triable by courts-martial to their proper commands, with statements of their offenses and names of witnesses, and detaining in custody all other offenders for trial by military commission, provost courts, or native criminal courts, in accordance with law and the instructions bereafter to be issued. V. The port of Manila, and all other ports and places in the Philippines which may be in the actual possession of our land and naval forces will be open, while our military occupation may continue, to the commerce of all neutral nations as well as our own, in articles not contraband of war, and upon payment of the prescribed rates of duty which may be in force at the time of the importation. VI. All churches and places devoted to religious worship and to the arts and sciences, all educational institutions, libraries, scientific collections, and museums are, so far as possible, to be protected; and all destruction or intentional defacement of such places or property, of historical monuments, archives, or works of science and art, is prohibited, save when required by urgent military necessity. Severe punishment will be meted out for all violations of this regulation. The custodians of all property of the character mentioned in this section will make prompt returns thereof to these headquarters, stating character and location, and embodying such recommendations as they may think proper for the full protection of the properties under their care and custody, that proper orders may issue enjoining the cooperation of both military and civil authorities in securing such protection. VII. The commanding general, in announcing the establishment of military government and in entering upon his duty as military governor in pursuance of his appointment as such by the Government of the United States, desires to assure the people that so long as they preserve the peace and perform their duties toward the representatives of the United States they will not be disturbed in their persons and property, except in so far as may be found necessary for the good of the service of the United States and the benefit of the people of the Philippines. WESLEY MERRITT, Major-General, United States Army, Commanding. REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL SHAFTER, COMMANDING THE TROOPS IN ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE ARMY, CUBA. WASHINGTON, D. C., September 13, 1898. Washington, D. C. SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the campaign which terminated in the fall of Santiago de Cuba, and the adjacent territory, and the establishment of the military government therein: The expedition was undertaken in compliance with telegraphic instructions of May 30, 1898, from Headquarters of the Army, in which it was stated "Admiral Schley reports that two cruisers and two torpedo boats have been seen in the harbor of Santiago. Go with your force to capture garrison at Santiago, and assist in capturing harbor and fleet." On this date there were a large number of transports in Port Tampa Bay, which had been collected for the purpose of an expedition which it had been previously contemplated I should command, and for such other emergencies as might arise. Orders were immediately given for loading aboard those transports the necessary subsistence and quartermaster's supplies, and for the embarkation of the authorized number of troops and their material. General Orders, No. 5, from these headquarters, indicate the organizations it was at first proposed to take. The order is as follows: GENERAL ORDERS, No. 5. HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS, The following troops will hold themselves in readiness to move immediately on board transports upon notification from these headquarters: 1. The Fifth Army Corps. 2 The Battalion of Engineers. 3. The detachment of the Signal Corps. 4. Five squadrons of cavalry, to be selected by the commanding general of the cavalry division, in accordance with instructions previously given. 5. Four batteries of light artillery, to be commanded by a major to be selected by the commanding officer of the Light Artillery Brigade. 6. Two batteries of heavy artillery, to be selected by the commanding officer of the siege artillery battalion, with eight siege guns and eight field mortars. 7. The Battalion of Engineers, the Infantry and Cavalry, will be supplied with 500 rounds of ammunition per man. 8. All troops will carry, in addition to the fourteen days' field rations now on hand, ten days' travel rations. 9. The minimum allowance of tentage and baggage, as prescribed in General Orders 54, Adjutant-General's Office, current series, will be taken. 10. In addition to the rations specified in paragraph 8 of this order, the Chief Commissary will provide sixty days' field rations for the entire command. 