Sunday morning, I considered the situation of our army as extremely critical and perilous. The larger portion of it was on the opposite side of the Chickahominy, the bridges had been all destroyed, but one was rebuilt, the New Bridge, which was commanded fully by the enemy's guns from Goulding's, and there were but 25,000 men between his army of 100,000, and Richmond. Had McClellan massed his whole force in column, and advanced it against any point of our line of battle, as was done at Austerlitz, under similar circumstances, by the greatest captain of any age, though the head of his column would have suffered greatly, its momentum would have insured him success, and the occupation of our works about Richmond, and, consequently, the city might have been his reward." * * * Happily McClellan did not have the genius or audacity to use this opportunity of attack, and, retreating across Gen. Magruder's front, he made for the James River, below Richmond. In this retreat he surprised Gen. Magruder, who was only able to come up with his rear-guard at Savage Station, and afterwards made an ill-advised attack upon his batteries of Malvern Hill. In these incidents of McClellan's retreat (which have been elsewhere related more fully), Gen. Magruder fell under some popular censure, from which he was vindicated, however, by an official investigation of the facts. After these battles he was sent west of the Mississippi, to take command in Texas, bearing with him, in the order assigning him to this distant command, an extraordinary tribute to his services, declaring that "Maj.-Gen. Magruder has deserved the thanks of the army and the people, and will carry to his new field their confident hopes for the achievement of new successes." These hopes were more than realized. He appears to have had a fondness for dramatic and startling adventures; his dashing courage took to desperate enterprises; and the country was soon electrified by a train of victories on the Gulf Coast, where the war had hitherto dragged, and presented but few exhibitions of interest. As he was on his way to Texas, accompanied by Judge Oldham, Major Forshey, and others, the subject of retaking Galveston Island was introduced. The difficulties of the undertaking were canvassed, and the question came up whether the work was feasible. Major Forshey observed: "General, I think the best plan is to resolve to retake Galveston any way, and then canvass the difficulties." The General replied that he thought so too, and from that point began the undertaking. The recapture of Galveston was accomplished on the 1st January, 1863, by an attack on the enemy's fleet and garrison; the steamer Harriet Lane was carried by boarding from two small steamers fenced with cotton; and the whole Federal fleet would have been compelled to surrender, had they not ignominiously escaped under cover of a flag-of-truce. Some months later followed the success of Sabine Pass. Attacked by five gunboats, the fort, mounting but three guns of small calibre, and manned by 200 men, steadily resisted their fire, and at last forced the surrender of the two gunboats Clifton and Sachem, badly crippling another, which, with the others, escaped over the bar. The result of this gallant achievement was the capture of two fine gunboats, fifteen heavy guns, over 200 prisoners, among them the Commodore of the fleet, and over fifty of the enemy killed and wounded, while not a man was lost on the Confederate side or a gun injured. About the close of the year 1863, Gen. Magruder had reason. to suppose that the enemy contemplated a formidable invasion of Texas by the coast, Gen. Banks having taken possession of the Lower Rio Grande and occupied Aransas and Corpus Christi Passes. In view of these movements, an address was issued to the planters who resided in counties within fifty miles of the coast, from Corpus Christi to Galveston, to remove their negroes beyond the reach of the enemy. In making this appeal to the people of Texas, Gen. Magruder warned them against the faithless promises of the enemy. "The utter disregard of all social rights," he said, "as well as the distinct proclamation of President Lincoln, so ruthlessly carried out by his minions, leave no room for hope, even to the most credulous, to save their property, and especially their negroes, even by the base submission of men who should prefer death to dishonour. Should hopes be held out to the people of Texas that they will be exceptions to the rule so vigourously enforced in her sister States in localities where the enemy are in possession of temporary power, and should even the property of some, deceived into an oath of allegiance by the treacherous promises of our enemy, be for a time respected, such hopes will prove deceitful-such respect a snare. The playing of the ravenous cat with the harmless mouse is not more deceitful or fatal." It