pay until next month. and I have all her funeral expenses to pay." Grandmother has just died, for a moment but said nothing. "I believe your husband lost a horse the other day. Has anything else died since I saw him, such as a dog or a grandmother?"" Well," said the wife, "his horse did die." The farmer, a whole-souled, honest old Quaker, believing this tale, was willing to wait, and so began sending the usual quantity of milk. June 3 came, and no check. The farmer decided to wait a few days. On June 12 he stopped sending the milk and came to the city to see me. The next day I sent my clerk to the milk dealer to interview him. I had warned that clerk not to choose his words, but talk plainly, and let that milk dealer know how little mercy he could expect if he did not pay up promptly. The milk dealer told a pitiful tale, and promised to call at the office in five days and square all up. Six days passed, and no milk dealer. I felt I knew my man now, and would haunt him until that bill was paid. Each afternoon I sent some one to see him. One evening, it was October 4, 1894, I went to see him as agreed. I found him on the stoop smoking. When he saw me he walked to his front door and closed it; then came back and leaned against a post. He kept on smoking, and would puff the smoke right into my face. At last, having cleared his throat several times, he condescended to speak. He said: "I can't pay you that money to-night, because a horse of mine died three days ago, and I have to use the money I intended to pay you to buy another. Now, I'll tell you what I'll do. If you'll come up next week Friday, I'll really have the money ready for you." I said very well. Just as I was passing outside of the gate he said: “If it was daylight you could see the straw they used to cover the horse.' I walked four blocks out of my way so as to go back and see that straw. I saw none. The next day I investigated about the dead horse and found out that no dead horse had been removed from that "Is it possible? Well, what in the world did you do with him? You must have eaten him, or, perhaps, you sold him for sausage meat, because he was never carried away by the public cart." I heard a peculiar sound in the hall, and the wife tried to close the door a little more, but I wedged myself firmly against the framework of the door and determined to give my last shot. Before I could give it the wife said, "Well, I don't care what you say, that horse did die. What can you do anyway? We own nothing. We have mortgaged everything." do. Madam, it's not for you to say as to what I shall You must tell your husband what I will do if that bill is not paid within the next thirty days. I have ascertained the names of all the farmers who send him milk, and have also interviewed them by mail. They have promised not to send any more milk to your husband if he does not pay this bill, because they expect that he will treat them in the same way. Good evening, madam." I walked away, delighted with my evening's work. Within ten days I had that money. - The World. MELLE STANLEYETTA TITUS. Abstracts of Recent Decisions. JUDGMENT EVIDENCE. A judgment of a court of a sister State, authenticated as prescribed by act of Congress, is conclusive here upon the subject matter of the suit. An action thereon can only be defeated on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the case, that there was fraud in procuring the judgment, or by defenses based on matters arising after the judgment was rendered. (Snyder v. Critchfield [Neb.], 62 N. W. Rep. 307.) MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-MAYOR.-A mayor of a neighborhood within twelve days. The Friday agreed on came at last. I was anxious to see his next move. It was as good as a game of chess. I went to that house, and rang the bell. The milk dealer's wife opened the door. I asked for her city who, in good faith, caused the arrest of a party husband. under a city ordinance subsequently declared invalid, is not liable for malicious prosecution, though at the time of the arrest he had some doubt as to the validity of the ordinance, and its enforcement rested exclusively with the board of public works, which had refused to enforce it, because they believed it to be invalid. (Goodwin v. Guild [Tenn. ], 29 S. W. Rep. 71.) MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-SPECIAL TAX.-Land of a railroad company, used ouly for a right of way, may be specially taxed for a local improvement consisting of a sewer in an adjoining street. (Chicago & A. R Co. v. City of Joliet [Ill.], 39 N. E. Rep. 1077. The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, JUNE 8, 1895. Current Topics. [All communications intended for the Editor should be ad tions are sometimes large, but often no larger than common mortals with good appetites. Last, but not least, that practical humanitarian, the criminal lawyer, whose clients are all angels in due time, and who could have proven an alibi for the devil himself, in that famous affair in the Garden of Eden. Then there is the coming dressed simply to the Editor of THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL. lawyer who is largely in embryo this evening as All letters relating to advertisements, subscriptions, or other business matters, should be addressed to THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL COMPANY.] I the student of law. "The profession has many advantages over that of medicine. No doctor was ever known to get himself patented. He may consider along. The ethics of the profession forbid it. We are highly moral people, and consequently they are no criminal doctors. Even our novelists are compelled to go outside of the medical profession to find their