SECT. III. The PROVIDENCE of God. Visu carentem magna pars veri latet. Sen. in Oedep. T is very reasonable to believe, that part of the pleasure which happy minds fhall enjoy in a future ftate, will arise from an enlarged contemplation of the Divine Wisdom in the government of the world, and a difcovery of the fecret and amazing steps of providence, from the beginning to the end of time. Nothing feems to be an entertainment more adapted, to the nature of man, if we confider that curiofity is one of the strongest and most lafting appetites implanted in us, and that admiration is one of our most pleasing paffions; and what a perpetual fucceffion of enjoyments will be afforded to both thefe, in a scene fo large and various as fhall then be laid H open open to our view in the fociety of fuperior Spirits, who perhaps will join with us in fo delightful a profpect! It is not impoffible, on the contrary, that part of the punishment of fuch as are excluded from blifs, may consist not only in their being denied this privilege, but in having their appetites at the fame time vaftly increased, without any fatisfaction afforded to them. In these, the vain pursuit of knowledge fhall, perhaps, add to their infelicity, and bewilder them into labyrinths of error, darkness, distraction, and uncertainty of every thing but their own evil ftate. Milton has thus reprefented the fallen Angels reasoning together in a kind of refpite from their torments, and creating to themselves a new difquiet amidst their very amusements; he could not properly have defcribed the fports of condemned Spirits, without that caft of horror and melancholy he has fo judiciously mingled with them. Others apart fat on a hill retir'd, In thoughts more elevate, and reafon'd high In our prefent condition, which is a middle ftate, our minds are, as it were, chequered with truth and falfhood; and as our faculties are narrow, and our views imperfect, it is impoffible but our curiofity must meet with many repulfes. The bufinefs of mankind in this life being rather to act than to know, their portion of knowledge is dealt to them accordingly. From hence it is, that the reason of the inquifitive has fo long been exercifed with difficulties, in accounting for the promiscuous diftribution of good and evil to the virtuous and the wicked in this world. From hence come all those pathetical complaints of fo many tragical events, which happen to the wife and the good; and of fuch furprising profperity, which is often the reward of the guilty and the foolish; that reason is fometimes puzzled, and at a loss what to pronounce upon fo myfterious a difpenfa tion. Plato expreffes his abhorrence of fome fables of the Poets, which feem to reflect on the Gods as the authors of injustice; and lays it down as a principle, that H whatever is permitted to befal a just man, whether poverty, ficknefs, or any of those things which feem to be evils, shall either in life or death conduce to his good. My reader will obferve, how agreeable this maxim is to what we find delivered by a greater authority. Seneca has written a difcourfe purposely on this fubject, in which he takes pains, after the doctrine of the Stoics, to fhew, that adverfity is not in itself an evil; and mentions a noble faying of Demetrius, That nothing would be more unhappy than a man who had never known affliction. He compares profperity to the indulgence of a fond mother to a child, which often proves his ruin but the affection of the Divine Being to that of a wife father, who would have his fons exercised with labour, disappointment and pain, that they may gather ftrength, and improve their fortitude. On this occafion the Philofopher rifes into that celebrated fentiment, that there is not on earth a fpectacle more worthy the regard of a Creator intent on his works, than a brave man fuperior to his fufferings; to which he adds, that it must be a pleasure to Ju ; piter piter himself to look down from heaven, to fee Cato amidst the ruins of his country preferving his integrity. This thought will appear yet more reasonable, if we confider human life as a ftate of probation, and adverfity as the post of honour in it, affigned often to the best and most felect Spirits. But what I would chiefly infist on here, is, that we are not at present in a proper fituation to judge of the counfels by which Providence acts, fince but little arrives at our knowledge, and even that little we difcern imperfectly; or according to the elegant figure in holy Writ, We fee but in part, and as in a glass darkly. It is to be confidered, that Providence in its œconomy regards the whole fyftem of time and things together, fo that we cannot discover the beautiful connexions between incidents which lie widely feparated in time, and by losing To many links of the chain, our reafonings become broken and imperfect. Thus those parts in the moral world which have not an abfolute, may yet have a relative beauty, in refpect of fome other parts concealed from us, but open to his eye, before whom Paft, Prefent, and To H 3 come, |