sagacity, strength, and comprehension of mind, and earnest and unbroken attention, they may, after the most full and lucid statements and illustrations of the bar and court, still be too imperfectly acquainted with the many facts, circumstances, and reasonings pertaining to the case, to come to a sound decision on its merits; if, again, they are wanting in impartiality and are influenced by prejudice and passion, the stains with which partiality, prejudice, and passion are accustomed to discolor every object, will be seen on their verdict; if, finally, they are wanting in firmness and independence of understanding and judgment, they will be led blindly by the court, or in times of strong popular excitement, yielding to the general impulse, they will become the tools of party, or mere instruments in ministering to the excited passions of the multitude. It is the duty, then, of the citizen, to bring to the maintenance and support of this institution, those qualifications of heart and understanding, which are indispensable to give it its full effect and influence, and to sustain the high estimation with which it has been regarded wherever it has been known. Jury trials can fully answer their end, only in countries where education and the moral and manly virtues prevail, and only so long as they prevail; and the state of trial by jury in any country is a very good index of the morals and intelligence of the people. Moreover, any duty which is committed to the hands of very many is in danger of being neglected by all; and hence it happens, that many of our citizens, if they have suitable impressions of the importance of the institution, seem to be without adequate views of the moral and intellectual qualifications required, and of the moral responsibilities which the duty of a juryman imposes on him. The trial by jury is the main pillar in the temple of justice; and impartiality, truth, knowledge, wisdom, integrity, candor, firmness, patience, and independence adorn its portals, and become its sacred precincts. It is the duty of the citizen further to aid in the administration of justice by giving testimony on oath in courts of justice, when required by law. Some persons, in their estimate of the obedience which they owe to the laws of their country, acknowledge themselves morally bound by such laws as prohibit intrinsic evil (malum per se), while they consider themselves at liberty to evade, and this, too, with a safe conscience, such laws as make any thing an offence (malum prohibitum), which was not such before their enactment. For instance, theft is intrinsically a crime, in its nature; but smuggling is an offence made such by the enactment of law. This distinction, when made for the purpose of obeying one law, and evading or breaking another, is unquestionably unsound. The law of the land is one of the chief moral rules by which the conduct of all is to be squared, and with a very few exceptions, and those of a character clearly extraordinary, is morally binding on all.* CHAPTER VII. MORAL DUTIES OF THE UNITED STATES, REGARDED AS INDEPENDENT states, kingdoms, empires, commonwealths, all civil communities, under whatever name, are moral persons, endowed with understanding, will, and conscience, capable of merit or demerit, responsible for their acts, and charged with duties of various kinds. † The United States owe to one another all the duties prescribed by the Law of Nature and Nations, which independent nations owe to each other. The principle which lies at the foundation of these duties, says Montesquieu, is, that "different nations ought to do each other as much good in peace, and as little harm in war, as possible, without injury to their true interests." Lord Bacon says, "The Divine Law is the perfection. both of the Law of Nature and Nations," and he applies the law of Christian charity, § and the law of our neighbour, || "which includes the Samaritan as well as the Levite," to the case of * See pp. 29-32, 100. L'Esprit des Lois, Book I. c. 3. "Lex proximi," Luke x. 29-37. + Vattel, Preliminary Principles, § 2. § "Lex charitatis," Matt. vii. 12. nations, and this he does to the exclusion of the principles of jurists, when the latter do not agree with the former. * Again; "In cases of doubt," says Chitty, "arising upon what is the Law of Nations, it is now an admitted rule amongst all European nations, that our common religion, Christianity, pointing out the principles of natural justice, should be equally appealed to and observed by all as an unfailing rule of construction." Finally, in 1815, the emperors of Austria and Russia, and the king of Prussia, "declared, in the face of the whole world, their fixed resolution, both in the administration of their respective states, and in their political relations with every other government, to take for their sole guide, the precepts of Christian charity and peace, which, far from being applicable only to private concerns, must have an immediate influence on the councils of princes, and guide all their undertakings, and as being the only means of consolidating human institutions and remedying their imperfections." Thus, these high authorities distinctly recognise Christian morals and the Christian religion, as the basis of the reciprocal duties of nations. Christianity, then, is the ultimate standard, to which, among Christian nations, international duties are to be referred, and the rule by which they are to be measured. Every Christian nation is bound to conduct towards every other, as it wishes that others should, in like circumstances, conduct towards itself. They are morally bound to respect the rights, and, in every reasonable way and degree, to consult the welfare and interests of one another. But Vattel has well said, "that it exclusively belongs to each nation to form its own judgment of what its own conscience prescribes to it; of what it can or cannot do; of what is proper, or improper, for it to do."