1. A more particular provision will prevail over a more general one." 2. When a general intention is expressed, and also a particular intention which is incompatible with the general one, the particular intention shall be considered an exception to the general one.1o 10 3. Where two or more provisions contained in the same statute are directly in conflict with one another, and cannot be brought into harmony by any rule of construction, one or the other of the two following principles must be applied in the construction of said statute: (a) The provision latest in position will prevail; or (b) the contradictory provisions cancel each other, and both are void.12 11 SECTION 10. GRAMMATICAL INTERPRETATION. In the interpretation of laws grammar is always to be used as a servant and never as a master. While primarily a statute is to be interpreted according to the ordinary rules of a grammatical construction, this rule will never be applied, where its evident effect will be to defeat the manifest intention of the Legislature. "The grammatical construction of a statute is one mode of interpretation. But it is not the only mode, and it is not always the true mode. We may assume that the draftsman of an act understood the rules of grammar, but it is not always safe to do so. 13 The editor of the statutes of one of the largest western states was accustomed, for many years, to place at the head of certain chapters of the statutes, a note to the effect that he desired all readers to understand that the grammar and spelling used was that of the Legislature, and not his own work. In the case of such statutes, as the ones referred to, grammatical rules must be left out of consideration in attempting to construe the statute, and the real intention of the Legislature sought by whatever means are available. It is, of course, desirable that the laws of our nation and states should be written in clear and correct English, but, nevertheless, statutes are intended as rules of action and not as exercises in composition, and while grammatical rules may, and often do, assist in determining the intentions of the lawmaker, such rules cannot be set up for the purpose of defeating such intention. "Awkward, slovenly, or ungrammatical phrases and sentences may yet convey a definite meaning; and if they do, the courts must accept it as the meaning of the law-makers."'14 SECTION 11. CORRECTION OF ERRORS. Not only will grammatical errors, or inapt or inaccurate language 15 not be allowed to defeat the operation of a law, if such a result can be avoided, but under proper circumstances, the courts will also correct clerical errors or misprints.16 Such corrections will only be made when the error would destroy the effect of the statute, and the intention of the legislative body can be clearly made out. 14 Black on Interpretation of Laws, N. 72, citing Kelly's Heirs vs. McGuire, 15 Ark., 555; Murray vs. State, 21 Tex. App., 620; Lane vs. Schomp, 20 N. J. 15 State vs. King, 44 Mo., 283. CHAPTER III. PRESUMPTIONS. SECTION 12. PRESUMPTIONS IN GENERAL. The term "presumption," in its legal significance, is used to designate an inference, affirmative or disaffirmative, of the existence of some fact, which courts or juries shall or may draw from the proof of other facts, and is the probable inference, which common sense, enlightened by human knowledge and experience, draws from the connection, relation, and coincidence of facts and circumstances with each other.1 "The ground of all presumption is the necessary or usual connection between facts and circumstances, the knowledge of which connection results from experience and reflection." 2 Presumptions play an important role in all branches of the law, and the definition of presumptions above given is a general one, applicable to all places where presumptions are employed. Presumptions in the interpretation and construction of statutes are of the same general species as those used elsewhere. By the experience of the courts, it has been found that the intention of the legislative body will, in the long run, be most nearly reached by the adoption and use of certain presumptions, which are accordingly made use of wherever applicable, in the case of doubtful statutes. The more important of these presumptions will be taken up in the next four sections. 1 22 American and Eng. Ency. of Law, 1233. Vol. II-19. 289 Chesley vs. Brown, 11 Maine, 143. SECTION 13. MOST IMPORTANT PRESUMPTION-PRESUMPTION AGAINST UNNECESSARY CHANGE OF LAW. The most important of all the presumptions which the courts will resort to to aid in the interpretation and construction of statutes is the one against any unnecessary change of laws. This presumption is closely connected with the principle that all laws are to be harmonized if possible. When a new statute has been passed the courts will, if possible, harmonize it with the existing body of the law, both statutory and common law, and consider the new statute as creating additional law, rather than as repealing any of that already existing. Only in cases of necessity will the new law be held, by implication, to have repealed the old, and then only to as limited an extent as possible. SECTION 14. PRESUMPTION AGAINST UNCONSTITU TIONALITY. There always is a strong presumption in favor of the constitutionality of any act passed by Congress, or by a State Legislature. This presumption is in no wise a restriction upon the clearly admitted power of the courts to declare legislative acts inconsistent with the Constitution void, but means that when a statute, or a portion of one, is capable of two constructions, under one of which it will be in harmony with the Constitution and under the other of which it will be in violation thereof, that construction will be adopted which will render the act constitutional, rather than the construction which will render it unconstitutional and void. The Supreme Court of the United States has said on this point: "No court ought, unless the terms of an act rendered it unavoidable, to give a con'Parsons vs. Bedford, 3 Peters, 433, 448. 3 |