the council to be exercised for police purposes and police regulations; and we find nothing in the charter empowering the council to tax this particular business, or to impose any other or further restrictions or burdens upon it than authorized by the provision above referred to. The authority to exercise such powers must affirmatively appear in the charter. They are not to be taken by intendment or implication merely. City of St. Paul v. Fraeger, 25 Minn., 252.

The plain purpose of the charter provision quoted is to authorize the council to control and regulate the business by means of the license and the fee; the general purpose being to promote order, to protect buyers from imposition, etc., and not to suppress the business or to raise revenue. The fact, however, that the city derives a revenue incidentally from the reasonable exercise of the police power in regulating and controlling the business, is no serious objection to such an ordinance. City of St Paul v. Colter, 12 Minn, 50, (Gil. 16). What is a reasonable license fee must depend largely upon the sound discretion of the city council, having reference to all the circumstances and necessities of the case. The general rule is that a reasonable license fee should be intended to cover the expense of issuing it, the services of officers, and other expenses directly or indirectly imposed. Unless, however, the amount is manifestly unreasonable, in view of its purpose, as a regulation, the court will not adjudge it a tax. See 2 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cases, 29; Van Hook v. Selma, 70 Ala. 362; Van Baalen v. People, 40 Mich., 258; 36 Amer. Rep. 522, note, In respect to exhibitions, amusements, etc., a larger discretion on the part of the municipal corporation is recognized than in the case of trades and useful occupations, and the rule has, of course, a still broader application where the business is such as is liable to degenerate into a nuisance, of such as tends to promote disorder or crime. But the business of an auctioneer is a lawful and useful one, and there would seem to be no reasonable warrant, from its nature or the expenses that might be directly or indirectly incurred in regulating it, for exacting so large a sum as a license fee, the result of which, it appears, is not to regulate, but to suppress such business. In view of the facts found, we think the trial court was warranted in holding the ordinance unreasonable as a regulation

and unauthorized as a tax. The question raised, in respect to the bond required by the ordinance, we do not esteem very important. Its terms are not set out in full, but it seems to be similar to the bond required in the case of a county license to auctioneers. It will not be presumed that any unlawful or unreasonable duties have been or will be imposed. We think there is nothing in the case to show that the ordinance is invalid for this cause. Judgment affirmed.

DIGEST OF CASES.

Collateral Security-Duty of Pledgee-Negligence.-When a debtor assigns a judgment as collateral security to his creditor, he parts with his authority over it, and the assignee has the right and power to let the lien die or to keep it alive, and must abide the consequences of his own will or negligence. The debtor is entitled to a credit for a loss upon a judgment assigned as collateral to his creditor, when the loss is occasioned by the supine negligence of the assingee. A bond or chose which is transferred as collateral security is put under the dominion of the creditor to make his claim out of it. He is to employ reasonable diligence in collecting the money on the security and applying it to the principal debt, and a conversion of it into a less security is such misuse as makes him accountable to the debtor. A creditor who holds a collateral security for debt stands in a different relation to the assignor from that of a creditor to the surety for his debtor. McQueen's App., Pa. Sup. Ct., Jan. 7, 1884. 41 Leg. Int., 358.

Deed--Delivery-Married Woman.-1. The deed of a married woman, until it is acknowledged and certified according to law, has no validity and is not in a condition to be delivered or accepted. 2. Handing a deed to one of the directors of a bank to be delivered by him to the bank when certain matters between the parties are settled, and upon instructions to make such delivery, is not a delivery to the bank. Bank of Healdsburg v. Bailpace, Cal. Sup. Ct., June, 1884. 18 Rep., 333.

Equitable Jurisdiction and Relief-Parol Gifts of Land-Specific Performance.-Equity will compel conveyance of legal title of land, claimed under parol gift supported by meritorious consideration, and coupled with delivery of possession, and by reason of which donee has been induced to alter his condition and make expenditures of money in valuable improvements on the land. (Burkholder v. Ludlam, 30 Gratt., 255), and will protect such gifts equally with parol agreements to sell land. No writing is necessary to create a good equitable title to real estate. Statute of frauds has no bearing on parol gifts of land which are founded on meritorious considerations. If the promise, reduced to writing, could under the circumstances be enforced, it may be enforced even when only parol. Halsey v. Peters. Va. Sup. Ct. App. 8 Va. Law Journal, 530.

Evidence-Res Gesta.-A. kept a horse at the livery stable of B. with permission to let him occasionally to a careful driver. The horse was hired from the livery stable to certain persons and returned the same day. Held, that the declarations of the manager of the livery-stable as to the condition of the horse when he was returned was admissible as part of the res gestæ, though made several days thereafter. Homan v. Boyce, Neb. Sup. Ct., May, 1884. 18 Rep., 345.

Judgment-When kept alive after payment.—A judgment as between the parties may be kept alive, although once paid, for the purpose of securing another loan. As against subsequent lien creditors a mortgage or judgment once paid cannot be kept alive. Pierce v. Black, Pa. Sup. Ct., March 10, 1884. 41 Leg. Int., 357.

