of the independent Servian societies was held at the city of Chicago, and at this convention Angels' Camp, No. 1, was represented. Its delegates then and there signed a new constitution, which was promulgated at that time. Under this new constitution a branch camp of any of the camps signing might become a subordinate lodge in the First Benevolent Brotherhood Association, independent of its original organizer, and subject only to the jurisdiction of the Illinois association, upon the payment of all its debts and obligations to the organizing camp or lodge. The testimony of the witnesses for the defendant is to the effect that in the fall of 1904 Angels' Camp directed by letter that Douglas Camp should thereafter make all its reports to the office of the grand lodge of the First Servian Benevolent Association at Chicago. This letter was not produced, but the statement is not controverted. Thereafter a convention of the independent lodges, or what in the translation of the constitution is termed subordinate lodges, was convened at the city of Chicago on the 20th day of July, 1905, and Douglas Camp was represented by a delegate. At this time the constitution was reframed, and all the Servian societies represented signed the constitution by their delegates. Thus Angels' Camp and Douglas each signed the constitution and by-laws of the First Servian Benevolent Brotherhood Association, and became. subject to that association in all things. Since that time each society has reported to the Chicago grand lodge, and has been under its direction and control. The defendant offered to prove that it had paid all its obligations and debts to the Angels' Camp, and this was admitted by the plaintiff. Plaintiff also conceded the sending of the delegate by Douglas Camp to the convention of July 20, 1905, at Chicago, and the propriety of its having reported to that society its financial condition, etc., but contends that this is merely the financial part of the society, and that the jurisdiction over members and the control of the ritual of the society generally, aside from financial matters, is still in Angels' Camp. An examination of the translation of the constitutions of Angels' Camp and of the First Servian Benevolent Association of Chicago does not substantiate this contention. It is clear from the translations, which are evidently very poorly done, but which nevertheless in a general way disclose the purpose and intention of the organization, that the jurisdiction of Angels' Camp ceased at the time that the delegate or representative of Douglas Camp participated in the convention at Chicago in July, 1905, and that since that time all the control and jurisdiction over Douglas Camp was vested in the grand lodge or governing board of the First Servian Benevolent Association at Chicago. This view is borne out by the weight of the whole testimony, and by the telegrams exchanged between the plaintiff and his own camp and between the plaintiff and the president of the First Servian Benevolent Association at Chicago. The opinion arrived at is that plaintiff has no right to the relief for which he prays in his complaint. Let an order be entered dismissing the suit, with costs. LINGE'S ADM'R v. ALASKA TREADWELL CO. (First Division. Juneau. March 12, 1906.) No. 410A. 1. NEW TRIAL (§ 128*)-MOTION-GROUNDS TO BE PLAINLY SPECIFIED. On motion for a new trial "because the court erred in denying the motion of defendant to instruct the jury to return a verdict for the defendant," the court will not consider whether or not *See same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. Key No. Series & Rep'r Indexes the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, since that ground of objection is not plainly specified in the motion. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see New Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 257262; Dec. Dig. § 128.*] 2. NEW TRIAL (§ 71*)—SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE IN JURY TRIAL. A new trial will not be granted for insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict, where there was a well-defined issue of fact and a fair conflict of evidence, though the judge upon the same evidence would have found different from the jury. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see New Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 144, 145; Dec. Dig. § 71.*] 3. DEATH ($ 99*)-DAMAGES-EXCESSIVE VERDICT. In a suit for wrongful death through negligence, the jury returned a verdict for $10,000. Held, under section 353, Alaska Code of Civil Procedure, the verdict was not excessive. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Death, Cent. Dig. §§ 125-130; Dec. Dig. § 99.*] 4. NEW TRIAL (§ 32*)—GROUNDS-IMPROPER REMARKS OF COUNSEL TO JURY. When counsel for the plaintiff used language to the jury tending to prejudice them toward the defendant, but upon objection withdrew same, and the court specifically instructed the jury to disregard same, and the verdict was clearly within the statute, held not a ground for a new trial. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see New Trial, Cent. Dig. § 47; Dec. Dig. § 32.*] 5. COURTS (§ 52*)—ABOLISHMENT OF PROBATE COURT-EFFECT. Administration on the estate of Linge was begun in the probate court in Douglas Island precinct. Afterwards by an order of the district court the Douglas Island precinct was abolished, the court closed, and the records and territory transferred to the Juneau precinct. Held, that the probate court in Juneau precinct had no jurisdiction to remove the administrator and appoint his successor; that the cases pending in the Douglas Island precinct were suspended by the order abolishing the court. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Courts, Dec. Dig. § 52.*] *See same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. Key No. Series & Rep'r Indexes 6. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 460*)-Supersedeas. An appeal from a probate court in Alaska to the district court does not operate as a supersedeas. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Dec. Dig. $ 460.*] Motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment. Z. R. Cheney and R. W. Jennings, for plaintiff. GUNNISON, District Judge. The motion for a new trial and that in arrest of judgment were duly filed and argued herein. The second ground upon which defendant bases its motion for a new trial is identical with that upon which it relies in its motion in arrest of judgment. This ground will be considered after the other ground assigned as reason for a new trial has been examined. The first ground set out is: "Because the court erred in denying the motion of defendant to instruct the jury to return a verdict for the defendant." The plaintiff urges that under this the court may not consider the question as to whether or not the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. It is unnecessary to enter into an extended consideration of the cases cited by counsel for either party, because, in the opinion of the court, plaintiff's position was well taken under sections 226 and 229 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The latter section (229) declares with great clearness that: "In all cases of motion for a new trial, the grounds thereof shall be plainly specified, and no cause of new trial not so stated shall be considered or regarded by the court." The ground stated in the motion does not specify the reason relied upon therein to be the insufficiency of evidence to jus *See same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. Key No. Series & Rep'r Indexes tify the verdict. On the contrary, it is charged that the court "erred in denying the motion" to direct a verdict. And though, when arguing upon this ground, defendant's counsel discussed the sufficiency of the evidence, as well as questions of law, the court is of the opinion that under section 226 this assignment must be deemed to have reference to error in law, for the reason that it does not plainly specify that it is aimed at the insufficiency of the evidence. The question of law urged thereunder is the same as that urged in the second ground, and will therefore be discussed in connection therewith. But in the event that the contention of plaintiff had not been well taken, and that the evidence should have been considered on these motions, the result would have been no different; for the mind of the court, expressed on the trial, in ruling on the motion for a directed verdict, has not changed. There then appeared to the court to be a clearly defined question which should be submitted to the jury. And while the weight of evidence upon that question might not have appealed to the court as it evidently did appear to the jury, the question as to the weight of testimony was for the jury to determine, and not for the court. The court refused to direct a verdict on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, and, were that question properly before the court on this motion, the ruling of the prior occasion would not be changed at this time. The third reason assigned for a new trial is that: "The verdict of the jury is excessive in amount, and was manifestly rendered under the influence of passion and prejudice." The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $10,000. Under section 353 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this was the maximum amount that could be returned in an action of this kind. But defendant contends that amount to be excessive, and that the verdict was rendered under the influence of passion and prejudice. The quantum of damages in this, as in most cases, is intimately blended with questions |