the Potomac. If indeed, mine be less than yours, it can only be so because the South, the West, and the East, presenting like cause for solicitude, have in the same manner demanded my care. Our correspondence must have assured you that I fully concur in your view of the necessity for unity in command, and I hope, by a statement of the case, to convince you that there has been no purpose to divide your authority by transferring the troops specified in Order No. 206 [of 5th instant] from the center to the left of your department.

The active campaign in the Greenbrier region was considered as closed for the season. There is reason to believe that the enemy is moving a portion of his forces from that mountain region towards the valley of Virginia, and that he has sent troops and munitions from the east, by the way of the Potomac Canal, towards the same point. The failure to destroy his communications by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and by the Potomac Canal has left him in possession of great advantages for that operation.

General Jackson, for reasons known to you, was selected to command the Division of the Valley, but we had only the militia and one mounted regiment within the district assigned to him. The recent activity of the enemy, the capture of Romney, &c., required that he should have for prompt service a body of Confederate troops to co-operate with the militia of the district. You suggest that such force should be drawn from the army on the Greenbrier. This was originally considered and abandoned, because they could not probably reach him in time to anticipate the enemy's concentration, and also because General Jackson was a stranger to them, and time was wanting for the growth of that confidence between the commander and his troops the value of which need not be urged upon you. We could have sent to him from this place an equal number of regiments (being about double the numerical strength of those specified in the order referred to), but they were parts of a brigade now in the Army of the Potomac, or were Southern troops, or were ignorant of the country in which they were to serve, and all of them unknown to General Jackson. The troops sent were his old brigade; had served in the valley, and had acquired a reputation which would give confidence to the people of that region, upon whom the general had to rely for his future success. Though the troops sent to you are, as you say, "raw," they have many able officers, and will, I doubt not, be found reliable in the hour of danger; their greater numbers will to you, I hope, more than compensate for the experience of those transferred; while in the valley the latter, by the moral effect their presence will produce, will more than compensate for the inferiority of their num bers. I have labored to increase the Army of the Potomac, and, so far from proposing a reduction of it, did not intend to rest content with an exchange of equivalents. In addition to the troops recently sent to you, I expected soon to send further re-enforcements by withdrawing a part of the army from the Greenbrier Mountains. I have looked hopefully forward to the time when our army could assume the offensive and select the time and place where battles were to be fought, so that ours should be alternations of activity and repose; theirs, the heavy task of constant watching.

When I last visited your headquarters my surprise was expressed at the little increase of your effective force above that of July 21 last, notwithstanding the heavy re-enforcements which had in the mean time been sent to you. Since that visit I have frequently heard of the improved health of the troops; of the return of many who had been absent sick, and some increase has been made by re-enforcement. You can then

imagine my disappointment at the information you give, that on the day before the date of your letter the army at your position "was no stronger than on July 21." I can only repeat what was said to you in our conference at Fairfax Court-House, that we are restricted in our capacity to re-enforce by the want of arms. Troops to bear the few arms you have in store have been ordered forward. Your view of the magnitude of the calamity of defeat of the Army of the Potomac is entirely concurred in, and every advantage which is attainable should be seized to increase the power of your present force. I will do what I can to augment its numbers, but you must remember that our wants greatly exceed our resources. Banks' brigade, we learn, has left the position occupied when I last saw you. Sickles is said to be yet on the Lower Potomac, and, when your means will enable you to reach him, I still hope he may be crushed. I will show this reply to the Secretary of War, and hope there will be no misunderstanding between you in future. The success of the army requires harmonious co-operation.

Very respectfully, yours, &c.,

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY KANAWHA,
Camp Dickerson, November 10, 1861.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN, Secretary of War:

SIR: As this is a strictly private letter, I write with my own hand. It is now 2 o'clock p. m. I have labored until 2 in the public service, and have taken this afternoon to arrange my papers and make up my cash account. I find leisure while my clerks are at work, not requiring my immediate attention, to write you. This army is utterly demoralized, or, if this term is too strong, it is the most disquieted collection of men I have ever known massed together. They want to go back to some point to winter nearer to provisions for men and horses. I have opposed this, and do now oppose it, for the reason that we will have to conquer territory abandoned in the spring at full as great a sacrifice as it will cost to hold it this winter. The men of this army are dying, it is true, at a fearful rate, but raw men who do duty every other night would die anywhere. We are compelled to have strong pickets, as we are an inferior force in the immediate presence of a vastly superior one. The mutterings that precede a storm are so loud in the army that any one in the army could hear them in the dead hour of the night if not under the influence of some powerful narcotic. Now, sir, you must fully understand, in my position, as I feel and know it to be from the confidence reposed in me (even from the President down I am trusted), I have and do exercise on most occasions an energy that is startling to the sluggish multitude; but kindness, energy, and the performance of duties fail to satisfy an army who resolve upon a purpose which I oppose; and now, from being the most popular man in this army, I am now satisfied, from the requisitions made on me-some legitimate, but many to vex—that I ain now not acceptable to the army.

Yours, respectfully,

A. W. G. DAVIS.

P. S.-Inclosed I send you a topographical sketch, which has the merit of being exactly correct.

HEADQUARTERS, CENTREVILLE, November 11, 1861.

Brig. Gen. W. H. C. WHITING,

Commanding Troops near Dumfries:

MY DEAR GENERAL: I have sent both your letters on the subject of a new battery to the War Department with my concurrence. I look upon the case as hopeless, however; it is too late to make this additional preparation against any combined operation against Evansport. Remember that it took our War Department a month to make the mere removal of guns and a little ammunition to Evansport. If the attack you anticipate is to be made, it must be within that time. Is your position near enough to Evansport? Will not the distance, 3 or 4 miles, render it difficult for you to defend both with your force? Consider the whole question carefully before breaking ground. Would not the masked battery used on a former occasion-I mean the guns and gunners-make a useful diversion, should the proposed battery not be ready?

