us. disposable troops, I venture to assert that no more important object can be found for their employment. Superior numbers and the control of the river and possession of a great number of vessels, give the United States troops in Maryland opposite to Evansport great advantages over Should he (the enemy) establish himself on our shore in force, he will so intrench himself in a few hours as to make it impossible to dislodge him, and we shall soon have a fortified army on our right flank. The condition of the roads is now such from the rains, unusual at this season, that the troops here cannot move with such facility as to be able to guard this position and watch the Lower Occoquan and shore of the Potomac near its mouth. We have great difficulty in transporting our supplies from Manassas even. It is necessary, therefore, in order to prevent the apprehended landing of the enemy, that we should have as nearly as possible a sufficient number of troops to repel the enemy on the Occoquan or the bank of the Potomac. It would be impossible to march from this position in time to aid Brigadier-General Whiting after learning the enemy's designs, which could only be known after his movement should be commenced. Should the enemy establish a new base on the river below the Occoquan in the manner indicated above, it would be impossible to hold this position. The superiority of numbers against us makes it impracticable to divide this army. This position cannot be given up upon any conjecture of the enemy's designs. I therefore respectfully urge that any disposable troops you may have be ordered to this army for service under General Whiting. Should they be at Richmond, the Fredericksburg road would be most expeditious for a part of the force at least. The Adjutant-General informed me that 6,000 or 7,000 of General Loring's troops would be near Staunton about this time. They might serve here during the crisis, and afterwards perform the service for which they have been intended. This will be delivered to you by Lieutenant Lane, son of the late United States Senator from Oregon. Most respectfully, your obedient servant, J. E. JOHNSTON, General. P. S.-McC. regards the division of this army as his best chance of success. [Inclosures.] HEADQUARTERS TROOPS NEar Dumfries, Private Hanan, of Andrews' battery, has just returned from Maryland, where he has been since October 24. He reports very much the same as all others as to force and intention of the enemy. They will attack by the flotilla above and below, and attempt throwing a very large force across. He landed at Holland Point, and informs me that he learned above Occoquan that they were building a pontoon bridge to cross the Occoquan, and the reconnaissance the other day was to select a place for it. This is important. I have seen French. He pronounces the batteries untenable against fire from the opposite side and the fleets; in fact, expresses himself just as I did, you recollect, when I saw them. He is very much disgusted, and he goes in for my plan of changing to Cockpit. I have written to Richmond for permission. If they cross the Occoquan in heavy force I shall probably fight at the Neabsco crossing. You must look out on the right. We have tremendous odds against us, and if they cross the run we shall have a heavy fight. It is good that General T. has been relieved, though mighty hard on French. If the re-enforcements come, I will give him two regiments. I have to watch that Occoquan movement. My dear general, the position is difficult and anxious. What wouldn't I give if G. W. [Smith] was in command down here? As to the change to Cockpit, if it can be executed it will undoubtedly disconcert and delay the enemy. I only fear it may be too late. Where are all the engineer officers of the Army? Hadn't you better show this to Beauregard ? Very truly, yours, W. H. C. WHITING. HEADQUARTERS TROOPS NEAR DUMFRIES, DEAR GENERAL: I sent you yesterday some important intelligence, received from some of our men who have been over in Maryland. Perhaps owing to the swelling of the creeks it did not reach you. The chief point was the certain information that the enemy are preparing a pontoon bridge to cross the Occoquan. They will cross near the town of Occoquan, and I think land at the same time at Deep Hole, where they can put across a very large force. I think you may depend on the grand attack being on our right this time, and we shall catch it here. You must look out for me. There is no time to be lost. The enemy are only waiting for their flotilla organization. The batteries, per se, as batteries, will not be tenable against a heavy fleet attack combined with the fire from the other side. They were never constructed so as to protect the guns from being dismounted. I telegraphed for authority to with. draw them and place them at Cockpit. The main question is whether it can now be done in time. If you are fortified up there, and believe as I do in the attack here in heavy force, let a brigade move at once toward Bacon Race. There ought to be a regiment of cavalry here to act, and