corded. Mrs. Jacobs began to reside on the land in 1866; in the summer of that year it was cultivated by her son and she received the profits. In 1867 one Pope farmed the land and she received the profits. In 1868 one Krauns farmed the land and she received the profits. Pope, in 1867, rented the land from Grant. Grant swears he acted as the agent of Mrs. Jacobs and he then did and does now all her business for her. He also swears that at the time he settled his pre-emption claims he considered that he owned no other land. I think there can be no doubt of the good faith of Grant. He had an actual residence on the land from May, 1867, down to the time of proving up and there is no adverse claim that can in any case be recognized. The testimony shows also that he did not "quit or abandon his own land." The legal title to the land which he claims to have sold remained in him at the time he made his pre-emption settlement but he did not "quit or abandon it" to go upon the land in controversy. He made a contract for its sale and afterwards completed the sale by executing a warrantee deed. I do not think under these circumstances he can be said to have abandoned the land to take up the claim. A former ownership is no disability if terminated by sale before pre-emption. (Lester, 420, Nalse v. Lawson.) I am of opinion that the decision of the Commissioner should be affirmed. Very respectfully, W. H. SMITH, Asst. Atty. General. HON. C. DELANO, Secretary of the Interior. No. 362. WRIGHT v. WOODS, Four men built a house 32 feet square and two stories high in the centre of a section, in such a way that 16 feet square stood on each quarter. Each occupied the part standing on his own quarter, and each improved and cultivated his own quarter. Wright bought out one of these parties, paid for same $800, made settlement and filed on the quarter. His good faith as a pre-emptor was shown. He was a single man and boarded with a family in the house, but occupied a portion of his share of the building. Held-That this building was his dwelling and that he was entitled to preempt the quarter. Cites-Lindsey v. Hawes, 2 Black., 554, Silver v. Ladd, 7 Wall., 225. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, Washington, D. C., June 18th, 1873. SIR-I have considered the case of John W. Wright v. Frank R. Woods, appealed from your decision of February 27th, 1873. Woods on the 21st of November, 1871, filed his D. S. on the S. E., Sec. 2, Tp. 8, R. 16 W., Grand Island District, Nebraska, alleging settlement on the 17th of November. Wright, on the 18th of July, 1871, entered the same as a soldier's homestead, under the act of July 15th, 1870, and on the 20th of April, 1872, instituted proceedings in the local office to contest the validity of Wood's filing. The testimony shows that one H. I. Hungerford had, on the 14th of April, 1871, filed D. S. on this tract, alleging settlement on the 12th of April, 1871, and that he, in connection with other persons, who claimed the remaining quarters of said section 2, had built a house thirty-two feet square, and two stories high, on the centre of said section in such a manner that one-fourth of said building stood on each of said quarter sections. The portion of said house standing on said S. E. was sixteen feet square and two stories high. Hungerford having broken and otherwise improved at least twelve acres of said land, sold and transferred his interest in the same to the said Woods, for the sum of eight hundred dollars, who after such purchase, settled upon and resided on the same from the 17th of November, 1871, to date of hearing. As soon as spring opened, Woods commenced improving and cultivating the premises. It is evident from the entire testimony that he acted in good faith and intended to make said tract his place of residence, and to comply with all the provisions of the pre-emption law. It is objected that his occupation of a portion of the building, in the manner above-stated, was not a legal residence on said land. He was a single man and so were the others who claimed the balance of the section, and who have received patents therefor. These persons each occupied portions of their respective premises and allowed a man by the name of Collins to board them, and occupy the balance of the premises not needed by them, without payment of any rent, other than the boarding and occupation above-described. I think the facts show a legal residence by Woods, on the premises. His portion of the building was more extensive than the entire buildings of a majority of pre-emption settlers. It must be conceded that if each of these four settlers had built separate houses, sixteen feet square, and two stories high, and located them just as this building was located it would have been in compliance with the law. Does it make any dif ference, in principle, that the four houses were under one roof, and were so constructed as to allow ingress and egress from one to the other? Was the building intended for and used as a dwelling for the applicants? If it were, and if it were also a suitable building to be used for that purpose, then the law was complied with. See Lindsey, et. al. v. Hawes