11. All recruits and extra baggage, the latter to be stored, carefully piled and covered, will be left in camp, in charge of a commissioned officer, to be selected by the regimental commander. Where there are no recruits available, the necessary guard only will be left. 12. Travel rations will be drawn, at once, by the several commands, as indicated in paragraph 8. By command of Major-General Shafter: E. J. MCCLERNAND, Assistant Adjutant-General. This order was afterwards changed to include 12 squadrons of cavalry, all of which were dismounted, because of lack of transportation for the animals, and because it was believed from the best sources of information obtainable that mounted cavalry could not operate efficiently in the neighborhood of Santiago. This was found subsequently to be correct. The facilities at Tampa, and Port Tampa, for embarking the troops and the large amount of supplies required were inadequate, and with the utmost effort it was not possible to accomplish this work as quickly as I hoped and desired. On the evening of June 7, I received orders to sail without delay, but not with less than 10,000 men. The orders referred to caused one division composed of volunteer troops-commanded by Brigadier-General Snyder, and which it had been intended to include in my command-to be left behind. I was joined, however, by Brigadier-General Bates, who had already arrived on transports from Mobile, Ala., with the Third and Twentieth Infantry, and one squadron of the Second Cavalry, with their horses-the latter being the only mounted troops in my command. After some of the transports had already reached the lower bay, telegraphic instructions were received from the Honorable Secretary of War directing that the sailing of the expedition be delayed waiting further orders. This delay was occasioned by the Navy reporting that a Spanish war vessel had been sighted in the Nicholas Channel. The ships in the lower bay were immediately recalled. On the next day, in compliance with instructions from the Adjutant-General of the Army, the necessary steps were taken to increase the command to the full capacity of the transports, and the expedition sailed on June 14 with 815 officers and 16,072 enlisted men. The passage to Santiago was generally smooth and uneventful. The health of the command remained remarkably good, notwithstanding the fact that the conveniences on many of the transports, in the nature of sleeping accommodations, space for exercise, closet accommodations, etc., were not all that could have been desired. While commenting upon this subject, it is appropriate to add that the opinion was general throughout the army that the travel ration should include tomatoes, beginning with the first day, and that a small quantity of canned fruit would prove to be a most welcome addition while traveling at sea in the tropics; if the future policy of our Government requires much transportation for the military forces by sea, definite arrangements should be determined upon to provide the necessary hammock accommodations for sleeping. Hammocks interfere immeasurably less than bunks with the proper ventilation of the ships, and during the day can be easily removed, thus greatly increasing space for exercise; moreover, they greatly diminish the danger of fire. While passing along the north coast of Cuba, one of the two barges we had in tow broke away during the night, and was not recovered. This loss proved to be very serious, for it delayed and embarrassed the disembarkation of the army. On the morning of June 20, we arrived off Guantanamo Bay, and about noon reached the vicinity of Santiago, where Admiral Sampson came on board my headquarter transport. It was arranged between us to visit in the afternoon the Cuban general, Garcia, at Aserraderos, about 18 miles to the west of the Morro. During the interview General Garcia offered the services of his troops, comprising about 4,000 men, in the vicinity of Aserraderos, and about 500 under General Castillo at the little town of Cujababo, a few miles east of Daiquiri. I accepted his offer, impressing it upon him that I could exercise no military control over him except such as he would concede, and as long as he served under me I would furnish him rations and ammunition. Ever since the receipt of my orders I had made a study of the terrain surrounding Santiago, gathering information mainly from former residents of the city, several of whom were on the transports with me. At this interview all the possible points of attack were for the last time carefully weighed, and then, for the information and guidance of Admiral Sampson and General Garcia, I outlined the plan of campaign, which was as follows: With the assistance of the small boats of the navy, the disembarkation was to commence on the morning of the 22d at Daiquiri. On the 21st 500 insurgent troops were to be transferred from Aserraderos to Cujababo, increasing the force already there to 1,000 men. This force under General Castillo was to attack the Spanish force at Daiquiri in the rear at the time of disembarkation. This movement was successfully made. To mislead the enemy as to the real point of our intended landing, I requested General Garcia to send a small force (about 500 men), under General Rabi, to attack the little town of Cabanas, situated