villains. Dr. Jeykil must become Mr. Hyde (who was probably a lawyer), in order to be interesting. We have no divorce doctors, because we are too T is always amusing to read an opinion of the legal profession by a doctor, for despite the effort to be pleasant when addressing ahimself a good thing, but he dare not push it gathering of lawyers there is sure to appear a little flattery and some insinuation of the superiority of the men who ply the knife and administer the physic. Doctors of course have a niche in the field of usefulness, but it has an aroma peculiar to itself and as a rule, is not eagerly sought as a sweet abiding place, while it is doubtful if one could find a happier class of people than those clients who eagerly wait to press their retainer into the hands of the much sought after dispenser of justice. Still lawyers and doctors have need of each other which usually is strongest at the annual gatherings of one or the other of the professions. a recent banquet of the Chicago Law Students Association Dr. Frank G. Lydston, who is one of the lecturers at the Kent College of Law, responded to a toast in part thus: At familiar with both sides of such cases. We have lady doctors, but I object to them as a temptation, to overdosing, just as I am opposed to lady lawyer as tempting one to perpetually litigate. Corporations have no use for doctors, because when a man falls off a ten story building and sits down good and hard upon his antipodes, or in that immediate vicinity, we say that he has spinal concussion, and the poor fallen man gets big damages. You see we doctors are practical, moralistic philanthropists, and sympathize deeply with poor fallen men. "The profession of law is more aptly termed a learned profession than either medicine or the ministry. It is in the profession of law that the man of broad culture and scholarly attainments receives his highest appreciation. My own profession is so tainted with modern socalled specialism, that the veriest dunce may "I see about me nearly all the varieties of the genus lawyer. Judges, who run law dispensaries, where a dram of justice is so skillfully mixed with a barrel of law, that the unwary layman is fain to take his medicine without flinching. The law and the lady the female lawyer against whom I shall enter a replevin suit to-morrow, cause one lost heart. Law professors who toil not, neither do they spin, achieve public notoriety and at least financial but make a business of professing. Patent lawyers, so called, I presume, like a country newspaper, they have patent insides an attribute which is patent enough to one who has ever watched them irrigating or feeding the inner man. Real estate lawyers, who hold mortgages on cemeteries and fifteen-story buildings. Divorce lawyers, who act equally well It is success. Too often does he receive the adulation of the body medical. The accomplished scholarly, cultured physician is in danger of becoming lost in the race for wealth. easier to pander to a simple minded public by commercial shrewdness than to win appreciation of scholarly attainment by solid merit. much the worse for medicine. Thank heaven attorney, complainant or defendant, but that so many mistakes are hidden by good old would shine with effulgent brilliancy as co-re- mother earth. It is not surprising that the lawspondent. Corporation lawyers, whose corpora- I yer has so little respect for the medical expert. VOL. 51 No. 23. as So Was it not a lawyer who divided witnesses into liars, d-d liars and medical experts? Fortunately the so-called expert is not always a fair criterion of the intelligence and honesty of the medical profession. "The personnel of the professional man has greatly changed for the better within a few decades. Time was when the legal profession was supposed to be represented by a seedy looking individual, with a lurid nose and a breath which suggests the possibility of spontaneous combustion. This individual had a little den somewhere in town, the furniture of which consisted of much dirt and a few law books. Notwithstanding the fact that his admiring neighbors said he could try a case better when he was drunk than some men could when sober. This apostle of the law is now a relic of the past The lawyer of to-day must be a clean, sober, cultured gentleman, or a charming woman, or he or she may not rise above the level of a shyster. It is no longer considered unprofessional to have a clean office and a decent library. The old time squire has been relegated to the valley of dead lumber, along with that good old besotted doctor, who was so awfully good for children when he was sober, and who in all his life never rose above the dignity of "Dock" the most opprobrious epithet ever applied to a medical man. "In the profession of law, talent and scholarly attainments soon find their level in these modern days. I have noticed, too, that there is an esprit du corps among lawyers which is sadly lacking among doctors. I have observed that most lawyers have much that is good to say of each other. When a man distinguishes himself in law, his brethren vie with each other in doing him honor. In medicine, the great man's achievements are brilliant in inverse proportion to proximity to those who comment There is usually a qualifying clause, a sort of damning with faint praise. This is not true of the profession of law. It would be well if the sentiment of personal honor, which every lawyer worthy of the name cherishes so highly, could permeate every profession." upon them. Judge Lacombe, in the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, recently decided another trade-mark case which attracts attention because of the discussion of some of the defendants' claims