called upon to convince in turn varying groups of elective officials and appointive ones as well? Should every presumption be against change and in favor of the status quo? Should the common business of all of us be conducted on the principle of inaction, and the private business of each of us be granted a liberty of action close to license? For the principle underlying American industrial life is freedom,-the greatest possible freedom to organize, to act, to play, not only with property but with the destinies of the community as well.

I believe there are axioms of politics as fundamental as those of taxation, as fundamental as those of private business. Among those axioms I should include the following:

1. Politics should be simple and easily understood by all. Issues should be free from confusion. There should be a direct line of vision between the voter and the end desired and a means for the immediate execution of the common will, once it is declared at the polls.

2. The relation of the voter to the government should be as direct as possible. There should be the fewest possible intermediaries, such as electoral colleges, delegates, conventions, and caucuses between the citizen and his servant.

3. Government should be responsive on the one hand and responsible on the other, not to the past, not to political parties, not to interests, but to people.

4. The machinery of legislation and administration should be equally simple, direct and final in its action. Once the public will express itself, it should be registered into law.

Principles to be Considered in Framing New York Constitution

Reducing these political axioms to the subject in hand, that is, the constitution and public opinion, I should suggest:

First, the constitution should be as short as possible, following the model of the federal constitution, which is little more than an enumeration of the powers of the various branches of the government, to which was added the bill of rights. State constitutions departed from this model. They have been enlarged to indefensible lengths, and by reason of their enlargement and the inclusion of many legislative provisions, the under

lying idea of a constitution as a framework of government has been lost sight of.

Constitution an Evolving Instrument

Second, the constitution should be an evolving instrument, not an inflexible, finished thing, complete in all its details for a generation, or as in the states of Kentucky, Indiana, Rhode Island and Connecticut, practically unchangeable for all time.

The constitution should reflect changing social conditions. and changing needs. It should mirror the seasoned convictions of the nation, rather than lag many years behind them. It should have more permanence than a legislative act, and amendments should be approved by the people. But it should not be necessary for two successive legislatures to approve of a resolution permitting an amendment to be voted upon, and the majority within the legislature for submission ought not to be prohibitive. It should provide that a two-thirds majority of any general assembly or a mere majority of two successive assemblies may submit an amending resolution. Further than this, provision should be made for amendment by the direct action of the people themselves, acting through petitions submitted for this purpose. If five or eight per cent of the electors of a state like New York are sufficiently exercised over a condition to go to the trouble and expense of preparing petitions, then their petition should be given a hearing by being placed upon the ballot, the same as a resolution regularly submitted by the legislature; and if a majority of those voting upon the proposal favor it, it should become part of the organic law of the state. This is the very essence of the right of petition, sanctioned in every constitution, for the right of petition is empty unless it can be made effective. It is also of the essence of responsive and responsible government, as well as of the idea of an evolving, changing constitution, reflecting the seasoned opinions of the community. It is unfair to a people to require it to accept for a generation's time the deliberations of a group of representatives, whose opinions can be known only after they have deliberated, without power to escape from their opinions by any action which the people themselves may take. This is not representative government; it is government by chance.

Separate Submission of Debated Questions

Third, in keeping with the above suggestions, amendments to the constitution, involving radical departures like woman suffrage, prohibition, the initiative, referendum and recall, should be submitted as separate proposals for the discriminating action of the voter. Alterations in the fundamental laws such as these should not be incorporated into the body of the constitution when submitted but should at all times and under all circumstances be open to unincumbered action by the electorate. The Ohio constitution of 1912 contained many separate and detached amendments, placed before the people in separate columns, upon which the electors passed individual judgment. About one-half of these proposals were adopted, the other half were rejected, showing a more highly developed political intelligence than the electorate is generally assumed to possess.

Commission Government for State

Fourth, in keeping with the idea of simplicity and efficiency, the commission form of government should be substituted for that which now prevails. The legislature should consist of a single chamber of a relatively small size. A legislative body composed of one representative from each congressional district would be adequate for all purposes. It should be in continued session all the year, as is the Congress of the United States. Surely, if the needs of the smallest town require the attention of its council for twelve months in the year, the legislative body of a commonwealth of 10,000,000 people, more than three times the population of the United States when the constitution was adopted, requires the same continuous legislative service.

The commonest complaint of our assemblies is that they pass too many laws and too hasty legislation. Much of this is due to the size of the legislature. Each member feels that at least one measure must bear his name. As a consequence, state laws command little respect, and for the most part are entitled to no more respect than they receive. A small legislative body

in continuous session, acting with the informality of a city commission, would result in more mature deliberation, more intelligent action and a great decrease in the number of illadjusted laws which issue from our state legislatures, even when they are in session for but a few months in the year.

In addition, I should suggest that the governor should appoint the members of his cabinet, including the attorney-general, the secretary of state and the executive heads of other departments. The governor and each member of the cabinet should have a seat in the legislature, with the right to discuss all measures, but not to vote. This is a provision now found in many city charters; it has resulted in greater unity of action and increased municipal efficiency.

This is perhaps as near an approach as is possible to the British idea of responsible cabinet government. It should tend to bring into politics a more highly trained type of man, as well as greater unity in the administration of public affairs. In connection with this, I would entrust the governor with the appointment and easy removal of the directors of all executive departments, whose relations to the governor should be somewhat similar to those of the department heads in a great city.

Short Ballot

Fifth, the short ballot. The commission form of government would lead to the short ballot. It would reduce the

number of elective officials to the governor and the member of the state assembly. This would simplify elections and automatically make it possible to select a higher type of man than those who now go to the assembly. Further than this, it would lure better men into politics, for the opportunities of real service offered would prove attractive to the best-equipped men in the community.

In addition, I favor longer terms of office for the governor and the members of the assembly. I should suggest a term of four years, with the right of recall. By this means the official would always be responsible to his constituents, while a

continuing policy, covering a reasonable period of time, would be open to achievement by an administration.

Right of Judicial Review

Sixth, I have never believed that the federal constitution contemplated the power of judicial review of congressional or executive acts. The constitutional provisions seized on by the courts to justify their interposition are entirely inadequate to sanction such assumption. The recently adopted constitution of Ohio recognized this protest against judicial usurpation and provided that no act of the legislature should be held to be unconstitutional by the supreme court, except when such decision was concurred in by six out of seven members of the highest appellate tribunal.

Complete Municipal Autonomy

Seventh, complete home rule should be accorded municipalities. They should be permitted to prepare their own charters; to determine for themselves what activities they shall perform; what industries and activities they shall engage in; what salaries they shall pay, and what powers they shall exercise over persons and property within their midst, subject only to the constitutional safeguards. Municipalities should have the same freedom to experiment that a private corporation now enjoys; they should be permitted to decide for themselves as to the sources from which they shall collect their revenues and as to the way in which they shall spend them. The amount of their bonded indebtedness should be determined by the community itself, as well as the purposes for which such indebtedness is incurred. Cities should have the same autonomy now enjoyed by the state and the nation. Within their own sphere of action they should be sovereign, much as are the cities of Germany and some of the cities in our western states.

Such a devolution of power would relieve the legislature from the burden of considering local demands and would render it possible for the city itself to develop its own life and adjust its administration to local needs, as is not now possible when the financial limitations of a municipality are fixed and