History of the Appointing Power of the PresidentG. P. Putnam's sons, 1886 - 129 pages |
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History of the Appointing Power of the President (1886) Lucy Maynard Salmon No preview available - 2008 |
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10th Congress 2d sess administration amendment Andrew Johnson Anti-Federalists appointing power April bill Boston cabinet candidate cause civil service clerks Collector Cong Constitution consular corruption Council of Appointment debate December December 30 Democrats desire dismissed duties election evil executive patronage favor Federalists filled friends Gales and Seaton give given Globe Hildreth House impeachment inaugural influence introduced J. Q. Adams Jackson Jefferson Jenckes John Adams John Quincy Adams large number legislative letter Madison March members of Congress Memoirs ment Minister Monroe never Niles nomination number of offices opposition ous letters partisan party person political assessments position Postmaster-General postmasters power of removal President Tyler President's principle proscription public officers question reasons regard Republican resignations Resolution asking revenue rotation in office says Schouler Secretary secure Senate session speech spoils system subordinate officers term tion Treasury urged vacancies viii vote Washington Webster Whig xxii xxxvi York
Popular passages
Page 55 - The recent demonstration of public sentiment inscribes on the list of executive duties, in characters too legible to be overlooked, the task of reform, which will require particularly the correction of those abuses that have brought the patronage of the federal government into conflict with the freedom of elections...
Page 45 - The chief magistrate of a great and powerful nation should never indulge in party feelings. His conduct should be liberal and disinterested, always bearing in mind that he acts for the whole and not a part of the community.
Page 68 - Jefferson, forbidding their interference in elections further than giving their own votes; and their own independence secured by an assurance of perfect immunity in exercising this sacred privilege of freemen under the dictates of their own unbiased judgments. Never, with my consent, shall an officer of the people, compensated for his services out of their pockets, become the pliant instrument of Executive will.
Page 40 - The Judges of the Supreme and all other Courts of the United States shall be removed by the President, on the joint address of both Houses of Congress, requesting the same, anything in the Constitution of the United States to the contrary notwithstanding.
Page 97 - My own public life has been a very brief and insignificant one, extending little beyond the duration of a single term of senatorial office ; but in that brief period I have seen five judges of a high court of the United States driven from office by threats of impeachment for corruption or maladministration. I have heard the taunt, from friendliest lips, that when the United States presented herself in the East to take part with the civilized world in generous competition in the arts of life, the...
Page 36 - I can say with truth, that one act of Mr. Adams's life, and one only, ever gave me a moment's personal displeasure. I did consider his last appointments to office as personally unkind. They were from among my most ardent political enemies...
Page 42 - Mr. Marbury, then, since his commission was signed by the president, and sealed by the secretary of state, was appointed; and as the law creating the office, gave the officer a right to hold for five years, independent of the executive, the appointment was not revocable, but vested in the officer legal rights, which are protected by the laws of his country. To withhold his commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the court not warranted by law, but violative of a vested legal right.
Page 42 - When a person appointed to any office refuses to accept that office the successor is nominated in the place of the person who has declined to accept, and not in the place of the person who had been previously in office, and had created the original vacancy.
Page 26 - I shall not, whilst I have the honor to administer the government, bring a man into any office of consequence knowingly, whose political tenets are adverse to the measures, which the general government are pursuing ; for this, in my opinion, would be a sort of political suicide.