et. al., (2 Black., 554,) the Supreme Court of the United States held that "where the house of a pre-emptor is built on the line dividing two quarter sections, his residence in it avails as the foundation of a pre-emption right in either," and that, too, although the greater portion of the building was on the quarter section not pre-empted. Justice Miller in delivering the opinion of the court used the following language: "This is a question arising under the Government of the United States, and concerns a construction of one of its most benevolent statutes made for the benefit of its own citizens, inviting and encouraging them to settle upon its public lands. The Government which made the law owned both quarter sections and was indifferent as to which should be sold to Lindsey, provided it was legally done. Lindsey's house was on both quarter sections. So far as mere personal residence is concerned we think he may correctly be said to have resided on both sections." The case of Silver v. Ladd (7 Wall., 219) was one under the Oregon Donation Act. Elizabeth Thomas, an aged widow, went with her son, an unmarried man, to Oregon Territory and settled there. They lived in the same house. It stood upon the line dividing two parcels of land, the line running through the centre of the building. Cultivation was made on both tracts, one being claimed by the mother, the other by the son. A donation certificate was issued to the mother for the tract she claimed and one to the son for the tract he claimed. The mother died, and the United States sold the land claimed by her and patented it to third parties. Upon this state of facts, the Court held that the title of Mrs. Thomas was good, and thereby also that the title of the son was good. They said, "In reference to the question of actual settlement and residence on the land, we have only to refer to the case of Lindsey v. Hawes (2 Black, 554) where this precise question is raised, and where it is said that a person residing in a house which is bisected by the line dividing two quarter sections will be held to reside on both and consequently on either of them to which he may assert a claim.” I adopt and apply the liberal principles of construction announced in these cases, and hold them decisive of the principle involved in the present. Wright made his entry after Woods had made his settlement and with a full knowledge of all the facts, and he cannot complain that he has been taken by surprise. I reverse your decision and award the land in controversy to Woods, and herewith return the papers transmitted with your letter of the 16th instant. Very respectfully, C. DELANO, Secretary. HON. WILLIS DRUMMOND, Commissioner General Land-Office. (D) PROOF AND PAYMENT. No. 363. CIRCULAR. TREAMENT OF PRE-EMPTION CLAIMS. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, GENERAL LAND OFFICE, Washington, D. C., December 30, 1870. GENTLEMEN :--In view of the act of Congress approved July 14, 1870, (Part II., No. 26,) limiting the time within which payment must be made in pre-emption cases, the following rules are prescribed for your guidance: 1st. You will admit all filings for offered lands presented within thirty days after alleged settlement where the land has not been disposed of prior to such alleged date of settlement-provided the applicant is not disqualified by a previous filing, and in other respects has the right under the pre-emption law. 2d. Where the tract is subject to "ordinary private entry" the preemption filing is no bar to the conditional entry of the land, either by cash, homestead, or other legally authorized disposal-it being understood that any such disposal, according to long established practice, will be subject to the right of the pre-emptor to prove up and consummate his entry within the twelve months allowed by law, without being compelled to give further notice to other parties, who at the time of such entry had notice of the existence of a prior-alleged pre-emption claim. 3d. Where the land has once been offered and afterwards withdrawn from private entry, making public notice of at least thirty days under direction of this office necessary to its restoration to ordinary private entry, and where such land has not been withdrawn from homestead or pre-emption entry, you will pursue the course indicated in the 2d rule, so far as homestead and pre-emption entries are concerned-filing within thirty days, and proof and payment within twelve months, being required for pre-emption claims on this class of lands. 