on the coast a few miles to the west of the entrance to Santiago Harbor, and where it was reported the enemy had several hundred men intrenched, and from which a trail leads around the west side of the bay to Santiago. I also requested Admiral Sampson to send several of his war ships, with a number of my transports, opposite this town for the purpose of making a show of disembarking there. In addition I asked the admiral to cause a bombardment to be made at Cabañas, and also at the forts, around the Morro, and at the towns of Aguadores, Siboney, and Daiquiri. The troops under General Garcia remaining at Aserraderos were to be transferred to Daiquiri or Siboney, on the 24th. This was successfully accomplished at Siboney. These movements committed me to approaching Santiago from the east over a narrow road, at first in some places not better than a trail, running from Daiquiri through Siboney and Sevilla, and making attack from that quarter. This, in my judgment, was the only feasible plan, and subsequent information and results confirmed my judgment. On the morning of the 22d the army commenced to disembark at Daiquiri. The following general order indicates the manner in which the troops left the transports, and the amount of supplies carried immediately with them: GENERAL ORDERS, Į No. 18. HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS, EXTRACT. 1. Under instructions to be communicated to the proper commanders, troops will disembark in the following order: First. The Second Division, Fifth Corps (Lawton's). The Gatling gun detachment will accompany this division. Second. General Bates's brigade. This brigade will form as a reserve to the Sec ond Division, Fifth Corps. Third. The dismounted cavalry division (Wheeler's). Fourth. The First Division, Fifth Corps (Kent's). Fifth. The squadron of the Second Cavalry (Rafferty's). Sixth. If the enemy in force vigorously resist the landing, the light artillery, or part of it, will be disembarked by the battalion commander and brought to the assistance of the troops engaged. If no serious opposition be offered, this artillery will be unloaded after the mounted squadron. 2. All troops will carry on the person the blanket roll (with shelter tent and poncho), three days' field rations (with coffee ground), canteens filled, and 100 rounds of ammunition per man. Additional ammunition, already issued to the troops, tentage, baggage, and company cooking utensils, will be left under charge of the regimental quartermaster, with one noncommissioned officer and two privates from each company. 3. All persons not immediately on duty with, and constituting a part of, the organizations mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs, will remain aboard ship until the landing be accomplished, and until notified they can land. 4. The chief quartermaster of the expedition will control all small boats, and will distribute them to the best advantage to disembark the troops in the order indicated in paragraph 1. 5. The ordnance officer, Second Lieutenant Brooke, Fourth Infantry, will put on shore, at once, 100 rounds of ammunition per man, and have it ready for distribution on the firing line. 6. The commanding general wishes to impress officers and men with the crushing effect a well-directed fire will have upon the Spanish troops. All officers concerned will rigidly enforce fire discipline, and will caution their men to fire only when they can see the enemy. * By command of Major-General Shafter: E. J. MCCLERNAND, Assistant Adjutant-General. The small boats belonging to the Navy and to the transports, together with a number of steam launches furnished by the Navy, were brought alongside and loaded with troops as prescribed in the order just quoted. When General Lawton's division was fairly loaded in the small boats the latter were towed in long lines by the steam launches toward the shore. The sea was somewhat rough, but by the exercise of caution and good judgment the beach was reached and the troops disembarked satisfactorily. As a precaution against a possible attack upon the part of any Spaniards who might have been hidden in the adjacent blockhouses and woods, the Navy opened a furious cannonade on these places while the troops were moving toward the shore. It was learned afterwards that the Spanish garrison had retired in the direction of Siboney soon after daylight. By night about 6,000 troops were on shore. General Lawton was ordered to push down a strong force to seize and hold Siboney. On the 23d the disembarkation was continued and about 6,000 more men landed. Early on this date General Lawton's advance reached Siboney, the Spanish garrison of about 600 men retiring as he came up, and offering no opposition except a few scattering shots at long range. Some of the Cuban troops pursued the retreating Spaniards and skirmished with them. During the afternoon of this date the disembarkation of Kent's division was commenced at Siboney, which enabled me to establish a base 8 miles nearer Santiago, and to continue the unloading of troops and supplies