§ Especially, they are to respect each other's freedom, independence, sovereignty, and rightful jurisdiction. One nation is to perform, in all good faith, the duties of neutrality towards other nations, which, unable to adjust their differences by peaceable means, have submitted them to the arbitration of the sword. No nation is permitted, * Works, Vol. II. pp. 289–294. 4to. London, 1765. Note to Vattel on the Law of Nations, Preliminary Principles, § 3. § Preliminary Principles, § 14, 16. by its duty, to interfere in the internal concerns of another nation. Every nation is entitled to manage its internal concerns in its own way, without the interference or dictation of another. Any interference of this kind tends to disturb friendly intercourse, and is just cause of offence. These duties, indeed, are too well understood to be often violated; but there is another, the violation of which is much more common; I refer to the case of one nation countenancing the infringement of the laws of another, and even lending the aid of its tribunals to carry such infringement into effect.* Assuredly, Mr. Justice Story well concludes, with Pothier, that such a practice is inconsistent with good morals, and sound views of international duties and obligations. "The natural and primary law is that of God and our conscience, the law which enjoins us to do good to our neighbour, whether in literal strictness he may have a perfect right to demand such treatment from us or not. This is a law that ought to be as strong in obligation as the most distinct and positive rule, though it may not always be capable of the same precise definition, nor consequently may allow the same remedies to enforce its observance. As an individual is bound by the law of nature to deal honorably and truly with other individuals, whether the precise acts required of him be or be not such as their own municipal law will enforce; just so a state, in its relations with other states, is bound to conduct itself in the spirit of justice, benevolence, and good faith, even though there be no positive rules of international law, by the letter of which it may be actually tied down. The same rules of morality which hold together men in families, and which form families into a commonwealth, also link together several commonwealths as members of the great society of mankind. Commonwealths, as well as private men, are liable to injury, and capable of benefit, from each other; it is, therefore, their duty to reverence, to practise, and to enforce those rules of justice, which control and restrain injury, which regulate and augment benefit, which preserve civilized states in a tolerable condition of security from wrong, and which, if they could be * See Story's "Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws," pp. 204, 205, 212. generally obeyed, would establish and permanently maintain, the well-being of the universal commonwealth of the human race."* The peculiar duties, which the United States owe to each other, chiefly respect the preservation of that harmony, which it is so essential to maintain among communities standing in a relation so very intimate to one another, and without which reflecting men have always foreseen, the union could not long subsist. It is the moral duty of the citizen to obey the laws; and, as the Constitution of the United States is the highest law known to the country, an observance of its obligations, becomes the highest rule of duty to the citizen next after the divine law. A constitutional duty, then, is a great moral duty, binding on the states as communities, and, of course, binding on the consciences of the individual citizens of which the State is composed. This cannot be denied, without falling into the absurd consequence, that what is binding on the body politic, is not binding on the members. But the duty of the States and of the citizens to maintain this harmony, which is the great object kept in view by the Constitution in those of its provisions which refer to the relation and intercourse of the coördinate States with each other, may be most successfully illustrated by reviewing the occasions, on which it has been most frequently violated, and on which future violations are most likely to occur. 1. One way in which this duty of cultivating harmony and maintaining friendly relations, has sometimes been violated is, by a course of unfriendly legislation by one State, calculated and intended to affect injuriously the interests of one or more of its sister States. Such a course arises from a real or supposed inconsistency of interests. Sometimes it has arisen from a wish, by one State, to obtain for its citizens exclusive advantages, which in reason equally belonged to other States.‡ Every thing of this kind rests on the ground, that the pecuniary interest of a State is its highest interest; when, viewed as a mere stroke of selfish policy, it is mistaken and short-sighted, as indeed are all violations of moral duty either by individuals or * Chitty, note to Vattel on the Law of Nations. - Prelim. Principles, § 10. See The Federalist, p. 116. Wheaton's Reports, Vol. ix. p. 1. |