sults of past management which carries a well-considered plan and financial program for the future; and it must be prepared and submitted to the legislature by someone who can be held responsible to the body politic for its proposals. The legislature cannot meet either of these requirements. The personnel of the legislature cannot report on the results of past management and be effective in the formulation of plans for future work because it is not in charge of the details of public business, and even if it could, its report and proposals could not serve the purpose of a budget. The underlying purpose of a budget is to force the executive to account for supplies previously granted, and to lay before the legislature and the country his plans before another grant is made. The only effective function that the legislature can perform is that of an agency of review and inquiry on the one hand, and of decision with respect to matters of policy on the other. When the legislature itself undertakes to formulate plans for the administration, the country is deprived of all the benefits of a budget. Even if the legislature were a small body, it would be in no better position to prepare and submit to itself or to the country a report and financial prospectus with recommendations than is a board of trustees of a private corporation which as a matter of business sense puts this responsibility on the chief executive. Recognizing the impracticability of such action on its part, the board of trustees requires the president of the corporation to submit at the annual meeting a statement of affairs and a definite program for the approval of the board as a guide for action.

Again, the personnel of the legislature cannot be held responsible to the electorate for the plan and proposals submitted. Each member represents a local or narrow interest. No member knows what is required to facilitate the business in hand. No member has before him the needs of the state as a whole. No member can be held to account for his acts to the state electorate as a whole, but even if he could, he is not in touch with the everyday needs of the government as they have developed in course of administration. It is in recognition of the local and restricted interest and contact of each

member of the legislature that a political party united by some expression of principle, rather than the individual, has become the instrument for enforcing responsibility in acting on budget proposals and other legislative matters.

The State "Board of Estimate" not Adapted to Budget

Making

In 1913 an act was passed establishing a state board of estimate.1 The primary purpose of this board was to make a budget. The board is made up of the governor, lieutenantgovernor, president pro tempore of the senate, chairman of the finance committee of the senate, speaker of the assembly, chairman of the ways and means committee of the assembly, controller, attorney-general, and commissioner of efficiency and economy-four members ex officio of the legislative branch and five members ex officio of the executive and administrative branch of the government.

The powers and duties of this board as defined by statute are as follows:

1. To keep minutes of meetings which shall be open to public inspection.

2. To prepare

propriated.

"estimates" of amounts required to be ap

3. To examine all requests for appropriations.

4. To hold such public hearings as may be advantageous. 5. To transmit its estimates to the legislature with such recommendations, reasons, and explanations as shall be deter

mined.

6. To prescribe forms for the preparation of departmental estimates.

7. To transmit the estimates of the department with its own estimates to the legislature.

8. To afford heads of departments a reasonable opportunity for explanation and hearing.

9. To make an estimate of all moneys required to be appropriated for the payment of interest and sinking funds.

An Act to Establish a State Board of Estimate.-Laws of 1913, ch. 281.

10. To make an estimate of the revenues of the state expected to be received during the next fiscal year and to make such recommendations with respect thereto as shall be deemed appropriate.

II. To ascertain and report the amounts of all unexpended balances of appropriations theretofore made and to make such recommendations to the legislature as shall be deemed appropriate for the disposition thereof.

From the foregoing analysis it will be seen that the personnel and the duties are partly executive and partly legislative. Not only is the plan itself one which tends to confuse rather than to define responsibility, but the futility of such an agency for the purpose was shown the first year. The board was unable to agree; it failed to formulate definite proposals; it did not submit to the legislature a report.

In this relation it is also to be noted that at the time this committee was created, there were two other agencies on which had been conferred powers similar in character, namely, the controller, and the commissioner of efficiency and economy. For example, the latter officer was given the following powers:

1

1. To make a careful and thorough study of each office. 2. To examine the accounts and methods of business accounting and administration of the several offices.

3. To prescribe forms for the submission of departmental estimates.

4. To examine such statements and to make such recommendations as in the opinion of the commissioner would contribute to promote efficiency and economy in the administration of the state's business.

Pursuant to the powers which were given to the commissioner of efficiency and economy and to the controller, each of them made a report to the legislature with recommendations bearing on next year's finances. However, the controller confined his attention largely to the discussion of proposals for

1 An act to provide efficiency and economy in the public service and to create a department of efficiency and economy.-Laws of 1913, ch. 280.

1aising revenues, and the commissioner of efficiency and econcmy confined his report largely to recommendations with respect to the appropriations.

Budget-Making Essentially an Executive Function

Mention has already been made of the practical reason for having the executive or administrative branch of the government prepare and submit an annual statement of affairs, with proposals for the consideration of the legislature. There is another and still more vital reason for making the chief executive the one to prepare and submit these proposals. This reason relates to the second essential of a budget, namely, that the budget-making officer should be one who may be held responsible to the electorate. The governor is the only officer chosen by a state-wide constituency on whom this important function may devolve. Various other officers have been required to perform this function for state government, but to little purpose. Even though other officers may be elected at large, they have little or no responsibility for the business to be reported and proposed. The governor is the head of the administration; he can be made responsible only by requiring him to submit to the legislature a definite financial plan or program, with recommendations as to what shall be undertaken by the state. But the requirement that the chief executive shall make and submit a budget is not all that is necessary to define responsibility. The proposals must stand on their own merits. If every member of the legislature is permitted to come in and tinker with the plan before adoption, all responsibility is destroyed. If it will not stand criticism, then the executive should be required to amend it so that it will still be his plan, and if the executive is not able or willing to submit a plan which will be approved, then some method must be provided for getting the issues before the electorate. This can be done in any one or several of these ways: (1) by giving to the executive the power to prorogue; (2) by giving to the legislature the power to call an election; (3) by a provision in the constitution authorizing the administration to run on the basis of previous appropriation until the next elec

tion; or (4) by giving to the electorate a right to recall the governor and the legislature.

A Specialized Staff an Essential

In nine states constitutional provision has been made requiring the governor "to present estimates, at the commencement of the session, to the legislature of the amount of money required to be raised by taxation for all state purposes." 1 These provisions, however, have failed in part at least to fulfil their purpose for lack of an effective staff agency by means of which the executive may inquire into working conditions, keep himself informed and formulate wellconsidered plans for the future. In fact, it may be said that government in this country has differed essentially from governments abroad, in that we have almost wholly disregarded the "staff" side of our political organization.

As time goes on, as our public institutions have become more complex, executive officers have had an increasing load of responsibilities placed upon them by law with no added means provided for their discharge. The result is that from the first day of official life they have found that they were slaves to an official grind which left little or no opportunity for planning or for the consideration of plans. In public, as well as in private business, there has been an increasing need for the development of a "staff," an agency which will be free from the routine of administration, one which may devote itself to inquiry and to the preparation of plans; to the consideration of results; to the making of recommendations; and to advising with executive officers on matters that are before them for decision.

The primary purpose of a budget is institutional planning. An institutional plan must necessarily be based on consideration of the details of work-plans. Each service to be performed, each improvement to be made, must be taken up with a view to determining what are the needs to be met and what are the requirements in order to meet these needs. There

1 Frederick J. Stimson, Federal and State Constitutions of the United States, pp. 242-3.