certainly another battery. I have only Imboden and Hampton, and consequently nothing to act with my brigade, which is and will be the reserve troops, the artillery being posted at certain points for action. Heintzelman's division will I think cross the Occoquan, and Sickles will land in force at Deep Hole. The roads converge at Kankey's farm, on the Neabsco, where I expect Wigfall to meet and hold them in check while I fall on their flank. The Fredericksburg regiments have not arrived spoken of in your note. The sooner they come the better; but order, if you please, your commissariat and quartermas ter's department to be energetic. My train has the whole burden of the Texas brigade, which was sent here without transportation from Richmond, &c. Yours, truly, General JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON: WHITING. NOVEMBER 16, 1861. MY DEAR GENERAL: I believe in all that Whiting says. As to that new battery at Cockpit Point, I fear it is entirely too late. Either we must be prepared to fight them there with some force or withdraw our forces and guns within the line of the Upper Occoquan, and then, should they attempt to move along the Potomac, we must attack them in flank and rear. As to Colonel Anderson, he has received orders to work with his garrison on those new forts around Manassas. I advise you to send an express to Richmond with a copy of General Whiting's letter to the President, calling his attention to the fact that the intrenched camps and hills in rear of the Evansport batteries have never been constructed, notwithstanding your repeated instructions or advice on the subject. Yours, truly, Brigadier-General WHITING: G. T. BEAUREGARD. HEADQUARTERS, Centreville, November 16, 1861. DEAR GENERAL: A regiment left Richmond on the 14th for Fredericksburg, and another is to do so to-day and another to-morrow, all unarmed. I directed the quartermaster to send you for these new regiments, beginning with the Texans, twenty-four wagons, which will start to-day, should the Occoquan be fordable. They are to take 1,600 muskets (perhaps 1,800) and about 60 boxes of cartridges for the regi ments of the 14th and 16th-dates of leaving Richmond. All these new troops are unarmed, and as I said that two could be armed at Manassas, they send five to use the muskets-these people in Richmond. I requested General Holmes to procure permanent transportation for these troops about Fredericksburg, if possible; I shall therefore wait to hear from him before sending more wagons. When I hear of the last regiment, arms shall be sent for it, too, if they can be found. I have had a bridge over the Occoquan begun on the road from Dumfries to Manassas, and am asking for laborers to improve the road. I have desired General Holmes to have such field works as can now be made begun on the heights at Evansport. Will you advise in the case? No Staunton regiments are to join Wigfall. His brigade consists of the three Texan regiments belonging to your command. The three regiments to come, also to be under your command, are new, I suppose, being unarmed. Brigade them at your discretion. Colonel Walker is, I doubt not, a very competent officer. I knew him as an excellent captain. If the new regiments can serve where there are breastworks it will be well to so place them, by exchanges if necessary. I wish the dividing lines between the districts considered obliterated. Yours, truly, J. E. JOHNSTON. In arming these regiments don't include men not likely to be able to use their muskets soon, for we are to have more men than arms. HDQRS. SECOND CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Centreville, Va., November 16, 1861. Brig. Gen. W. H. C. WHITING, Commanding near Dumfries: DEAR WHITING: General Johnston desires me to write you in answer to your letters to him of yesterday and to-day. The position you propose to occupy on the Neabsco and general plan for resisting an advance of the enemy is considered the best that could be adopted. In regard to moving the batteries, he authorizes you to do whatever in your judgment may be best. The only question in his mind is the one suggested by you as to whether there is time. If only part of the guns can be moved, it would perhaps be well to do this; but this and all other points in regard to the disposition of the guns and batteries and their defense are placed under your control. The general expressly directs me to tell you to communicate this fact to General French. Copies of your letters above alluded to-with certain passages omitted-have been sent by special messenger to the President, with a view to having re-enforcements sent to you by railroad from Staunton or other available sources. A battery will be sent you from here immediately, and a brigade will be kept on the Occoquan in observation. The general suggests that Hampton's Legion, as far as practicable, watch and endeavor to delay and annoy the enemy at the passage of the Occoquan; and above all get definite information in regard to their strength. If they come upon you in large numbers, approaching, say, half of their