is well known that Gen. Banks subsequently changed his intentions, if he had contemplated an invasion of Texas from the sea, and undertook the famous Red River campaign, in which Gen. Magruder was called upon to coöperate with the other Confederate forces in the Trans-Mississippi. This was the last event of importance west of the Mississippi. When, by the progress of dominant events on the other side of the river, the necessity of surrender came here, Gen. Magruder attempted to animate the Texas troops in the hope of prolonging the war, or punishing the enemy to the last opportunity. At Houston he addressed the citizens, sought to inspire them with something of his own hope and ardour, and concluded by protesting that "he had rather be a Comanche Indian than bow the knee to the Yankees." But these appeals were vain; and Gen. Magruder accepted for himself the experiment of exile, removing to Mexico, where he was connected with the government of Maximilian in some scheme of colonization. This enterprise having failed, he has since returned to his country, where enough of sympathy for "the lost cause" yet remains to make welcome for all its illustrious and unhappy champions. A companion-in-arms of the General, writing of him in the active period of the war, when his star was ascending with the fortunes of the South, thus describes the man: "Of Gen. Magruder, in the freedom of private life, it may be said, without vio lating the proprieties of social reserve, that never was there a more agreeable man. In conversation he is especially happy, enriching whatever topic may be under discussion with illustrations drawn from the stores of a large and various reading, or enlivening it with anecdotes of his actual experiences of life and manners. The elegance of his demeanour, and a certain je ne sais quoi of repose, derived from much observation of men and cities, courts and drawing-rooms, combined with the betrayal, now and then, in his personal adornments, of a cultivated taste in objects of luxury, brought upon him, among his intimate friends in society, the title of "Prince John "-a title which was used in pleasantry by his brother officers in the old army. But never was a man more free from mere vulgar ostentation, either outwardly or in social intercourse. On the contrary, his style in talk and in correspondence is that of severe simplicity. Few men, however, can engage him in an encounter of wits without loss of reputation. Beast Butler tried it while at Fortress Monroe, in an exchange of letters, and came off No. 2. Wherever he may go, he will be to his friends the same merry, dashing, charming fellow that he has been in former days, in the drives and fêtes of Newport, in the saloons of Paris, in the military outpost, in the midnight bivouac, in the club, and in the camp; and we may be assured that he will prove to the enemies of the country the same self-composed, self-reliant, indomitable, dangerous combatant that he was to Tiger-Tail and Osceola, Valencia and the Young Napoleon." " * * * SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS. CHAPTER LXXVIII. Reflections on the close of the war.—The true glory of history.—"The possession forever."-The duties and hopes of the South.-Two distinct grounds of faith in the future. The people of the South to make their own history and Pantheon.Their dead heroes. On the completion of our work there arise some great and ennobling reflections. It should be the pride of the people of the South, and the ambition of its youth, to uphold as a peculiar ornament the glorious names of the war, and to cultivate with tenderness and reverence whatever remains of the institutions. and ideas of chivalry in their country, so well distinguished in the world as it already is for its types of courage and peculiar schools of honour. In the second year of the past war, the London Times declared that whatever might be the fate of the Southern Coufederacy, it had "begun its career with a reputation for genius and valour which the most famous nations might envy." It is for us to remember that the title thus conferred is not changed or diminished by the mere political issues of the war. The true glory of history is indifferent to events; it is the record of honour, as often read in the grand stories of misfortune as in the illuminated text of victory. It is thus that although the cause of the South, in certain respects, and for a certain time, may be lost, we are yet gainers in history and inheritors of its glory. This reputation is not a shadow; it is the treasure which the Greeks called "the possession forever," a substantial and enduring crown, that for which nations have fought as above all other objects of contest. The low and grovelling mind may apprehend but little in a name in history, and weigh it lightly in the coarse scales of a utilitarian philosophy; but it is the first |