And what are the objections to this closer association of executive and legislature? Like the objections to the short ballot they are rather elusive and not always rational when discovered. Governor Spry, of Utah, justified his opposition by saying:

I may be a reactionary. I plead guilty to being one. . . . I am simple enough to believe that those men were inspired when they wrote the Constitution of the United States. I believe that the Constitution was given to this Republic as an anchorage, and I pray God sincerely that the Republic may never go so far away from the Constitution as to be considered to be drifting from its moorings, because if it does we are liable to go out at sea and drift upon the rocks and go to pieces.

This is the kind of argument which was used in justifying the rotten boroughs of England. Strictly speaking, it is not argument at all. What then do the more or less rational opponents of executive leadership say? Nothing more damaging has been said than that the independence of executive and legislature would be endangered. Perhaps so; personally I view the danger with profound indifference. Separation of powers, though a time-honored theory of American government, is now worn pretty thin, especially in our cities; and theory never counted for much beside practical expediency among men of solid political sense. But there are people, apparently, who would rather see representative assemblies perish from the face of the earth than have their cherished doctrine for one moment under partial eclipse.

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PARTICIPATION OF THE EXECUTIVE IN LEGIS

LATION 1

T

OGDEN L. MILLS

Senator-elect from the Seventeenth District of New York

HE very serious problem which confronts us to-day is that of making our state governments more responsible, responsive and efficient, and so restoring them to that degree of public confidence which is absolutely essential to effective government. Aside from the increase of efficiency and responsibility which can be accomplished by diminution of the number of elective executive officers and the concentration of the appointing power in the hands of the governor, many people believe that a closer relationship between the executive and legislative branches will be highly beneficial. Much, of course, can be accomplished by the preparation and submission of administration bills along the lines suggested by Professor Sait, particularly the submission by the governor of an annual budget. The United States is the one civilized country to-day in which a scientific budget is unknown, and there is no question that much of the waste and extravagance which have invariably characterized our governments, both state and national, is due to this fact. The budget is nothing more nor less than an estimate of the cost of running the government for the ensuing year together with suggested methods of raising the necessary funds. Inasmuch as the executive department disburses the money, it is but fair to assume that the executive is in the best position to know the needs, while the legislature, which votes the money, can readily prevent extravagance by being permitted to cut and pare wherever, in its judgment, the appropriations demanded are excessive, but under no circumstances to increase such appropriations. Under the present system there is a tendency on the part of the legis

1 Discussion at the meeting of the Academy of Political Science, November 19, 1914.

lature to increase appropriations as reported from committee, not to cut them down, a tendency continually accelerated by the very natural desire on the part of each member to look after his own district.

I am one of those who would go a step further and establish a direct relationship between the executive and legislative branches by giving to the governor and his department heads seats in the legislature, with the right to take part in debate though not to vote. A system of checks and balances by the separation of the three great powers of government is an inherent part of our governmental structure, but we must not confuse separation and isolation. The former may or may not be wise; the latter is fatal, yet it is to the latter that we have been steadily and constantly tending. As Judge Story said in criticizing our present system:

The heads of the departments are in fact thus precluded from proposing or vindicating their own measures in the face of the nation in the course of debate and are compelled to submit them to other men who are either imperfectly acquainted with the measures or are indifferent to their success or failure. Thus that open and public responsibility for measures, which properly belongs to the executive in all governments, and especially in a republican government, as its greatest security and strength, is completely done away with. The executive is compelled to resort to secret and unseen influences, to private interviews and private arrangements to accomplish its own appropriate purposes, instead of proposing and sustaining its own duties and measures by a bold and manly appeal to the nation in the face of its representatives.

There is no question in my mind that the presence of the chief executive in the legislature would result in the passage of wise and beneficial legislation; for who is better qualified to foretell the effect of laws than those charged with their execution? Such participation would also furnish that coöperation and cohesiveness so necessary to the smooth running of any intricate and delicate machine.

Moreover, the governor and his cabinet should be under a duty to answer, upon due notice being given, all proper inter

pellations. In this way the legislature will most promptly, economically and effectively perform its function of critic, the object of investigations be at once attained without expense and delay, and any wrongdoing be given publicity through the legislature, which will thus perform functions now depending upon the newspapers as the result of our clumsy and inefficient legislative methods. This one benefit is in itself invaluable, as anyone who has studied the English system, or has been present in the House of Commons when "questions" are in order, will testify. Mr. Bryce says:

British ministers are obliged to tell Parliament everything that is being done in the course of our administration which it is not inconsistent with the public service to disclose. They must answer all questions put to them about what they are doing, and how they are doing it, and why they are doing it. It is good for them. Like other ministers, I have, when a member of the British cabinet, sometimes found the process tiresome. But I never doubted that it was a good thing for everybody concerned.

The great argument against this particular reform is that it would further diminish the power of an already declining legislature. To this view I take sharp exception. Far from weakening the legislature, it would, to my mind, prove invigorating. It is true, of course, that it is becoming increasingly hard to get our ablest men to become senators and assemblymen and that those positions are no longer looked upon with the same degree of honor as they were in the earlier days of the republic. This is due to a great extent to the fact that the legislature has been limited in power, and consequently has diminished in dignity, and in the second place to the fact that it no longer furnishes a real stepping stone to larger and more responsible positions in public life. The presence of the chief executive on the floor of either house would not only add dignity to its debates, but would serve the further purpose of attracting public attention to deliberations which are no longer held with the people as audience. It could not but have a stimulating influence on the members while offering an inducement to ambitious men to enter this branch of

the public service. The last is particularly true when you consider that under such a system a practice would almost inevitably grow up of choosing heads of departments from among the members of the legislature not only because of their familiarity with the machinery of government, but because of their skill in debate acquired while either supporting the administration or opposing it.

Thus might we not reasonably hope to see in a comparatively short space of time the able men of the state serving it in a legislative capacity, and preferring service at the state capital rather than service at Washington as the best means of advancement; our legislatures restored to public confidence and honor; and representative government saved from the attacks which now threaten its very existence?

EDGAR DAWSON

Professor of Political Science, Hunter College

My contribution to this discussion is some added emphasis on two facs: First, that all legislation must and will be the result of leadership; and second, that we must decide whether we want this leadership to be in the hands of a governor whom we elect or in the hands of a party boss with whose election we have nothing to do.

I use the word boss only because there is no other way of conveying my meaning, not because I attribute any undesirable characteristics to the person to whom I apply it. I have in mind the unofficial, somewhat inconspicuous person who really controls a party's councils and directs its policies. Everyone who knows anything of party organization knows that the party is closely organized and that discipline is rigid. There is no doubt in the minds of any of the party workers who is boss, who controls the action of the party. It is this head of the organization or machine to whom I refer when I use the unfortunate term boss.

When one analyzes it, the legislative process falls naturally, it seems, into three elements. These elements are the initiation, the drafting, and the ratification of laws.