CARGO บ. SCHOONER if he should be of that opinion, he was, by the same law, PAULINA'S authorised to detain the vesssel until the pleasure of the President should be known. The object of the legislature was completely answered by denying a clearance, U.STATES. and thereby preventing the vessel from going to sea, in case she had taken in her lading without the inspection of a revenue officer. It was not intended to prevent the owner from using his vessel as a store-house without a permit, or from putting goods on board without the inspection of an officer. That this was the understanding of the legislature upon the subject is evident from the act of the 9th of January, 1809, usually called the enforcing act, the 2d section of which (vol. 9, p. 186) requires a permit, and prohibits the lading of any vessel without one, and without the inspection of a revenue officer, all which would have been necessary if the law was the same before. 2. As to the 3d section of the act of the 9th of January, 1808, (vol. 9, p. 11) the supposed violation of which is, by the amendment of the libel, made a ground for the claim of condemnation of the cargo, it does not apply to a lading or trans-shipment in port. The objects of this law were three: 1. To prevent a vessel from departing without a dearance. 2. To prevent her, after having obtained a clearance, from going to a foreign port; and 3. To prevent her, after clearance, from taking in goods at sea. It does not contemplate an act done in port. The expression "such prohibited foreign voyage," shews that the legislature were contemplating foreign voyages only, and not merely the lading of a vessel in port. There were many ports in which a vessel could not be laden but by the intervention of lighters. It cannot be supposed that the legislature meant to prohibit all lading at those ports. The act of 25th of April has an express exception in favor of all vessels, then laden, without re gard to the manner of their lading; so also has the act SCHOONER of the 9th of January, 1809. PAULINA'S DALLAS, Attorney of the United States for the District v. of Pennsylvania, contra. Penal laws are to be construed according to their plain intent. No construction ought to be given which would defeat the object of the law. 1. As to the claim of forfeiture under the 2d section of the act of the 25th of April, 1808, and the 50th section of the collection law. Let us consider what was the previous law-the mischief intended to be remedied; and the remedy intended to be applied. 1. As to the previous law. The first embargo law, of the 22d of December, 1807, (vol. 9, p. 7) required bonds from registered and sea-letter vessels only, conditioned to reland their cargoes in the United States. The second embargo law, of January 9th, 1808, (vol. 9, p. 10) required vessels, licensed for the coasting trade, to give a similar bond; and those licensed for the fisheries, or whose employment had been uniformly confined to rivers, bays and sounds, were to give a general bond. It also forfeited the vessel and cargo if she departed without a clearance or permit, or proceeded to a foreign place, or traded with, or put goods on board any other vessel, or if (being a foreign ship) she took in a cargo. 2. The mischief intended to be remedied, was, that there was no provision for compelling vessels which were confined to bays, &c. to take a clearance, and give a manifest of their cargoes, and to produce a certificate of relanding them in the United States. Nor any provision for inspecting the lading of vessels. 3. The remedy provided by the legislature was, to prohibit all bay craft, &c. from departing from a district without having obtained a clearance, and deliverVOL. VII. U.STATES. SCHOONER ing a manifest of their cargoes; and to require a cerPAULINA'S tificate of the relanding of the cargo within the bay, &c. CARGO v. And to prohibit all other vessels from receiving a U.STATES. clearance, unless the lading should be made under the inspection of the proper revenue officers, subject to the same restrictions, regulations, penalties and forfeitures, as are provided by law for the inspection of goods, wares and merchandize, imported into the United States, upon which duties are imposed. We are thus referred expressly, in a case of lading for exportation, to the rule of a case of importing to unlade. There is no case of inspection of lading, but for the benefit of drawback, which is a case of ex-portation and not im-portation, and is therefore out of the reference. The penalties and forfeitures apply to a relanding, or to not producing a certificate of relanding, and not to the lading. We are therefore to adopt the restrictions, regulations, penalties and forfeitures of the import law, mutatis anutandis. Under that law, goods must be un-laden in the day time. Under this, they must be laden in the day time. Under that, there must be a permit to un-lade. Under this, there must be a permit to lade. Under that, the un-lading must be under the inspection of a revenue officer. Under this, the lading must be under the like inspec tion. Under that, goods un-laden without permit, are forfeited. Under this, they are forfeited if laden without permit. If the legislature meant this, it is well; if they did SCHOONER not, there is no meaning in the sentence; nothing upon PAULINA'S which the reference can operate. That this is the true CARGO construction of the act appears from the provisions v. made by the legislature in pari materia in the act of the U.STATES. 9th of January, 1809, vol. 9, p. 186, where the same ideas are expressed in different language. 2. As to the claim of forfeiture under the sd section of the act of January 9th, 1808. (Vol. 9, p. 10.) 1. What was the previous law? 1. An embargo had been laid on all American vessels, but no penalty was inflicted. 2. Foreign vessels might sail in ballast and with the goods then on board. 3. Bonds were to be given by registered and sea-letter vessels only, not to violate the embargo, 2. What was the mischief to be remedied? 1. American vessels might slip away without clearance or permit. 2. Registered and sea-letter and licensed vessels might go to foreign places. 3. Or might trade. Or 4. might put goods on board another vessel. 3. What was the remedy provided? 1. That licensed and fishing vessels should give bond. 2. That no vessel should sail without a clearance or permit. 3. That no vessel should proceed to a foreign place. 4. That no ship should trade with another; and 5. That no vessel should trans-ship goods, under the penalty of the forfeiture of the goods. The fact is not denied that the Paulina took in her lading without a permit, and without the inspection of a revenue officer, and that it was trans-shipped from the May-flower. She is then within the letter of the law, and we say she was also within the spirit and meaning. The circumstances also show that the intention was to violate the embargo; and the provisions of the law were intended to punish that intention when it should be manifested by certain acts. SCHOONER CARGO v. PITKIN, in reply. The words of the 2d section of the act of the 25th of April are subject to the same restrictions, &c. as are U.STATES. provided by law for the inspection of goods imported. If we are to be guided by the grammatical construction of the sentence, the revenue officers, being the last antecedent, are to be subject to the same restrictions, regulations, penalties and forfeitures, &c. But if the lading is to be subject to the restrictions, &c. it is only to be subject to the restrictions, &c. respecting the inspection of goods imported. We are not referred to the law respecting the necessity of a permit. And there was no reason for a permit to lade. The permit was evidence that the duties had been paid or secured, upon goods imported. But as there were no duties to be paid upon goods exported, no such evidence was required, and a permit would have been useless. February 21st, All the judges being present, MARSHALL, CHIEF JUSTICE, delivered the opinion of the court as follows: The libel in this case, as amended in the Circuit Court for the District of Rhode Island, claims the schooner Paulina and her cargo as forfeited under the 3d section of the act supplementary to the act laying an embargo, and under the 2d section of the act in addition to the original embargo act and its several supplements, and under the 50th section of the act regulating the collection of duties on imposts and tonnage. In the District Court both vessel and cargo were acquitted; but in the Circuit Court the cargo was condemned. In construing these laws, it has been truly stated to be the duty of the court to effect the intention of the legislature; but this intention is to be searched for in the words which the legislature has employed to convey it. The legislature has declared its object to be to lay an embargo on the vessels of the United States, and to prevent the transportation of any article whatever from the United States to any foreign port or |