effective force for field operations, the whole of this army would probably be thrown against them, with a determination to crush them; but if their attack upon you should prove to be only a strong demonstration, or even a real attack with numbers only a little superior to your own, it would not be well further to divide this army. It is believed here upon the best evidence that McClellan bases his only hope of success in "putting down the rebellion" upon dividing and materially diminishing the strength of this army. The loss of Jackson's brigade was a great disadvantage to us, and was but the beginning of what McClellan is trying to accomplish. I think it will go no further; but that if he ventures from his fortifications on the bank of the Potomac he will have to fight us united. Keep us well advised. A bright eye, clear head, and resolute hand will beat them in spite of their numbers, organization, and equipment. We will do everything we can towards getting information of their movements in your direction from Alexandria, and give you the earliest possible advices. Major Martin, of the Mississippi squadron of cavalry, attacked a party of 50 men, the escort of a foraging train, about 13 miles this side of Upton's Hill, this afternoon, killed 4, wounded as many, and took 31 prisoners, among them a captain and lieutenant. He got five wagonsall they had-loaded with corn. On our side "nobody hurt." With best wishes for your complete success over the invaders, I am, as ever, your friend, G. W. SMITH, Major-General, Commanding. RICHMOND, November 16, 1861. General HOLMES, Brooke's Station, Va.: General Whiting has been authorized by telegraph to exercise his discretion. So inform him. S. COOPER, Adjutant and Inspector General. EVANSPORT, November 16, 1861. General JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON, Army of the Potomac: DEAR GENERAL: I leave for Richmond to-day and hope to be able to rejoin the Army of Potomac under you soon. One word about Evansport batteries: We have each of these batteries nearly inclosed by separate infantry defenses, and the entire shore is picketed off to effectually prevent a surprise by night. This I have deemed very important, and the inclosure of batteries preliminary to the intrenched camp. On this last point I have changed my opinion, as I think you and General Beauregard would yours if here. Powhatan Hill and Triplett's are too far from the batteries to protect them by infantry, and we have no heavy guns to put into such a camp; besides this, the enemy can only reach these hills (unless on our shore front) by landing above Quantico and Chopawamsic Creeks and marching 5 miles to the head of those creeks and 5 miles down into this peninsula, opposed all the way by our forces, in a country where scarcely more than a platoon can fight in front. This the enemy doubtless knows, and will never attempt. I have therefore abandoned the intrenched camp on the hills, and propose one down on the river plain to inclose the two upper batteries. This has been laid off but not begun, giving place, as I have remarked, to the pickets on the shore and the closing of the gorge of each battery. I have suggested to General French its rapid comple tion. But, general, we have too few guns here to resist a combined attack from three or more heavy ships and the batteries on the other side, and we should have more guns, either to put on the hills, or (which I prefer) to plant batteries on Cockpit Point Bluff above us, and thus elude the batteries opposite this point, extending our line of defense farther along the river. The guns, I think, can yet be got up on the George Page at night, if they are ready for use. I shall urge this to General Holmes and also in Richmond. What you have now to meet is a severe bombardment from the other side, combined with heavy ships from above and below our batteries. I do not think the enemy will attempt to land before this, but I believe he will at the same time the attack is made march down on the Occoquan, attempt to cross, and fall on our forces at Dumfries. With the belief you will again defeat the enemy, I am, truly, yours, I. R. TRIMBLE. P. S.-Ask General Beauregard if the intended camp was done, or why not; please give him my views. We have not the men or tools to do more than we have done; our heavy night pickets and large fatigue working parties have made the duty very severe on the command. You or General Beauregard or General Smith should come down here and take a look. It is to be the center of the next contest. General S. COOPER: CENTREVILLE, November 16, 1861. Please send several naval officers to serve under Captain Sterrett, at the navy batteries at Manassas, as soon as practicable. GENERAL ORDERS, J. E. JOHNSTON. ADJT. AND INSP. GEN.'S OFFICE, Paragraph 3 of General Orders, No. 15 [October 22], current series, is hereby modified, and the several divisions and brigades therein will be arranged as follows, to wit: First Division, under Major-General Van Dorn : First Brigade, Brigadier-General Whiting, to consist of five Mississippi regiments. |