objects of the two governments. This is the criterion by which we shall determine the just distribution of powers. The great leading objects of the federal government, in which revenue is concerned, are to maintain domestic peace and provide for the common defence. In these are 5 comprehended the regulation of commerce; that is, the whole system of foreign intercourse, the support of armies and navies, and of the civil administration. It is useless to go into detail. Every one knows that the objects of the general government are numerous, extensive, and im- 10 portant. Every one must acknowledge the necessity of giving powers in all respects, and in every degree equal to these objects. The principle assented to, let us inquire what are the objects of the State governments. Have they to provide against foreign invasion? Have they to main- 15 tain fleets and armies? Have they any concern in the regulation of commerce, the procuring alliances, or forming treaties of peace? No. Their objects are merely civil and domestic: to support the legislative establishment, and to provide for the administration of the laws. Let any one 20 compare the expense of supporting the civil list in a State with the expense of providing for the defence of the Union. The difference is almost beyond calculation. The experience of Great Britain will throw some light on this subject. In that kingdom the ordinary expenses of peace 25 to those of war are as one to fourteen; but there they have a monarch, with his splendid court, and an enormous civil establishment, with which we have nothing in this country to compare. If in Great Britain the expenses of war and peace are so disproportioned, how wide will be their dis- 30 parity in the United States! how infinitely wider between the general government and each individual State! Now, Sir, where ought the great resources to be lodged? Every rational man will give an immediate answer. To what extent shall these resources be possessed? Reason says, 35 as far as possible exigencies can require; that is, without

limitation. A constitution cannot set bounds to a nation's wants; it ought not, therefore, to set bounds to its resources. Unexpected invasions, long and ruinous wars, may demand all the possible abilities of the country. 5 Shall not your government have power to call these abilities into action? The contingencies of society are not reducible to calculations. They cannot be fixed or bounded even in imagination. Will you limit the means of your defence when you cannot ascertain the force or 10 extent of the invasion? Even in ordinary wars a government is frequently obliged to call for supplies to the temporary oppression of the people.

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Sir, if we adopt the idea of exclusive revenues, we shall be obliged to fix some distinguished line which neither 15 government shall overpass. The inconveniences of this measure must appear evident on the slightest examination. The resources appropriated to one may diminish or fail, while those of the other may increase beyond the wants of government. One may be destitute of revenues, while the other shall possess an unnecessary abundance, and the constitution will be an eternal barrier to a mutual intercourse and relief. In this case, will the individual states stand on so good a ground as if the objects of taxation were left free and open to the embrace of both the govern25 ments? Possibly, in the advancement of commerce, the imports may increase to such a degree as to render direct taxes unnecessary. These resources, then, as the constitution stands, may be occasionally relinquished to the States; but on the gentleman's idea of prescribing ex30 clusive limits and precluding all reciprocal communication, this would be entirely improper. The laws of the States must not touch the appropriated resources of the United States whatever may be their wants. Would it not be of more advantage to the States to have a concurrent juris35 diction extending to all the sources of revenue than to be confined to such a small resource as, on calculation of the

objects of the two governments, should appear to be their due proportion? Certainly you cannot hesitate on this question. The gentleman's plan would have a further ill effect it would tend to dissolve the connection and correspondence of the two governments, to estrange them 5 from each other, and to destroy that mutual dependence which forms the essence of union. Sir, a number of arguments have been advanced by an honorable member from New York, which, to every unclouded mind, must carry conviction. He has stated that in sudden emergencies it 10 may be necessary to borrow, unless you have funds to pledge for the payment of your debts. Limiting the powers of the government to certain resources is rendering the fund precarious; and obliging the government to ask instead of empowering it to command, is to destroy all 15 confidence and credit. If the power of taxing is restricted, the consequence is that, on the breaking out of a war, you must divert the funds appropriated to the payment of debts to answer immediate exigencies. Thus you violate your engagements at the very time you increase the burden 20 of them. Besides, sound policy condemns the practice of accumulating debts. A government, to act with energy, should have the possession of all its revenues to answer present purposes. The principle for which I contend is recognized in all its extent by our old constitution. Con- 25 gress is authorized to raise troops, to call for supplies without limitation, and to borrow money to any amount. It is true they must use the form of recommendations and requisitions; but the States are bound by the solemn ties of honor, of justice, of religion, to comply without reserve. 30 Mr. Chairman, it has been advanced as a principle that no government but a despotism can exist in a very extensive country. This is a melancholy consideration indeed. If it were founded on truth, we ought to dismiss the idea of a republican government, even for the State 35 of New York. This idea has been taken from a cele

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brated writer who, by being misunderstood, has been the 'occasion of frequent fallacies in our reasoning on political subjects. But the position has been misapprehended, and its application is entirely false and unwarrantable. It relates only to democracies, where the whole body of the people meet to transact business and where representation is unknown. Such were a number of ancient and some modern independent cities. Men who read without attention have taken these maxims respecting the extent of 10 country, and contrary to their proper meaning have applied them to republics in general. This application is wrong in respect to all representative governments, but especially in relation to a confederacy of States, in which the supreme legislature has only general powers, and the 15 civil and domestic concerns of the people are regulated by the laws of the several States. This distinction being kept in view, all the difficulty will vanish, and we may easily conceive that the people of a large country may be represented as truly as those of a smaller one. An assembly 20 constituted for general purposes may be fully competent to every federal regulation, without being too numerous for deliberate conduct. If the State governments were to be abolished, the question would wear a different face; but this idea is inadmissible. They are absolutely neces25 sary to the system. Their existence must form a leading principle in the most perfect constitution we could form. I insist that it never can be the interest or desire of the national Legislature to destroy the State governments. It can derive no advantage from such an event; but, on 30 the contrary, would lose an indispensable support, a necessary aid in executing the laws and conveying the influence of government to the doors of the people. The Union is dependent on the will of the State governments for its chief magistrate and for its Senate. The blow 35 aimed at the members must give a fatal wound to the head, and the destruction of the States must be at once

a political suicide. Can the national government be guilty of this madness? What inducements, what temptations, can they have? Will they attach new honors to their station, will they increase the national strength, will they multiply the national resources, will they make themselves 5 more respectable in the view of foreign nations or of their fellow-citizens by robbing the States of their constitutional privileges? But imagine, for a moment, that a political frenzy should seize the government; suppose they should make the attempt; certainly, sir, it would be 10 forever impracticable. This has been sufficiently demonstrated by reason and experience. It has been proved that the members of republics have been and ever will be stronger than the head. Let us attend to one general historical example. In the ancient feudal governments of 15 Europe there were, in the first place, a monarch; subordinate to him a body of nobles; and subject to these, the vassals, or the whole body of the people. The authority of the kings was limited, and that of the barons considerably independent. A great part of the early wars in 20 Europe were contests between the king and his nobility. In these contests the latter possessed many advantages derived from their influence and the immediate command they had over the people, and they generally prevailed. The history of the feudal wars exhibits little more than a 25 series of successful encroachments on the prerogatives of monarchy. Here, sir, is one great proof of the superiority which the members in limited governments possess over their head. As long as the barons enjoyed the confidence and attachment of the people, they had the strength of 30 the country on their side, and were irresistible. I may be told that in some instances the barons were overcome; but how did this happen? Sir, they took advantage of the depression of the royal authority, and the establishment of their own power, to oppress and tyrannize over 35 their vassals. As commerce enlarged, and as wealth and

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