Captain Stevens has been very sick and I fear will not be strong enough for service for some days yet. He is our only engineer, you know. Before leaving us I shall wish him to plan such additions as may enable Fort Pickens to be independent of the army for a few days.

I am embarrassed on the subject of winter quarters. I made arrangements a month ago for the beginning of preparations, but was disappointed by the supposed contractor, who gave up the undertaking

* Not found.

without giving me notice. I suppose that, upon occasion, your troops could make themselves log huts in a few days. Here we can't find the logs where the huts will be wanted..

Very truly, yours,

J. E. JOHNSTON,

General.

We have just received a report from Stuart that our pickets at Fairfax Court-House have been driven in, and that a large force is gathered at Springfield, on the railroad, 7 miles beyond.

Maj. THOMAS G. RHETT,

HEADQUARTERS VALLEY DISTRICT,
Winchester, Va., November 12, 1861.

Assistant Adjutant-General, Hdqrs. Dept. of Western Virginia: MAJOR: The enemy at Romney are, from the most reliable information, near 6,000 strong, and are fortifying the town.

Before leaving Centreville I had a conversation with the general commanding the department respecting his ordering Lieut. Col. T. H. Williamson, Corps of Engineers, to this district, and he expressed a willingness to do so when Captain Stevens should recover his health. If Lieutenant-Colonel Williamson can, consistently with the interests of the public service, be ordered here, I respectfully request that it may be done at as early a period as practicable, as his services are much needed. Please send me all the intrenching tools that you can spare. The Chesapeake and Ohio Canal is so damaged by the late freshets as not to be boatable.

Your most obedient servant,

T. J. JACKSON, Major-General, Commanding Valley District.

HEADQUARTERS, Centreville, November 12, 1861. Brigadier-General WHITING:

MY DEAR GENERAL: I have received your note of this morning. The location you describe seems to me better than that of Evansport. To a question by telegraph General Cooper replied to-day that the guns you asked for should be sent without delay. This does not encourage me much as to time. In Richmond their ideas of promptitude are very different from ours. By the way, have you seen General Trimble's arrangements for land defense? If my ideas of the ground, given by a pencil sketch, are at all correct, they amount to nothing. A few of Dahlgren's boat howitzers would knock them to pieces from the hills in

rear.

I have very little apprehension of harm from the bombardment of a mere line like those batteries; nothing is necessary but shelter against the fragments of shells, which burst high. At the distance of 2 miles they cannot kill a man a day. I fear landing in force. It is, as you say, that which Holmes and yourself must look out for. I wish the heights in rear of the batteries were converted into an intrenched camp to enable a couple of regiments to hold out for several days. How is your position compared with the other in respect to defensibility on the land side? If you can prepare for the guns now, why not do it, if it can be done without danger of discovery by the enemy? We have had another

stampede to-day, caused by reports from Pohick again. Stuart made an expedition in that direction on Sunday, and this, I suppose, is retalia

tion..

You talk of huts for winter; it is rather a trying subject. I am afraid the Northern people are waiting to disturb us as soon as we have be come comfortable for the winter. This place is not fit for our winter residence on any account. If I had not been confident that we should have been attacked here before this time, the troops should have been established nearer to you, that material assistance might have been more promptly given. The difficulty of getting our supplies from Manassas is increasing fast; the roads becoming worse and worse fast. The amount of fortification here now is frightful; I fear that it will be harder to reconcile our troops to leaving them than it was to the falling back from Darkesville.

As to the removal of the guns from Evansport to your new position, you and General H. must determine it. I have no means of deciding between the relative merits of the two places. But strength on the land side I hold far more important than exemption from liability to bombardment. How is the comparison in regard to facility of succor I should suppose the upper position more within our reach than the other.

13th. Stuart reports from Lieutenant-Colonel Wickham, Sixth Virginia Cavalry, that the expedition of yesterday was of 1,500 infantry, a squadron and five field pieces, which went as far as Mrs. Violet's; a large part of the infantry going as far as Occoquan Creek, on Telegraph road, piloted by Joseph Stiles. Six hundred infantry went to Colchester, piloted by Jonathan Roberts. They are supposed to have bivouacked last night beyond Pohick.

Very truly, yours,

J. E. JOHNSTON.

CENTREVILLE, VA., November 13, 1861-10 p. m. Brig. Gen. W. H. C. WHITING, near Dumfries, Va.:

MY DEAR GENERAL: I believe you are nearly correct with regard to your conjecture as to the future movements of the enemy. Those balloon ascensions indicate either offensive or defensive movements, most probably the former. A few days more and we will have this place strong enough to detach a brigade to re-enforce you, i. e., in my opinion, for General J. must decide, and then we could be ready to march a large force to your relief, if you could hold out for one or two days with the assistance of Holmes, who ought to sacrifice, if necessary, some of his minor positions to save Evansport. Have Triplett's and Powhatan Hills been fortified, as had been determined upon; if not, why not? Those and Talbot Hill are the keys of that position; no time ought to be lost in fortifying them, even if it were only for infantry, for if the enemy takes them, how long would the batteries hold out? Not ten minutes! Can you not have it done at once if not already done? I think also the line of the Occoquan to be very important so long as the enemy does not land below it; but where have we the forces to occupy it? We have just lost one of our most important brigades (Jackson's), which has been sent to the valley of Virginia. It would have been worth its weight in gold with you at this moment.

I cannot approve of withdrawing Evans from Leesburg except for a battle. We cannot afford to lose that important point on our left flank so long as we hold this position.