gratifications of a life which is uncertain, and precarious, and at its utmost length of a very inconfiderable duration; or to fecure to ourselves the pleasures of a life which is fixed and fettled, and will never end? Every man, upon the first hearing of this queftion, knows very well which fide of it he ought to close with. But however right we are in Theory, it is plain that in practice we adhere to the wrong fide of the queftion. We make provifions for this life as tho' it were never to have an End, and for the other life as tho' it were never to have a Beginning.

Should a Spirit of fuperior rank who is a ftranger to human nature, accidentally alight upon the earth, and take a furvey of its inhabitants; what would his notions of us be? Would not he think that we are a fpecies of Beings made for quite different ends and purposes than what we really are? Muft not he imagine that we were placed in this world to get riches and honours? Would not he think that it was our duty to toil after wealth, and ftation, and title? Nay, would not he believe we were forbidden Poverty by threats of eternal punishment, O 2 and

and injoined to pursue our pleasures under pain of Damnation? He would certainly imagine that we were influenced by a scheme of duties quite opposite to thofe which are indeed prescribed to us. And truly, according to fuch an imagination, he muft conclude that we are a fpecies of the most obedient creatures in the universe; that we are conftant to our duty; and that we keep a fteddy eye on the end for which we were fent hither.

But how great would be his astonishment, when he learnt that we were Beings not defigned to exift in this world above threefcore and ten years? and that the greatest part of this bufy fpecies fall fhort even of that age? How would he be loft in horror and admiration, when he fhould know that this fet of creatures, who lay out all their endeavours for this life, which scarce deferves the name of Existence, when, I fay, he fhould know that this fet of creatures are to exift to all eternity in another life, for which they make no preparations? Nothing can be a greater difgrace to reafon, than that men, who are perfuaded of thefe two different ftates of Being, fhould be perpetually employed in providing for a life of threefcore

and

and ten years, and neglecting to make provifion for that, which after many myriads of years will be ftill new, and ftill beginning; efpecially when, we confider that our endeavours for making ourfelves great, or rich, or honourable, or whatever elfe we place our happiness in, may after all prove unfuccefsful; whereas if we conftantly and fincerely endeavour to make ourselves happy in the other life, we are fure that our endeavours will fucceed, and that we fhall not be difappointed of our hope.

The following queftion is ftarted by one of the Schoolmen. Suppofing the whole body of the earth were a great ball or mass of the finest fand, and that a fingle grain or particle of this fand fhould be annihilated every thousand years. Suppofing then that you had it in your choice to be happy all the while this prodigious mafs of fand was confuming by this flow method 'till there was not a grain of it left, on condition you were to be miferable for ever after; or fuppofing that you might be happy for ever after, on condition you would be miferable 'till the whole mafs of fand were thus annihilated at the rate of one fand in

a thousand years: Which of these two cafes would you make your choice?

It must be confeffed in this cafe, fo many thousands of years are to the imagination as a kind of Eternity, tho' in reality they do not bear fo great a proportion to that duration which is to follow them, as an Unite does to the greatest number which you can put together in figures, or as one of those fands to the fuppofed heap. Reason therefore tells us, without any manner of hesitation, which would be the better part in this choice. However, as I have before intimated, our reafon might in fuch cafe be fo overfet by the imagination, as to difpofe fome perfons to fink under the confideration of the great length of the firft part of this duration, and of the great distance of that fecond duration which is to fucceed it. The mind, I fay, might give itself up to that happiness which is at hand, confidering that it is fo very near, and that it would laft fo very long. But when the choice we actually have before us is this, Whether we will choose to be happy for the space only of threefcore and ten, nay perhaps only of twenty or ten years, I might, fay only a day or

an

an hour, and miferable to all eternity, or on the contrary miferable for this fhort term of years, and happy for a whole Eternity: What words are fufficient to exprefs that folly and want of confideration which in such a cafe makes a wrong choice?

I here put the cafe even at the worst, by fuppofing (what feldom happens) that a courfe of virtue makes us miferable in this life: But if we fuppofe (as it generally happens) that virtue would make us more happy even in this life than a contrary course of vice; how can we fufficiently admire the ftupidity or madness of those persons who are capable of making fo abfurd a choice?

Every wife man therefore will confider this life only as it may conduce to the happiness of the other, and chearfully facrifice the pleasures of a few years to thofe of an Eternity.