in the opinion and the use of them in framing the determination of the issue. The case under discussion is American Grocery Co. v. Bennett, Sloan & Co., and the opinion is as follows: "In the year 1884 the firm of Thurber, Whyland & Co. devised and adopted a trade-mark for a blend of roasted coffee. The name thus adopted was 'Momaja.' This name is suggestive of a composition of Mocha, Maracaibo and Java coffees, but certainly is not sufficiently descriptive to invalidate it as a trade-mark under the decision. See the 'Cottolene' case, N. K. Fairbank & Co. v. Central Lard Co., 64 Fed. Rep. 133, and cases there cited sustaining 'Maizena,' 'Cocoaine,' 'Valvoline,' 'Bromidia' and 'Bromo-Caffeine.' The brand was at once put on the market, was extensively advertised and largely sold and became well known to the trade. In 1891 the right to this trade-mark passed to a corporation known as the Thurber, Whyland Co.' That corporation passed into the hands of receivers in 1893 and on June 30, 1894, the complainant duly obtained the trade-mark 'Momaja' by purchase. From the time it was first adopted it has been in use, and sales of coffee under it have been made by the successive holders of the title. "The defendants, who are charged with infringement, are engaged in business as grocers in this city; their western agent in Chicago, one Charles H. Smith, was for many years subsequent to the adoption of the 'Momaja' trademark in the employ of Thurber, Whyland & Co., and of the corporation of the same name. Defendants make a blend of coffee and wishing, as they say, to give their product a distinctive character, they devised a trade-mark about a year ago under which they have since been offering their coffee for sale. The answer and affidavits submitted by defendants deny trade-mark 'Momaja,' which was well known any intent to simulate or infringe complainant's to defendants. On the contrary, the defendants' affidavits with great unanimity assert that, at the time they undertook to devise their trade-mark, coffee sold under complainant's mark had deteriorated and had obtained less and less favor in the market, that complainant's brand had no value, that the title 'Momaja' was rather a drawback and detriment, hindering and not assisting the sale of coffee, that because Momaja' had become so unpopular and unsaleable they intended to strictly differentiate in the selection of their own title, for, as the affidavits assert 'it would have been the poorest business policy, without considering the question of good morals or ethics, to have attempted to work up a new brand successfully upon the fading reputation of the 'Momaja.' The great object sought to be secured in the selection of defendants' trademark, as suggested on the argument, was 'to get away as far as possibe from 'Momaja.' The opinion is written by Judge Guffy, and it is held that a creditor of Kentucky cannot levy on property exempt under the laws of that State, on the property, which was temporarily in Ohio, where it was not free from attachment. The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of Judge Guffy, and the part of the decision in relation to the question, is: "The important question involved in this appeal is, whether or not a citizen of this State who is an insolvent debtor may go into another State for the purpose incident to interstate commerce, social intercourse or special business without subjecting his property, exempt by the laws of this State, from execution and attachment which he happens to take with him, to the payment of debts due another citizen of this State, who may be watchful enough to follow and attach such property, and the debtor has no redress. It seems to us that the law will laws of his own State. "The result of defendants' efforts in that direction is somewhat startling. They selected the word 'Mojava.' Certainly they did not get very far away; in fact from the point of view of a court of equity it looks much less like a departure than it does like an approach, and it may well be apprehended that if defend- not allow a creditor to so evade and annul the ants continue to use the word 'Mojava' they run considerable risk of confusion with the unpopular and unsaleable brand from which they wanted 'strictly to differentiate' their own title. In the light of decisions which find infringing resemblances between 'Cottoleo and 'Cottolene,' between Collonite' and 'Celluloid,' between Wamyesta' and 'Wamsutta,' between Maizharina' and 'Maizena,' between 'Saponite' and 'Sapolio' (see citations in 64 Fed. Rep. 135), there is little difficulty in disposing of this case. In the period of rest and quiet which will be secured by a temporary injunction possibly defendants may renew their strength sufficiently to be able to get farther away from Momaja,' the next time they try 'to strictly differentiate' their own goods. "The case of Manhattan Medicine Company v. Wood, 108 U. S. 218, has no application to the facts of this case; no misrepresentation as to who is the manufacturer of complainant's coffee, nor as to where it is manufactured is shown. The letters of Thurber referred to in defendants' affidavits are immaterial; they were written after the title to the trade-mark passed from the concerns in which he was in terested." The Kentucky Court of Appeals on May 24 decided the case of Stewart v. Thompson. Exemption laws have no force beyond the territorial limits of the State enacting the same, hence a citizen of one State, when his property is levied on in another State, cannot plead with effect the laws of his own State, because the general if not universal rule is that exemptions are allowed only to citizens of the State enacting such law; hence by the laws