the rule for determining whether an act of Congress could be supported as an exercise of implied power the statement laid down by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch vs. The State of Maryland; "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the spirit and letter of the Constitution, are Constitutional." Chief Justice Chase then proceeded to argue for a distinction between those acts which were "appropriate" for carrying a granted power into execution and those which might in some slight degree promote an end within the scope of a general power. To include the latter within the implied powers of Congress would, he argued, be dangerous. Following is an extract from this decision: "Let us inquire, then, first, whether making bills of credit a legal tender to the extent indicated is consistent with the spirit of the Constitution. Among the great cardinal principles of that instrument, no one is more conspicuous or more venerable then the establishment of Justice. And what was intended by the establishment of Justice, in the minds of the people who ordained it, is happily not a matter of disputation. It is not left to interference nor conjecture, especially in its relations to contracts." It is then argued, that although there is no express prohibition to the United States as there is to the States against passing laws impairing the obligations of contracts, still by the general force and tenor of the Constitution they are prohibited from passing any such laws, except such as only impair them incidentally. The Legal Tender Act is held to impair the obligation of contracts and also to be in violation of the fifth amendment which provides that, "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." Mr. Justice Miller delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Swayne and Davis concurred. At the time of the argument and decision in Hepburn vs. Griswold, there were two vacancies in the Supreme Court. These two vacancies were filled upon the 7th of February, 1870, the same day upon which the decision of the Court in Hepburn vs. Griswold was rendered. This same question as to the Constitutionality of the Legal Tender Acts came up again before the Supreme Court, with its increased membership, the following year in the cases of Knox vs. Lee and Parker vs. Davis. 45 The result in these cases was a reversal of the decision in Hepburn vs. Griswold" and a decision in favor of the Constitutionality of the Legal Tender Acts; such decision being based mainly on the ground of expediency and public necessity, and upheld as a proper and necessary war measure. In Juilliard vs. Greenman" the right of Congress to make paper currency a legal tender was again upheld. The decision in this case is, however, much more decided and is placed on much broader grounds, and there is no attempt to excuse the exercise of this power as a war measure or on the ground of expediency; the right is asserted to rest in Congress positively and at all times. The concluding paragraphs in this decision are as follows: "Congress, as the legislature of a sovereign nation, being expressly empowered by the Constitution to 'lay and collect taxes, to pay the debts and provide for "110 U. S., 421; decided in 1884 45 12 Wallace, 457. 46 8 Wallace, 603. the common defence and general welfare of the United States,' and to 'borrow money on the credit of the United States' and to 'coin money and regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin' and being clearly authorized as incidental to the exercise of these great powers, to emit bills of credit, to charter national banks, and to provide a national currency for the whole people, in the form of coin, treasury notes, and national bank bills; and the power to make notes of the government a legal tender in payment of private debts being one of the powers belonging to the sovereignty in other civilized countries, and not expressly withheld from Congress by the Constitution; we are irresistibly impelled to the conclusion that the impressing upon the treasury notes of the United States, the quality of being a legal tender, in payment of private debts is an appropriate means, conductive and plainly adapted to the execution of the undoubted powers of Congress, consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, and, therefore, within the meaning of that instrument necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States." "Such being our conclusion in matter of law, the question whether at any particular time, in war or in peace, the exigency is such, by reason of unusual and pressing demands on the resources of the government, or of the inadequacy of the supply of gold and silver coined to furnish the currency needed for the use of the government and of the people, that it is, as a matter of fact, wise and expedient to resort to this means is a political question, to be determined by Congress when the question of exigency arises, and not a judicial question, to be afterwards passed upon by the Courts. To quote once more, from the judgment in McCulloch vs. Maryland: 'Where the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any one of the objects intrusted to the government, to undertake here, to inquire into, the degree of its necessity would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department, and to thread on legislative ground', 4 Wheat., 423. "It follows that the Act of May 31st, 1878, c 146, is constitutional and valid; and that the Circuit Court rightly held that a tender in treasury notes reissued and kept in circulation, under that Act, was a tender of lawful money in payment of the defendant's debts to the plaintiff." SECTION 33. REGULATION OF COMMERCE. (The Congress shall have power)—"To regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." The regulation of Commerce is made the subject of Chapter VII of this work. (The Congress shall have power)-"To establish a uniform rule of naturalization throughout the United States." Naturalization is the conferring upon an alien of all the rights of citizenship upon his foreswearing his allegiance to his former country, and assuming all the duties and responsibilities incident to the new citizenship. Naturalization is a recent institution. Under the English Common Law no foreigner could attain to the full rights of an English citizen; a foreigner could be made a denizen, which gave him certain qualified rights of citizenship, only by special Act of Parliament.48 The difficulties put in the way of the natur"Blackstone, Book I, page 374; Book II, pages 249, 293. alization of a new citizen by the colonies, by George III, was one of the grievances complained of in the Declaration of Independence. "That the power of naturalization is exclusively in Congress does not seem to be, and certainly ought not to be controverted," and it would seem to be hardly consistent with this provision, to allow any one State, after the adoption of the Constitution, to exercise a power which, if it operated at all, must operate beyond the territory of the State and compel other States to acknowledge as citizens those whom it might not be willing to receive." 50 A State may confer privileges upon a person not a citizen of the United States, without making him a citizen of the United States, or giving him any privileges outside of the State itself; a State has no power by any law or regulation to confer upon anyone citizenship of the United States.51 A State, however, can confer upon a person not a citizen of the United States the right to vote in such State; there being a distinction between citizenship and the right to vote even for members of Congress or Presidential Electors, and the rights are not inseparable."2 An alien duly naturalized under the rules of the United States can become a citizen of any State in which he may choose to acquire a domicile.59 A naturalized citizen becomes entitled to all the privileges of a natural born citizen; the Constitution does not authorize Congress to enlarge or abridge those rights." Members of the Indian tribes can be naturalized by Act of Congress.55 49 J. C. D. Chiroc vs. The Lessee of A. P. Chiroc et al., 2 Wheaton, 259. 50 License Cases, 5 Howard, 504. Scott vs. Sanford, 19 Howard, 393. Lang vs. Randall, 4 Dill, 425. "Scott vs. Sanford, 19 Howard, 393. |