per annum less in November than in October-a difference which, if secured in civil life, would make the fortune of an insurance company. Important information is being constantly received from the inspecters of hospitals as to all matters relating to the comfort and health of the troops, thus affording opportunities for correcting errors and irregularities wherever they may be found to exist. A satisfactory progress has been made in improving the sanitary condition of the Army of the Potomac, and there is no reason to fear that this progress will not continne to be made until the health of this army will be such as will leave nothing to be desired. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, CHAS. S. TRIPLER, Surgeon and Medical Director Army of the Potomac. Surg. Gen. C. A. FINLEY, U. S. A. AUGUST 18, 1861.-Scout to Accotink and skirmish at Pohick Church, Va. REPORTS. No. 1.-Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin, U. S. Army. No. 2.-Capt. William H. Boyd, First New York Cavalry. No. 1. Report of Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin, U. S. Army. ALEXANDRIA, VA., August 18, 1861. The company of Lincoln [First New York] Cavalry sent out this morning met a party of the enemy's cavalry at Pohick Church, about 12 miles from here, numbering about 20. They charged the enemy, scattered them in all directions, and wounded two of them. One of our men was killed, and 2 are missing, who were thrown from their horses. The enemy's horses far outstripped ours, so that no prisoners could be made. I have learned nothing definite about Springfield. Our scouts were 13 miles from there last night. Saw their pickets; so there is no doubt that they are there. General Kearny thinks the force there is a variable one. So report his scouts. W. B. FRANKLIN, Brigadier-General, Commanding. Maj. S. WILLIAMS. No. 2. Report of Capt. William H. Boyd, First New York Cavalry. CAMP ELIZABETH, Alexandria, Va., August 18, 1861. SIR: Your orders of this a. m., "to proceed on a scout down the Mount Vernon road and vicinity of Accotink, to capture, if possible, 27 cavalry of the enemy," have, as far as circumstances would permit, been obeyed. At about 10 o'clock a. m., accompanied by Lieutenant Gibson, Second Dragoons, U. S. Army, Lieutenant Hanson, Dr. Her 8 R R-VOL V rick, and 46 of my own company, I proceeded towards Accotink, interrogating all pedestrians and examining all houses and outbuildings on our way thither, until we reached Accotink, where we learned that a number of cavalry of the enemy were this morning at Pohick Church, whither we immediately proceeded. Our advanced pickets, upon nearing the church, thought they discovered a whole army, and immediately retreated, communicating directly with the men instead of me, thereby causing a stampede. After a little delay I succeeded in rallying our anen together, and immediately retraced our steps. The road being narrow, we were unable to proceed to much advantage. Being in advance myself, upon getting up to the main road I was suddenly brought face to face with the enemy, whom I should judge to have been about 20 strong. The enemy were the first to challenge, and were evidently prepared to meet us, as they were in line at the side of the road (they being apprised of our coming by our advanced pickets, who had been previously challenged). After the usual war salutations I gave the order to charge, and our men shouted, cheered, and charged. Immediately beyond the church are cross-roads. The enemy separated on the three roads, and our men divided and followed in hot pursuit. One party pursued within a short distance of Occoquan, both parties shooting as they rode. At the cross-roads were three men in ambush, and it is believed that these were the men who fired on us. Our loss is One killed (Jacob Erwen, shot through the body), and two missing (Williams and Lancaster), who were thrown from their horses. We cannot say whether the enemy lost any or not, but it is said one of the enemy was shot in the arm, and another fell on his horse's neck, and seemed to be unable to manage his horse. The enemy were well mounted, had wery superior horses, and were enabled to outfoot us, and thus make their escape. It is my opinion that had we some infantry with us we would have been able to outflank them and taken some prisoners. Our dead we brought home with us. I desire to make honorable mention of our guide, Lieutenant Gibson, Second Dragoons, U. S. Army. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Brigadier-General FRANKLIN. WM. H. BOYD, Captain Company C, Lincoln Cavalry. AUGUST 23, 1861.