4th. Upon surveyed "unoffered lands" not withdrawn from preemption, you will also admit all filings properly offered within three months after alleged settlement, or within three months after the filing of the township plat of survey in your office. You will then hold the tract subject to pre-emption or homestead entry, or to any selection authorized by law, without requiring proof of the abandonment of prior filings-the disposal being always understood to be subject to the right of the pre-emptor to prove up and pay for his claim within the twentyone months after settlement or the filing of the township plat, as the case may be. 5th. The foregoing will not be construed to prevent any party who may desire a speedy adjustment of his claim, from bringing contest against adverse claimants, upon affidavit, as heretofore; and when proper affidavit shall be filed with you, and suitable provision made for the expenses of contest, you will, without waiting for reference to this office, duly notify all the parties whose claims appear on your records, and hold the usual investigation, at the expense of the party bringing the contest. At the close of the hearing you will report to this office all the papers, with copies of the preliminary affidavit, notices and proof of service, personal if practicable, otherwise, by such publication, at the expense of the parties, as will be deemed legal notice in land cases in the State or Territory, under the laws and the practice of the courts; your report to be accompanied with your joint opinion and decision. 6th. You will treat all filings upon lands which have once been "offered" as abandoned after the lapse of twelve months from the alleged settlement, which is the statutory limitation, and all filings upon "unoffered lands" as abandoned after the lapse of twenty-one months after such alleged settlement or the filing of the township plat, unless within the period fixed by law proof and payment shall have been made, or legal tender of such proof and payment shall have been made and refused; of which tender and refusal you will take care to make proper endorsement in each case. 7th. This office will duly examine all entries, and, where adverse filings appear, will hold them suspended until the legal expiration of the adverse claims; and when two or more entries are found to conflict, will dispose of them according to merit, ordering investigation when necessary to a determination of the respective rights of the parties. 8th. The pendency of contest between alleged pre-emptors who have merely filed for a tract, and who have not made actual entries, does not withdraw the land from market; but any right acquired by third parties subsequent to the initiation of contest, will be regarded as subject to the right of the contesting parties, and liable to be defeated by an award to either contestant of the tract claimed. This rule is issued in accordance with a decision of the department proper, dated October 22, 1870. 9th. After notice of restoration to private entry, and before the date fixed for such restoration by published notice, no settlement or other act, subsequent to such notice, can give any preference right to lands embraced in such notice; but the order of the Commissioner is imperative in its nature, and operates as a withdrawal from pre-emption, homestead or other disposal, except in accordance with the terms of the published notice. The land must in such case be restored; and, if there is competition, must be sold to the highest bidder, according to law. The same effect is given to a proclamation for public sale, from the date of its receipt and promulgation by the district officers. 10th. After decision by this office, you will in all cases allow the parties sixty days from service of notice, within which to appeal to the honorable Secretary of the Interior; and, at the expiration of that period, report promptly the action had pursuant to such notice. Careful attention to the foregoing will save much unnecessary correspondence and litigation, and greatly simplify the treatment of preemption claims; and you will please conform your action hereafter to the rules herein prescribed, referring to this office, as heretofore, in exceptional and doubtful cases. REGISTER AND RECEIVER. Respectfully, JOS. S. WILSON, Commissioner. Approved: C. DELANO, Secretary of the Interior. No. 364. CIRCULAR. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, May 5th, 1871. The following is an act approved July 14, 1870, to extend the provisions of the pre-emption laws to the Territory of Colorado, and for other purposes: [Part II., No. 26.] This act has been amended as follows: [Part II., No. 41.] These statutes leave the provisions of the law as heretofore respecting "offered lands," viz: filing within thirty days, and payment within twelve months after settlement. The settler on surveyed "unoffered land" must file his or her declaratory statement within three months from the date of his or her settlement on such land, and, within thirty months from the expiration of said three months, make the proper proof, and pay for such land. Where settlers had already filed before the passage of the act, they are required to make proof and payment within two years from such passage; therefore, all filings made prior to that date will expire, by limitation of law, upon unoffered lands, on the 14th of July, 1872. 64 The settler on unsurveyed land" must file his or her declaratory statement within three months from the date of the receipt, at the district land office, of the approved plat of the township embracing the tract upon which he or she has settled, and, within thirty months from the expiration of said three months, make the proper proof, and pay for such tract. The proviso of the act of June 2, 1862, requiring filing within six |