Mandamus-Legislative Acts—Journals of Proceedings—Rules and Regulations—“ Pairs”—Political and Discretionary Powers.-The remedy by mandamus goes only to the enforcement of duties, ininisterial in character, incumbent by law upon the person or body against whom it is invoked, in the performance of which there is no element of discretion left. It does not create or confer power upon the person or body to whom it is directed, but merely commands the exercise of powers already existing. It does not lie to compel the performance of an act which without its mandate would be unlawful. It is within the judicial power to enquire whether the constitutional requirements have been complied with in the manner of enacting laws by the legislative department, as well as in the objects and provisions of the laws. The journals of the legislature are records of its proceedings, importing absolute verity; and when they show that a law has been passed in the regular manner, that showing cannot be impeached. Each house of the legislature has power to make rules for its own government, excuse members from voting, and recognize what are called "pairs" among them. Laying off and defining the congressional districts in a state is the exercise of a political and discretionary power of the legislature, with which the courts cannot interfere. Wise v. Bigger. Va. Sup. Ct. App., 8 Va. Law Journal, 558.

Negotiable Instrument-Action-Possession and Production on Trial.— When an action is brought upon a negotiable instrument it must be produced by plaintiff upon the trial, unless it is lost, or the plaintiff brings himself within the exemptions afforded by equity, or the statute. If it appears that the note is in the possession of another claiming to own it, the action must fall. McKinney v. Hamilton Estate, Mich. Sup. Ct., April, 1884. 18 Rep., 343.

Promissory Note-Application of funds by bank in payment.-Where a bank at which a note is made payable becomes the owner of the note, and on the day of maturity the maker has funds on deposit sufficient to pay it, the endorser is discharged if the bank neglects or refuses to appropriate the maker's deposit to the payment of the note. People's Bank of Wilkesbarre v. Legrand. 40 Leg. Int., 367, distinguished; Com. Nat'l B'k of Reading v. Henninger, Pa. Sup. Ct., April 14, 1884. 41 Leg. Int., 357.

Partnership—General Assignment—Preferring Creditor of Partner.— Where a partnership makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors, in which it prefers as a creditor a bank which holds the note of one of the partners, indorsed by a third person, the assignment is prima facie void as to creditors. Willis v. Bremner, Wis. Sup. Ct., May, 1884. Rep., 351.

18

Real Estate-Adverse possession-Specific performance for Sale.—Possession. A party cannot claim that he holds property by adverse possession where he originally entered by a license. To enforce a parol agreement for the sale of lands the contract must be certain and possession must have been taken under it. Lund v. Brown, Pa. Sup. Ct., March 24, 1884. 41 Deg. Int., 356.

Bale-Stoppage in Transitu-Attachment.—The right of stoppage in transitu continues until the delivery to the buyer is complete. It is not impaired or extinguished by service or process of garnishment upon the carrier. C. B. & Q. R. Co. v. Painler, Neb. Sup. Ct., May, 1884. 18 Rep., 347.

Slander-Perjury-Actionable Words-Materiality.-The words “he made false affidavits in order to commence his case," or "the affidavit made by Mr. A. was false," spoken of an attorney at law, is not actionable per se. There should be a colloquium of judicial proceeding and its nature, and it should appear that the oath was material therein and taken before the proper officer. Casselman v. Winship, Dakota Sup. Ct., May, 1884. 18 Rep., 333.

Statute of Limitations—Running Account-Partnership.-A running account with a surviving partner of a dissolvd firm who has the collection of the partnership assets is not an account with the firm, and consequently cannot toll the running of the statute of limitations against a partnership claim. A fortiori are the above observations true where the items in the account relied upon to toll the statute are not charged against the firm but against the individual surviving partner. Stewart's App., Pa. Sup. Ct., Feb. 18, 1884. 15 Pittsb. Leg. J., 47.

Trespass-Measure of Damages for Using Wall.-In an action of trespass for using a wall the measure of damages is the extent of the wall used, unless there are circumstances of aggravation, when vindictive damages would be permitted. In an action of trespass the plaintiff may recover for the entire injury against the person committing the trespass. Ritler v. Sieger, Pa. Sup. Ct., March 17, 1884. 41 Lég. Int., 357.

Will-Spendthrift Trust—Power of Appointment in cestin que trust.— Where a bequest is made in trust to pay the income to a certain person for life, the same not to be subject to his debts, and on his death to hold the same subject to such uses and purposes and for such estates as the said cestin que trust may by will appoint; the existence of the power of testamentary disposition will not, either during or after his life, subject the property to the debts of the cestin que trust, and his appointees will take not under his appointment, but under the will of the original testator, and to the exclusion of creditors of the appointor. Swaby's App., Pa. Sup. Ct., April 21, 1884. 18 Rep., 350.

COPYRIGHT ON THE PUBLICATION OF THE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

The annual volumes of the Ohio State Reports generally appear about October 1st, and contain the cases decided by the Supreme Court from April of the year previous to April of the same year, these reports therefore, being from 6 to 18 months, or on an average, a year behind the time the cases were decided. The advance sheets furnished the judges are generally from 6 to 9 months behind time. Yet these decisions are law for our people-binding on all the Courts of the state, and the promptest publication is therefore not only desirable, but a necessity. As no legal provision is made to relieve this necessity, private enterprise has stepped in, and the prompt publication of the decisions of the Supreme Court, as fast as they are handed down by the Court, in the OHIO LAW JOURNAL and the WEEKLY LAW BULLETIN has not only been a convenience to the bench and bar of the State, but supplied a want for which no legal provision was made. It appears, however, that these opinions are covered by the copyright reserved by the State for the benefit of the party who obtains from the State the contract for publishing the Ohio State Reports, and that their advance publication by the legal periodicals or newspapers is an infringement' of this copyright. At the request of the present contractors, Messrs. Banks & Bros., of New York, the use of these opinions for the purpose of advance publication, was therefore stopped with the opening of the