-Engagement between Confederate Batteries at mouth of Potomac Creek, Virginia, and U. S. Steamers Yankee and Release. Report of Colonel R. M. Cary, Thirtieth Virginia Infantry. HEADQUARTERS, MARLBOROUGH POINT, August 23, 1861. COLONEL: I have the honor to report that this afternoon at about 4.30 o'clock the enemy's steamer Yankee and a tug were seen standing the mouth of Potomac Creek. I ordered down to the point the siege rifled gun (Betty Holmes) and a section (rifle) of Walker's battery. The enemy fired the first shot, not aimed at this point, however. Smith's battery replied. As soon as our field pieces opened the U. S. steamer Release (ice-boat) stood in and engaged us. The officers in charge of the pieces and the men behaved with proper coolness and deliberation. They were Lieutenants Hagerty, Pegram, and Dabney. The enemy's fire was very accurate, frequently bursting his shell in close proximity to our pieces. It is believed that both the Yankee and the Release were hit; the former more than once. No one was hurt on our side. The action lasted about forty minutes, during which we fired some twenty-five shot and shell; the enemy as many more. Capt. R. L. Walker was present, in immediate command of all the pieces. I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant, D. H. MAURY, Asst. Adjt. Gen., Dep't of Fredericksburg, Brooke's. AUGUST 25, 1881.-Skirmish near Piggot's Mill, West Virginia. Report of Brig. Gen. Henry A. Wise, C. S. Army. HEADQUARTERS WISE'S LEGION, August 27, 1861. SIR: On Saturday, as I informed you, I in person reconnoitered and found the enemy, and stationed guards on the turnpike, in advance of the Saturday road, at Tyree's, perfectly covering that and other roads. I left that point, near Westlake's, about 4 o'clock, with my men well posted. It seems that after I left (and certainly unknown to me, without the least notice to my command) a corps of your cavalry, about 175 strong, came down the Saturday road and advanced on the turnpike, under the command of Acting Colonel Jenkins, aided by Major Reynolds. They relieved my guard, who had scouted and were well acquainted with the ground. This was done by Colonel Jenkins, without notice to me or Colonel Davis, in command of the cavalry, or to Captain Brock, in command of the company. The result of this unexpected accession of force from your camp is known. The men not having sufficiently scouted the ground, and being badly supplied with ammunition, were ambuscaded and routed, with loss and a demoralizing flight. I met men with their subordinate officers flying at 5 miles distance from the enemy, and so panic-struck, that even there they could not be rallied or led back to look after the dead and wounded. Colonel Jenkins and Major Reynolds, on the spot of the ambuscade, tried bravely to rally them, but it was in vain. Eighteen of my cavalry, who were picketed in view of the scene, on a neighboring hill (Brock's troop), rushed to the rescue, and lost 1 killed and 5 wounded. Colonel Jenkins was hurt by the fall of his horse, and is here still, somewhat disabled. Major Reynolds, though in my camp, made no report to me, and has left with his command. His men and officers, whom I met flying, utterly failed to obey my orders, delivered in person, under the threat of the pistol, and did not return, from sheer cowardice, to the scene from which the enemy had rapidly retired. The appearance of this force on my outposts was the more unexpected, inasmuch as you had ordered me to send you 100 cavalry, which I did. And now I beg leave, most respectfully, to protest that nothing but disaster can follow such interference with my immediate command, without notice, and with orders from you to me which led me to expect the very contrary of what has occurred. I deplore the disaster which has occurred, but am not in the least responsible for it. I beg that in future you will notify me of any movement under your orders on the lines you have left me to defend. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, HENRY A. WISE, Brigadier-General FLOYD, Commanding, &c. Brigadier-General. P. S.-My camp is severely disabled by measles, and I send you a copy of a report, by Colonel Richardson, of the reduced condition of his regiment, the best under my command. I also send to you a copy of a report, made to me by Colonel Henningsen, showing the necessity of keeping my whole force for the present in position on this turnpike, and of watching the advance of the enemy on the Chestnutburg road. I respectfully submit whether I shall move a regiment to Carnifix Ferry. I will await your further orders, feeling, as I do, the necessity of keeping all my remaining force here. HENRY A. WISE, Brigadier-General. [Inclosures.] HDQRS. FIRST REGIMENT INFANTRY, WISE'S BRIGADE, GENERAL: I have the honor to report that the remnant of my command will be ready to move to-morrow morning by 9 o'clock. I regret that I have to offer an excuse for my regiment, but really think that it is not advisable to send it off crippled as it is. If it should be called into action in its present condition the result might not prove