of Ohio the appellant could not legally. claim the benefit of the law of Kentucky, nor any exemption law of Ohio. If the contention of appellee is to prevail, it follows that any insolvent citizen of this State who takes his property into another State for any purpose or for any length of time, makes it subject to the demands of any creditor of this State, and the same may be said of any citizen of another State who might chance to come into this State with his property. The exact question under consideration has never been passed upon by this court so far as we are aware, but the Supreme Courts of some other States have considered the question. We concur in that part of the opinion of the Superior Court in Brown v. Simmet, 13 Ky. L. R. 331, which says: "The weight of authority is that an injunction will lie by a citizen to restrain another citizen from instituting or prosecuting a suit in a foreign country or State where the plaintiff in such suit is fraudulently attempting to evade the laws of this State by subjecting to the payment of his debt property temporarily in a foreign State, when under the law of this State the property is exempt from seizure for his debt.' The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Dehon, etc., v. Foster, etc., 4 Allen, 535, in an elaborate opinion, held that an injunction would lie to prevent a citizen of that State from subjecting by attachment due in Pennsylvania to another citizen of Massachusetts, because the effect would be to give them an advantage over another creditor of the debtor, he having made an assignment. specified in the Constitution of the United States, are in legal contemplations foreign to each other. The courts of one State or country cannot exercise any control or superintending authority over those of another State or country, but they have an undoubted authority to control all persons and things within their own territorial limits. In such cases the courts do not pretend to direct or control the foreign court, but without regard to the situation of the subject matter of the dispute, they consider the question between the parties and decree, in personam.' Story's Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 899. "In Cranston v. Johnson, 3 Ves. Jr. 183, the master of the rolls said: 'I will lay down the "Chief Justice Bigelow says in his opinion: 'Inasmuch as the defendants in the present case are citizens of and residents in this commonwealth, there can be no doubt that the jurisdic-rule as broad as this: This court will not permit tion of this court over them is plenary.' 'Nor is the validity of the foreign law or of the lien acquired under it in any manner called in question.' 'An act which is unlawful and contrary to equity gains no sanction or validity by the mere form or manner in which it is done, it is none the less a violation of the law because it is effected through the instrumentality of a process which is lawful in a foreign tribunal.' "The same case was again appealed to the court after final hearing in the court below, and the injunction was made perpetual. (7 Allen, 57.) "The Supreme Court of New York, in Vail v. Knapp, 49 Barb. 301, enjoined a citizen of New York from prosecuting a suit in the court of Vermont. "The Supreme Court of Georgia, in Engel v. Scheurman, 40 Ga. 209, sustained an injunction against Scheurman, a citizen of Georgia, restraining him from collecting a judgment obtained against Engel in the State of New York. The jurisdiction of the Court of New York to render the judgment was not questioned, but it was claimed by Engel that he had been sued in Georgia for the same debt and judgment rendered for part of the claim, which judgment he had paid off, and that Scheurman had led him to believe by word and act that the suit in New York, then pending, would be abandoned, but instead of doing so was about to collect the judgment in New York off Engel and his securities. We quote as follows from the opinion delivered by Justice Warner: The States of the American Union, except for all purposes as him (the defendant) to avail himself of the law of any other country to do what would be gross injustice. This bill is not filed for the purpose of restraining the proceedings of the court of New York; the courts of this State have no jurisdiction to do that; nor would the courts of this State have jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of a judgment obtained in the courts of New York between citizens of that State. There is a clear distinction as to the power and authority of a court of equity in this State to restrain by injunction the proceedings of a court in another State, and the power and authority of such court to restrain by injunction the personal action of a citizen of this State. In the language of the master of the rolls in Cranston v. Johnson, this court will not permit the defendant to avail himself of the law of any other country, to do what would be gross injustice.' The foregoing authorities establish clearly the power and duty of the courts to prevent citizens within their jurisdiction from evading the laws of such State by and through the machinery of the law or courts of a foreign. State. In the case of Snooks v. Snelzer, 25 Ohio, 516, almost the exact question in this case was decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Ohio. Snooks was a creditor of Snelzer. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company owed Snelzer a debt in West Virginia, which was by the laws of Ohio exempt from garnishment or attachment. Snooks instituted suit in West Virginia, seeking to subject said indebtedness to the payment of his debt against Snelzer. Snelzer sued out an injunction in Ohio against |