at both points. The disembarkation was continued throughout the night of the 23d and 24th, and by the evening of the 24th the disembarkation of my command was practically completed. The orders for June 24 contemplated General Lawton's division taking a strong defensive position a short distance from Siboney, on the road to Santiago; Kent's division was to be held near Siboney, where he disembarked; Bates's brigade was to take position in support of Lawton, while Wheeler's division was to be somewhat to the rear on the road from Siboney to Daiquiri. It was intended to maintain this situation until the troops and transportation were disembarked and a reasonable quantity of necessary supplies landed. General Young's brigade, however, passed beyond Lawton on the night of the 23d-24th, thus taking the advance, and on the morning of the latter date became engaged with a Spanish force intrenched in a strong position at La Guasima, a point on the Santiago road about three miles from Siboney. General Young's force consisted of one squadron of the First Cavalry, one of the Tenth Cavalry, and two of the First U. S. Volunteer Cavalry, in all 964 officers and men. The enemy made an obstinate resistance, but were driven from the field with considerable loss. Our own loss was 1 officer and 15 men killed; 6 officers and 46 men wounded. The reported losses of the Spaniards were 9 killed and 27 wounded. The engagement had an inspiriting effect upon our men, and doubtless correspondingly depressed the enemy, as it was now plainly demonstrated to them that they had a foe to meet who would advance upon them under a heavy fire delivered from intrenchments. General Wheeler, division commander, was present during the engagement, and reports our troops, officers and men, fought with the greatest gallantry. His report attached marked A. This engagement gave us a well-watered country farther to the front, on which to encamp our troops. My efforts to unload transportation and subsistence stores, so that we might have several days' rations on shore, were continued during the remainder of the month. In this work I was ably seconded by Lieut. Col. Charles F. Humphrey, deputy quartermaster-general, United States Army, chief quartermaster, and Col. John F. Weston, assistant commissary-general of subsistence, chief commissary, but notwithstanding the utmost efforts it was difficult to land supplies in excess of those required daily to feed the men and animals, and the loss of the scow, mentioned as having broken away during the voyage, as well as the loss at sea of lighters sent by Quartermaster's Department, was greatly felt. Indeed, the lack of steam launches, lighters, scows, and wharves can only be appreciated by those who were on the ground directing the disembarkation and landing of supplies. It was not until nearly two weeks after the ariny landed that it was possible to place on shore three days' supplies in excess of those required for the daily consumption. After the engagement at La Guasima, and before the end of the month, the army, including General Garcia's command, which had been brought on transports to Siboney from Aserraderos, was mostly concentrated at Sevilla, with the exception of the necessary detachments at Daiquiri and Siboney. On June 30 I reconnoitered the country about Santiago and made my plan of attack. From a high hill, from which the city was in plain view, I could see the San Juan Hill and the country about El Caney. The roads were very poor, and indeed little better than bridle paths, until the San Juan River and El Caney were reached. The position of El Caney, to the northeast of Santiago, was of great importance to the enemy, as holding the Guantanamo road as well as furnishing shelter for a strong outpost that might be used to assail the right flank and rear of any force operating against San Juan Hill. In view of this, I decided to begin the attack next day at El Caney, with one division, while sending two divisions on the direct road to Santiago, passing by El Pozo House, and, as a diversion, to direct a small force against Aguadores, from Siboney along the railroad by the sea, with a view of attracting the attention of the Spaniards in the latter direction, and of preventing them from attacking our left tank. During the afternoon I assembled the division commanders, and explained to them my general plan of battle. Lawton's division, assisted by Capron's light battery, was ordered to move out during the afternoon toward El Caney, to begin the attack there early the next morning. After carrying El Caney, Lawton was to move by the Caney road toward Santiago, and take position on the right of the line. Wheeler's division of dismounted cavalry, and Kent's division of infantry, were directed on the Santiago road, the head of the column resting near El Pozo, toward which heights Grimes's battery moved on the afternoon of the 30th, with orders to take position thereon early the next morning, and at the proper time prepare the way for the advance of Wheeler and Kent on San Juan Hill. The |