satisfactory, and I feel that I should be censurable if I did not report these facts. I wish the command to do itself credit, and do not doubt that it will do so under any circumstances, but think it best just to give it a trial at first in its original strength. I beg leave herewith to submit the actual strength of my regiment, as per report of the company commanders: Company A, 39; Company B, 47; Company C, 29; Company D, 41; Company E, 19; Company F, 47; Company G, 30; Company H, 39; Company I, 41; Company K, 39, amounting in the aggregate to 371 effective men, a little upwards of one-third of the whole command, the measles daily reducing the ranks at the rate of at least 25 a day. According to the report of the surgeon of the regiment, it is owing to exposure and fatigue incident to rapid and forced marches. I have presented these facts as a matter of duty, and offer them for your consideration. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, J. H. RICHARDSON, Lieut. Col. Forty-sixth Reg't, P. A. C. S., Comdg. First Inf., W. B. Brig. Gen. II. A. WISE. CAMP AT DOGWOOD GAP, VA., GENERAL: In your dispatch of this morning you order me to maintain my position at Dogwood Gap, as the best to cover the turnpike, and as the best from which to move to the support of General Floyd. You warn me at the same time that this position is threatened from the New River, and you conclude by saying: Thus you have to guard the turnpike. Be ready to move with all your force to Carnifix Ferry, and to take commanding position against the enemy in the opposite direction. You add : This raises the question, "Have you more than force enough to do any one of these essential services?" In reply, I beg leave to state that the strength of the three regiments of infantry and of the artillery comprised in my command at Dogwood Camp is this morning reported at 1,386 privates and non-commissioned officers present and fit for duty. Colonel Davis, commanding the cavalry, who, as you are aware, does not report to me, told me yesterday that the horses were so worn with scouting, and had suffered so much from want of shoes, that he had only 50 efficient cavalry. Of these, 5 were killed and wounded yesterday endeavoring to aid Colonel Jenkins in his unfortunate skirmish. Less than 1,440 men, with five guns, is, therefore, as far as I am aware, the total force here present at your disposal. Undivided, by the aid of artillery used in positions where artillery is available, and with the assistance of position, this force is sufficient, by the exercise of great vigilance, to effect one, and probably two, of the objects you specify, and partially to cover them all. I mean that of guarding the turnpike road and preventing the enemy from getting on our rear by crossing the New River. This, in my opinion, can only be securely done by occupying Dogwood Gap. If driven thence, or compelled to abandon this position, all the other objects you specify might, and probably would, be frustrated; that is to say, the defense of the Lewisburg road, the safety of your command, and your ability to succor General Floyd or cover his rear in case of reverse to his arms, or even otherwise, would be jeopardized. I learned from you to-day that by reliable accounts the enemy had about 1,000 men at Gauley Bridge; 1,000 up the turnpike; 700 at the Hawk's Nest, and 500 at Cotton Hill. This information has since been confirmed to me, with the addition that the force at Cotton Hill is 1,000 men. The enemy, I am satisfied, is perfectly cognizant of our strength, or rather weakness, and immediately informed of all our movements. The moment we abandon Dogwood Gap, or leave it in a defenseless condition, even if he had received no further re-enforcements, he may, and doubtless would, advance along the turnpike and occupy or force the gap and hold it. In this case our communication, if we moved to Carnifix Ferry, or that of such portion of our force as moved thither, and also the communication of General Floyd with the turnpike, would be cut off, and the Legion, or a portion of it, starved into dispersion, while the remainder would become abortively weak. On the contrary, by holding Dogwood Gap, which with the present force may be successfully defended even if attacked in front and rear (considering that an attack from the rear could not be carried on for more than two or three days, even if General Floyd's column was cut off from the ferry), the Legion would be strengthened every day. In the first place, reconnoitering and slight intrenchments will so strengthen the position as to require less force for secure defense. In the next few days rest for men and horses will much increase the efficiency of the now exhausted force, to say nothing of its augmentation by re-enforcements under way and of sick returning to their companies and collecting already on the road. |